Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

126. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–56

Washington, 5 January 1956.

CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960²

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To estimate: (a) the political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of Communist China; (b) Sino-Soviet relations; and (c) Chinese Communist courses of action through 1960.

Conclusions

1. The Chinese Communists have firmly established their control throughout mainland China, and are energetically attempting to reorganize economic and social institutions and build military power along the lines of the Soviet model. With Soviet help, the armed forces have been greatly strengthened and to a large extent modernized, and economic output has for the most part reached or surpassed previous peaks. As a result of its achievements and growing power, Communist China’s prestige and influence in Asia have greatly increased. (Paras. 10–12)

2. The Chinese Communist regime is determined to convert its primarily agricultural economy into an industrialized Soviet-style state. To this end it has scheduled large investments over the next few years and, to mobilize resources for the program, has taken measures to restrain consumption and to step up its program for socializing agriculture. In pursuit of its goals, the government will encounter serious problems in the lack of trained personnel, in peasant resistance to government control, and in growing apathy or opposition among the people to the regime’s austerity measures. Moreover, as Peiping confronts these problems and attempts to deal with the difficulties of socialization, shifts in the influence of leaders may occur and purges may be expected, especially at lower levels. However, we believe that Peiping’s control apparatus will be adequate to maintain the stability of the regime. (Paras. 29–30, 33–34, 45, 94)

3. We estimate that by 1957 the Chinese Communists will attain many of the goals of their first Five Year Plan, which emphasizes heavy industry, though there will be shortfalls in steel, pig iron, trucks, petroleum products, and food crops. (See table and note on page 12.)³ They will probably not be able to develop certain of their planned capacities. The gross value of industrial output will probably increase about 75 percent during the Plan period as against the goal of 98 percent. By 1960 the Chinese Communist industrial base, which in 1952 was less than one-third that of Japan and produced only a limited range of manufactured goods, will have greatly expanded, though production in key industries will still be well below that of Japan in 1954. Communist China will still require considerable Bloc assistance to meet its economic needs. We believe that agricultural output will increase by about 10 percent instead of the 23 percent planned by the Chinese Communists but that this will not necessarily affect their industrial goals. However, should agricultural output fail to make this limited increase, industrial goals will almost certainly be adversely affected. (Paras. 42, 59, 92, and Chart II, page 9.)⁴

4. Communist China, with extensive Soviet aid, will have further strengthened and modernized its armed forces by 1960. In the absence of extensive US counteraction, Peiping will retain the capability to overrun South Korea, Taiwan, and mainland Southeast Asia. However, Communist China will still suffer from military weaknesses, particularly air defense deficiencies and lack of an adequate indigenous armaments base. We have no evidence that Communist China possesses any nuclear weapons, and it has only a primitive nuclear research capability. However, if the USSR were to provide the necessary equipment and technicians, the Chinese Communists could in a short time achieve the capability to use nuclear weapons. (Paras. 91, 93)

5. The relationship between Communist China and the USSR has become one of an alliance bound together not only by ideological ties, but by common hostility to the US, military interdependence, and the mutual advantages of concerted diplomatic and “revolutionary” activities. Peiping’s military and economic dependence on the USSR will cause it to continue to give Moscow’s views great weight on major questions of global policy. However, Peiping’s tactical position in many areas gives it considerable potential for influencing Moscow. Although potential conflicts of interest exist, we believe that common objectives and mutual advantage, and Peiping’s continuing dependence on Moscow, will serve to prevent any significant weakening of Sino-Soviet ties at least through 1960. (Paras. 95, 98–100, 102–103)

6. Chinese Communist foreign policy will continue to be focused on gaining control of Taiwan, reducing Western (and especially US) influence in Asia, and extending their own in the area. Peiping will continue to pursue policies emphasizing political rather than military action as long as its objectives are acceptably served by this means. The major factor in this consideration will be their estimate of the risk of US military counteraction; thus Communist China will probably emphasize political action over the next two or three years. The Communists may again resort to military action at any time they estimate that the benefits to be obtained will outweigh the military consequences of such action. In behalf of the joint Sino-Soviet policy of “competitive coexistence with the capitalist bloc,” Peiping is likely to play up to neutralist and nationalist sentiment in Asia, manipulate the Indochina and Taiwan issues to divide the West, and exploit such vulnerable situations as ROK-Japanese and Indian-Pakistani tensions to win further Asian support for the Bloc. The Chinese Communists will probably endeavor to have their approach to international problems characterized as conciliatory and flexible, but Bloc policy will probably permit no major concessions to the West and its Asian allies. At times, in fact, Peiping will probably assert its power ostentatiously, but within the general limits of Bloc strategy, in order to reaffirm its particular claims and pretensions. (Paras. 105–106, 112– 113)

