Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

169. Letter From President Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower¹

Taipei, April 16, 1956.

Dear Mr. President: During Secretary Dulles’ brief visit here last month, I had the pleasure of reviewing with him many of the problems that concern our two countries. I was particularly happy to learn from him of the remarkable restoration to health you had achieved to the blessing of the free world.

Mr. Dulles’ recent tour through Southeast Asia and Far East did much to enhance the prestige and strengthen the leadership of the United States in these parts of the world. Ever since the Summit Conference² last July and particularly as a result of the protracted talks between the representative of the United States and that of the Chinese Communists at Geneva, there has been felt an acute sense of uneasiness and bewilderment among the free peoples of Asia. Certain Asian countries, heretofore anti-Communist in their general outlook, have begun to waver and to veer toward neutralism. Mr. Dulles was able during his visit to reaffirm to the Asian leaders the determination of the United States to continue to oppose Communist aggression and to dissipate any fear that the United States itself might be contemplating a shift of policy toward Soviet Russia and Communist China. I was especially impressed by the Secretary’s account of the firm stand you took at your meeting with Anthony Eden early this year against the admission of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations. Needless to say, I am most appreciative of the continued support you give to my Government in this and other respects.

Secretary Dulles and I were in general agreement on a number of questions discussed. We shared the view, for instance, that the new posture assumed by Soviet Russia during and since the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party represented no change in basic policy, but new tactics designed for a more effective Communist expansion. In fact, it should be regarded as a more cunning, therefore more dangerous, phase of Russia’s cold war tactics. Soviet Russia’s policy remains the conquest of the world by Communism.

I have followed with understanding the various measures you have adopted in meeting the changing tactics of Soviet aggression. I am equally aware, however, of the mounting crisis besetting the free world in the face of Russia’s new offensive. You will, perhaps, agree with me that to combat Communist aggression more effectively at this crucial moment, it would be necessary for us to act in unity and concert. For this reason, a frank and periodic exchange of views between allies would be helpful. The shortness of Mr. Dulles’ visit here made our discussions inevitably brief. I have since asked my Foreign Minister to submit to Secretary Dulles, for your Government’s consideration, two memoranda,³ one on Asian regional economic development and the other on the question of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Here in these pages, I propose to set forth at some length some of my views on American policy in Asia in general— views that are based on my personal observations of the workings of international Communism during the past thirty years.

Factors in Contemporary Asian Outlook

The United States of America occupies a unique position in the contemporary history of Asia. As a result of her efforts and her influence, over 600,000,000 people in various parts of Asia have gained freedom and independence since the close of World War II. More than anything else, it is American political philosophy and practice that have made the great majority of the 1,200,000,000 people of Asia ardent friends of the United States. For the same reason, the entire free world looks to the United States for leadership. The aspirations of the Asian people manifested in their unceasing struggle for freedom and independence grow for the most part out of the influence of American concepts of personal liberty and social justice. The Asians know that the United States have no colonial designs. The granting of independence to the Philippines was a convincing example.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, himself a great admirer of American ideals and institutions, advocated close collaboration with the United States in China’a international relations long before the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911. The impact of American influence on China since Dr. Sun’s time had steadily gathered strength until the Communist occupation of the Chinese mainland. The loss of the Chinese mainland to Communism was, indeed, a shattering blow to the cause of freedom not only in China but in Asia as a whole. This is borne out by subsequent Communist aggression in Korea and Vietnam and the increasingly widespread infiltration and subversion in other Asian countries. Today, whether or not freedom in Asia could be made secure depends to a very large extent on the success or failure of China’s effort to regain her freedom by overthrowing the Communist regime.

