Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

168. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 100–4–56

Washington, April 10, 1956.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CERTAIN OFFSHORE ISLANDS²

1. In NIE 13–56³ we estimated that:

While the Chinese Communists probably do not intend to attack Taiwan so long as the US maintains its commitments to the Nationalists, they will almost certainly conduct probing operations against the offshore islands. If the Chinese became convinced that the US would not assist in the defense of these islands with its own forces, they probably would attempt to seize them. Should Peiping’s forces successfully occupy the Nationalist-held offshore islands without incurring US military retaliation, there would be an intensification of the campaign to obtain Taiwan.

We believe that this estimate is still valid. The Chinese Communists almost certainly continue to have as an objective the establishment of control over the offshore islands and have the capability of launching an attack against any of the islands with little or no warning.

2. The Chinese Communists probably believe that a major frontal attack on the main islands of the Quemoy and Matsu group would meet stiff resistance, might provoke US intervention, and would prejudice Peiping’s “peaceful” pose elsewhere. However, in the case of such lightly-held and strategically less important islands as the Wuchius and Yinshans, the Chinese Communists probably estimate that the chances of US intervention would be slight and that an attack would involve considerably less damage to their “peaceful” pose.

3. In these circumstances we consider the chances to be about even that the Chinese Communists will attempt to seize some of the minor offshore islands during the next six months or so. However, if during this period the Chinese Communists should come to estimate they are achieving significant progress by other means toward their announced foreign policy objectives, we believe that the chances of such action would be reduced.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. The procedures involved in the production and distribution of SNIEs were those that applied to NIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff”. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on April 10, 1956, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.
3. Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960, published 5 January 1956. [Footnote in the source text. For a summary of NIE 13–56, see Document 126.]