170. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, April 16, 19561
PARTICIPANTS
- President Chiang Kai-shek
- Madame Chiang
- Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh
- Ambassador K. L. Rankin
Note: Since the visit to Taipei of the Secretary of State and his party March 16–17, 1956, I have been awaiting a suitable occasion to review once more with President Chiang the question of offensive military operations against the communist-held China Mainland. For some time the President has been considering the despatch of a letter to President Eisenhower touching on this subject, and a preliminary English translation of this letter2 was handed to me today by the Foreign Minister. The occasion seemed appropriate, and this afternoon I took an hour and a half of the President’s time, including interpretation of my remarks by the Foreign Minister, to set forth some personal views.
The Foreign Minister rode with me to the President’s house. I told him that I planned to talk in general terms and to avoid military details. I did not mind telling the Foreign Minister, however, that I disagreed with President Chiang’s contention (in his letter to President Eisenhower) that the United States could provide the necessary logistic support for a Free Chinese landing on the Mainland without becoming directly involved in actual combat. Only if the Red Chinese forces were heavily engaged elsewhere would it seem feasible to affect any such landing in South China. Under those conditions the armies of Free China might well be able to maintain an important beachhead, at least. But they would require very large scale logistic support from the United States. This, in turn, would necessitate American naval and air support for convoys, landing of supplies, etc, [Page 350] etc. It would tax to the limit the present resources of our Navy and Air Force in the Pacific. And these forces would almost inevitably be involved in combat with the Red Chinese Air Force within the first 24 hours. However, I saw no purpose in arguing this point with President Chiang. As to direct Soviet participation under such circumstances, he probably was right in considering it unlikely. But the Soviets had various ways of giving indirect assistance, as we well knew.
After the usual pleasantries, President Chiang asked about our Chiefs of Mission Conference in Tokyo and my most recent call on the Governor of Hong Kong. I replied in general terms and then referred to the translation of his letter to President Eisenhower which I had just seen.
I remarked that I agreed with nearly everything he said in his letter. There was one point, however, with which I believed President Eisenhower would take issue. This was the rather urgent proposal that Free China be assisted in establishing beachheads on the Mainland before Chinese Communist strength could be fully consolidated. I noted that statements had been made from time to time that the United States would never undertake or support offensive war. “Never” is a long time and these statements tended to over-simplify, but a fair picture of what the United States would do, under given circumstances, could be obtained by referring to history.
Emphasizing that my remarks would represent simply a personal interpretation, I said that the present world situation was somewhat like that obtaining prior to America’s entry into World Wars I and II. In 1916 peace sentiment in the United States was very strong, and Woodrow Wilson was reelected to “keep us out of war”. Yet a few months later we declared war on Germany and took offensive action. What had happened in the meantime? Unrestricted submarine warfare was the immediate factor, particularly in its effect on American public opinion. But on some unspecified date President Wilson evidently decided that the United States could not permit the Western Allies to go down in defeat. This was not simply altruistic but a practical realization of our own danger.
The United States presumably could have postponed its entry into World War I for some time—perhaps indefinitely—by appeasement in one form or another. When it seemed that the Allies were liable to lose, however, Wilson determined to force the issue by taking a strong line, knowing full well that this probably would bring us into war. German actions brought American public opinion behind the President and war was declared in April 1917.
I recalled the years immediately preceding World War II. One day I was lunching at the Capitol with Senators Connally and Pope. The neutrality legislation was being discussed, and Connally was [Page 351] questioning the wisdom of it. Pope seemed equally uncertain of its value as a means of avoiding war, but he emphasized that the American people wanted peace. The legislation in question was intended to keep us out of war; therefore he favored it. President Roosevelt’s statements to the effect that no American boys Would be sent to fight overseas were a further reflection of American opinion not long afterward.
The fall of France in the spring of 1940 was a great shock to the United States. Perhaps at this time Roosevelt decided, as Wilson had done before him, that the Western Allies faced ultimate defeat without our active participation in the war, and that in our own best interest we could not permit them to be lost. He also determined to force the issue by adopting a strong policy, both against Germany and its partner in crime, Japan. Again, the United States undoubtedly could have bought peace for itself, with appeasement, for an indefinite further period of time. We refused to do this, and our firm policy brought the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. American public opinion was already largely in support of President Roosevelt and this sneak attack made it all but unanimous.
I had remarked earlier that the present world situation was somewhat like that in 1916–1917 and in 1940–1941. But I would mention three significant differences. First, there was today no large scale fighting in progress. Second, there was the existence of nuclear weapons, which probably served as a deterrent to any country which might consider starting an open conflict. Third, the United States today had great military strength to back up its firm policy of opposition to aggressors—something which had been notably lacking prior to World Wars I and II.
It was possible, of course, that a situation would develop in which President Eisenhower might come to a decision like those eventually arrived at by President Wilson and President Roosevelt: to force the issue with the enemy to an extent liable to bring the United States into war. First, he would have to decide that this was necessary. Second, he would have to obtain the support of American public opinion for such a policy. As matters stood today, I believed that President Eisenhower felt there was a reasonable chance to win the cold war without becoming involved in another hot one. I hoped so too. It seemed to me that the chances of avoiding at least a small-scale war in the Far East were no better than 50–50, but even that prospect made it worth while to exert our best efforts in the interest of preserving peace. With present American military strength to support a firm policy, there was at least a possibility of forcing the enemy to back down without fighting a war. We must try it in any case.
[Page 352]Coming back to the problems of Free China, I assured the President that we understood and sympathized with the objective of liberating his country from the Red yoke. We realized that this was a precept for Free China; for us it was at least an aspiration. For him it was an essential article of political faith which we could not ask him to give up. But, under present circumstances, it would be no less difficult for President Eisenhower to support offensive action against Mainland China than for him (President Chiang) to disavow his aim to restore China’s freedom.
At this point the President assured me that he did not intend to take offensive action against the mainland except under favorable circumstances. He was simply proposing that President Eisenhower consider the matter. In the election campaign of 1952 much had been said about liberating the countries which had been conquered by the communists. After President Eisenhower’s reelection this year would be a good time to review the question, President Chiang observed. I remarked that it was one thing to favor and hope for liberation and another to bring it about. I felt sure that President Eisenhower shared his desire to see China liberated. But under present conditions perhaps “active containment” or “competitive coexistence” would be about the best we could do.
I went on by saying it seemed to me that we were coming along rather well here in Free China. If our Congress appropriated what had been requested for FY 57, sufficient funds would be available to complete the initial equipment of the Chinese Armed Forces as foreseen in 1950–51. But actual deliveries would take at least two years, during which the effectivness of the forces would increase greatly. On the economic side much progress was being made. For example, in a comparatively short time the chemical fertilizer industry, which we had been helping, would be producing sufficiently to save US $20 million yearly in foreign exchange. Military and economic strength provided the base for free China’s political program. The President occupied a unique position as the unrivaled leader of all anti-communist Chinese. Whether the future offered war or peace, the practical preparations were the same: building Free China’s military, economic and political strength. I thought that the next couple of years would offer great opportunities, of which we should be prepared to take advantage when they arose. To succeed, Free China must be ready to swim with the tide when it is favorable.
Note: After taking our leave of President Chiang, Foreign Minister Yeh complimented me on my presentation and indicated full agreement with my views. He also invited my attention to a sentence in the last paragraph of the President’s letter, which had been inserted at his suggestion, assuring President Eisenhower that he would continue to abide by the commitment to joint action.