Political independence and territorial integrity remain the predominant aspiration of the Asian people today. The fact that many of the Asian countries have grown out of their colonial status does not remove their deep-seated resentment against Western colonialism. Any action taken by Western powers in Asia is looked upon with suspicion regardless [of] its true motive. This is true particularly in matters of collective security and foreign aid. Often groundless, such suspicion becomes an important political factor in Asia. It easily lends itself to Communist propaganda which, by exploiting anti-colonialism, seeks to turn the Asian people against the West, including the United States. It blinds the Asian people to the obvious fact that international Communism represents another form of colonialism, even more insidious. To cope with this psychological and emotional factor, the United States as the leader of the free world must try to convince the Asians that, in seeking their cooperation and offering them aid in any scheme of mutual security, her only purpose is to help the Asian countries safeguard their newly gained freedom and independence in the face of the threat of Communist colonialism. Thus, it would also be advisable for the United States to avoid, whenever possible, identifying its policy with colonial powers such as Great Britain and France in its dealing with Asian nations. American leadership, unfettered and unequivocal, must be clearly demonstrated.

There exists in Asia today another equally important political factor. In such countries as Korea, Vietnam and China where Communists have through aggression and conspiracy come into actual control of considerable parts of their territories, the over-riding aspiration of the people, whether behind or outside the Iron Curtain, is reunification under the banner of freedom and democracy. Such aspiration, however, has not been given due regard by the free world. While this popular aspiration has received considerable impetus from American military and economic aid, the general feeling is that its early fulfillment does not at present have the support of the United States. The people of these countries are even tempted to construe American aid as designed to perpetuate the status quo. To those suffering behind the Iron Curtain, this is perhaps even more disheartening. Conditioned as they are by Communist propaganda, they may give up all hope for their eventual liberation. I have suggested to Secretary Dulles that a close study should be made to better tailor the United States foreign aid programs to the demands of the political aspirations of the Asian people. Admittedly, it involves difficulties. But, as the force of Communist aggression continues to gain ground in Asia, the need for a more positive approach to the entire question of United States support for anti-Communist countries cannot be over-emphasized.

Basic Soviet Tactics and Countermeasures

Soviet Russia’s policy of world conquest has been evident ever since the October Revolution in 1917. The Soviet government on the one hand has sought to secure its totalitarian rule at home through an economy geared to military expansion. On the other, it has relentlessly pursued the goal of world revolution through the operation of the Communist Internationale. While its tactics may vary to accommodate the conditions of a given scene of operation and in accordance with its own strength at a given time, its final aim at world conquest has always remained unchanged and undiminished.

Viewing the Soviet practice against the Leninist dogma of world revolution, I believe the basic Communist policy of aggression consists of three things. First of all, it is the guiding principle in Soviet strategy that, unless its own territory is attacked or subject to imminent threat of attack, Soviet Russia would invariably avoid direct participation in any war and seek to preserve its own strength. But it would not hesitate to exploit any conflict and contradiction between other countries by means short of engaging itself in war.

Secondly, Soviet Russia relies for the success of its aggressive designs principally upon the use of indirect force. On the one hand, it constantly resorts to infiltration and subversion to manufacture internal revolution in other countries. Such activities are usually carried out under the guise of political collaboration, economic cooperation or cultural and technical exchange. When the time is ripe, arms are provided to national Communist parties which would then grab political control with force and turn the countries into Soviet satellites. On the other hand, Soviet Russia utilizes every friction and conflict between the free nations to create and enlarge dissensions and to destroy the unity of the free world. The current Soviet peace offensive featuring the so-called diplomacy of smiles is but an intensification of such divisive tactics. In the Communist calculation, the practice of such tactics is far more important to the achieving of world revolution than the actual use of military force.

The third element in the basic Soviet policy is the ceaseless preparation for war. Russia’s avoidance of direct use of force and its indirect methods of subversion and infiltration by no means contradict the policy of preparing for war. On the contrary, they serve as its effective cover, enabling the Soviet Government to carry out its militarized economic programs, to expand the war machine and to prepare for total mobilization. Such war preparation in turn provides an effective backing for further aggression short of war. It is designed also to cause confusion and weariness in the free world, to place the free nations on the defensive in armament race and to lead them astray both in concepts of strategy and in action. Thus, at the proper moment and after the indirect tactic of aggression has done its part, Soviet Russia would then be in a position to deliver the fatal blow on the free world.

For more than thirty years, especially since the end of World War II, Soviet Russia has been able to put to the most effective use, separately or combinedly, the above three phases of its basic policy. It exploits the weaknesses in the armour of the free world and devises such methods as required by any given set of circumstances. Without shedding its own blood, Soviet Russia has succeeded in the past decade in placing more than 600,000,000 people behind the Iron Curtain and the entire free world in a most precarious position.

The recent decision by the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party to encourage neutralism and to support the United Front movement is adopted as a counter action against the policy of collective self-defense under the United States leadership and represents the combination of the three kinds of tactics mentioned above. Assured that the United States and the free world as a whole would not initiate a war against it, Soviet Russia always enjoys freedom of action on the brink of war. Behind the peace offensive, the Russian Government is permitted to go all out in developing nuclear as well as conventional arms, in carrying out the 6th Five-Year Plan and in forging Russia and Communist China into one single war machine integrating the Eurasian landmass. In so doing, Russia strives to achieve and retain a military superiority over the United States so as to secure the benefit of initiative in the next world war when it eventually comes. An important part of the Soviet peace offensive is the effort to create and exploit differences among the free nations, so as to weaken the enemy even before the war actually begins. Its instigation of extremist activities among nationalists and anti-colonialists in North Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East and its brazen act of providing weapons for the armed conflict between Israel and the Arab countries are only more glaring examples.

Opinion has been divided as to how best to deal with the increasingly critical situation resultant from the Russian policy of aggression. The free world could wait for Russia to start another global war after the completion of the Soviet war preparations and then, and only then, strike back in force and resort to nuclear retaliation, if necessary. This policy, currently adhered to by the Western powers, appears to accept the inevitability of World War III. As an alternative, the free world may continue to hope for the day when Russia would of its own accord abandon the objective of world conquest. This line of thought seems to have gathered strength particularly since the advent of the “co-existence” propaganda. Certainly, this is but an illusion. The true alternative, I believe, lies in the gaining of the initiative by the free world, not to precipitate war, but to create confusion and unrest within the Communist camp and to induce revolution in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet Russia could thus be deprived of its capabilities not only of starting a world war, but of furthering its aggression piecemeal as it has done successfully thus far. Herein lies the only path to prevent a general world war.

As the leader of the free nations, the United States is the main and final target of the Communist world revolution. Which of the measures mentioned above should the free world adopt for the defeat of the forces of aggression at this crucial moment is necessarily the responsibility of the United States and, to a considerable extent, of your good self.

To Induce Revolution in Communist Camp

As stated above, it is my firm belief that to induce anti-Communist revolution behind the Iron Curtain is to prevent another global holocaust. But, with the captive populations under the Communist rule so tightly controlled and effectively intimidated as they are, it would be less than realistic to anticipate such uprisings to take place entirely on their own. A program of action to provide stimulus for such revolution from without the Iron Curtain is necessary if the monstrous rule of Communism is ever to be overthrown. Such initiative on the part of the free world is not meant, nor expected, to precipitate a world war. The program, in its essence, involves only limited military action in selected areas to puncture the Iron Curtain, to provide the captive people with moral support and material aid, to render their revolt possible and to put the Communist forces on the defensive.

So far as Asia is concerned, it is axiomatic that the Communist menace cannot be uprooted without overthrowing the Chinese puppet regime. For the Communist control of the Chinese mainland is the fountainhead of aggression in all Asia. It would be futile to attempt to prevent further Communist aggression in Asia by a policy of containment alone. In addition to intensifying the political and economic pressure on the Chinese Communist regime from all angles, the free world must seek to reduce the effectiveness of Communist internal control by creating unrest on the mainland of China. Particularly, free China must be given the opportunity to achieve a breakthrough of the Iron Curtain at the earliest possible moment. Once the forces of free China have established beachheads on the coast of the mainland, there is every possibility that the population throughout the country will rise in revolt. Caught between external pressure and internal revolt, the Communists could be forced into the most difficult position. Only thus, can their defeat be precipitated and our victory assured.

It may be argued that such a program of action would invite armed intervention by Soviet Russia, thus making a world war almost a certainty. As has been pointed out, the over-riding factor in the Russian policy today is the necessity to gain time. Until the current Five-Year Plan is substantially carried out and until its nuclear armament programs achieve a degree of success comparable or even superior to that of the United States, Soviet Russia will not and cannot involve itself in a large-scale war with the free world. Its present propaganda campaign for peaceful coexistence confirms this estimate. Even if Soviet Russia should choose to intervene in a war in China, it would confine its direct military action to north of the Yellow River as a matter of geo-political considerations.

The successful expansion of the Communist sphere of influence in Asia is attributable, among other things, to the series of limited local wars engineered by the Communists. The meaning of the lesson is clear. If Communist aggression is to be actively defeated, the free world must also be ready to use the same tactics, that is, to gain the initiative and to take the calculated risk of limited local actions. In the proposed action by the forces of free China on the southern coast of the mainland, United States logistical support would undoubtedly be called for. But that will be all. Direct participation in actual combat by United States forces is not necessary. In fact, such participation is even undesirable from free China’s point of view as it would provide the Communists with material for propaganda detrimental to our cause.

The Communist regime, for the purpose of tightening its control over the mainland, is at present enforcing with full force various totalitarian programs, such as collectivization of farms, expropriation of industrial and business enterprises and the so-called reformation of intellectuals. If these programs are allowed to succeed, any vestige of private ownership of land or private enterprise would be completely wiped out on the Chinese mainland in another three or four years and so would the remnants of what we know as liberal intellectual elements. The task of overthrowing the Communist regime would thus become much harder, though not infeasible. It is evident that the proposed scheme of action to carry the fight onto the beaches of the mainland must be put into force as early as possible, if the Chinese Communists are not to succeed, as Russia has, in reducing all human and material resources to a monolithic machine of war.

The Peiping regime is at present plagued with extreme social and economic difficulties inherent in its totalitarian programs. I feel this would be the opportune time to turn our thoughts to a plan of action. If the execution of the proposed plan is delayed too long, the probability of its bringing about a global conflict could become greater. Moreover, the prolonged period of indecision would also enable the Communists to induce and intimidate more Asian countries, especially the neutralists, into joining their camp. This would not only seriously impair the prestige of American leadership, but all what has been achieved by the United States in the cause of freedom in Asia would be completely nullified.

It is my considered opinion that the proposed measures, in spite of the limited risks involved, are in the long run the surest and safest way to defeat Communist aggression in Asia and to prevent another world war. Once the cause of freedom begins to regain ground on the Chinese mainland under the impact of a sustained action by the forces of free China, the constant Communist threat to the Republics of Korea and Vietnam will be automatically removed. The possibility of the entire Southeast Asia and even the Middle East being lost to Communist aggression would also be substantially reduced.

There are no basic differences between our two countries in our policy towards major world problems. We are bound by common interest and by our common desire for a lasting peace based on justice and freedom. The program of action I have here outlined is not intended to precipitate another world war. On the contrary, it represents my idea of how we can best deter Communist war preparation and thus prevent another world war. I am not unaware that American policy at this stage cannot entertain any proposal of action that may lead to war. As the leader of the free world, the United States is called upon to weigh matters on a global scale. But I believe that frequent exchange of views, be they divergent at times, could be most helpful and even necessary in maintaining unity of purpose and action. I have given you what may be called an Asian appraisal of the present Asian situation. While I hope you would give my views your consideration and, at the proper time, your active support, I wish to reassure you that my Government will continue to honor its commitments with reference to joint action in this area.

With my best wishes for your continued success,

Sincerely yours,

Chiang Kai-Shek⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Chiang Kai-shek Correspondence. Personal and Confidential. The letter was translated in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China. The original letter and translated copy were transmitted to the Department as enclosures to despatch 596 from Taipei, April 23. (Ibid., Central Files, 793.11/4–2356)
2. Reference is to the Geneva Conference of Heads of Governments, July 18–23, 1955.
3. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 166.
4. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.