7. The Chinese Communists will probably continue their buildup in the area opposite Taiwan and the offshore islands in order to increase pressure on the US and Nationalist positions. They probably do not intend to attack Taiwan so long as the US maintains its commitments to the Nationalists, but they may expect to induce a gradual erosion of the Nationalist position. Moreover, unless Peiping comes to believe that it can obtain the offshore islands by negotiation, it will almost certainly conduct probing operations against them. If the Chinese Communists became convinced that the US would not assist in defense of the islands with its own forces, or react in strength elsewhere, they probably would attempt to seize them. Should Peiping’s forces successfully occupy the Nationalist-held offshore islands without incurring US military retaliation, there would be an intensification of the campaign to obtain Taiwan. (Para. 119)

8. Peiping will continue its efforts, in conjunction with the Hanoi regime, to expand Communist influence and control in South Vietnam by attempting to discredit and undermine the authority of the Diem government through propaganda and diplomacy. Even if the Viet Minh are delayed in extending their control over South Vietnam, Peiping will probably not encourage the Viet Minh to renew open hostilities. However, at some point Peiping probably will encourage increased Viet Minh guerrilla activity in South Vietnam. Actions beyond that phase would probably depend upon the effectiveness of Diem’s counteraction and the response of the US and the SEATO powers. (Para. 121)

9. The possibility of a Communist-initiated war in the Taiwan Straits, Vietnam, Laos, and even Korea will continue to exist. Moreover, Peiping would almost certainly react with force if Communist control of North Korea or North Vietnam were seriously threatened. It would almost certainly retaliate to any sharp increase in the level of Nationalist attacks against the mainland. (Para. 116)

Discussion

10. The basic objectives of the Chinese Communists appear to be: (a) to develop a Soviet-style state in China with a strong industrial economy and a modern military establishment; (b) to eliminate Western (and especially US) influence and power and to achieve dominance in East Asia; (c) to establish control over Taiwan and other areas which they regard as traditionally Chinese; (d) to achieve recognition as a major world power; and (e) in general, to promote the goals of international communism.

11. Since its formal establishment in Peiping in 1949, the Communist regime has shown flexibility, skill, and ruthless determination and has made significant progress toward the achievement of its goals. Its authority is firmly established and its control effective throughout the mainland area. War-torn and neglected industry and communications were largely rehabilitated by 1952, production in most important sectors has reached or surpassed prewar peaks, and socialization on the Soviet model is well advanced in all fields except agriculture and retail trade. The armed forces have made great progress in the evolution from lightly armed formations to well-organized regular units with modern Soviet equipment.

12. The regime has also greatly enhanced the influence and prestige of Communist China in Asia. Its power and ability to influence Asian developments were demonstrated in Korea and Indochina. Its stature among Asian states has been enhanced by its skillful diplomacy at Bandung and by the establishment of contact with the US on the ambassadorial level. Strong pressures have developed in the Free World for a reduction of controls on trade with Communist China and for its entry into the UN. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet alliance has given Peiping considerable strategic security and access to the material resources of the Bloc, both of which have greatly reduced Peiping’s vulnerability to non-Communist pressures.

13. However, during the period of this estimate Peiping almost certainly will not sustain the momentum of its first five years. The Chinese Communists have only recently come to grips with the basic problems involved in the creation of a socialized national economy, and these will be difficult to resolve even with the benefit of Soviet experience.

I. Domestic Problems

14. The Chinese Communists define the present stage of their internal development as “the transition to socialism.” while they are relying on Soviet experience, their tactics continue to be modified by Chinese Communist experience and by flexibility toward groups which they regard as basically hostile. Peiping has sought to utilize the party’s monopoly of power and the state’s direct control of economic key points to coerce the remaining private producers of goods and services into accepting socialist economic forms. Periods of pressure and social change have been followed by brief respites. This tactic of “tension and release” has been applied in recent years both to unnerve the populace and to destroy whatever cohesiveness and independent leadership the intellectuals, private entrepreneurs, and well-to-do peasants may have possessed.

Political Situation

15. The government of Communist China has recently been reorganized, with control further centralized in Peiping. Although the constitution of September 1954 vests formal governmental responsibility in the National Peoples’ Congress, this body is primarily a forum for publicizing already decided policy. Between the infrequent sessions of the Congress, most of its functions are exercised by its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee has nominal supervision over the State Council, which in turn directs all the central government ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, and supervises the operation of provincial and local governments and the governments of “autonomous” minority areas. (See Chart I, page 5.)

16. Party Leadership. The Chinese Communist party dominates and controls the government structure. Although we have little information on the distribution of power within the party, the supremacy of party chairman Mao Tse-tung appears absolute. Mao is Chairman of the party Politburo and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, as well as formal head of the government.

17. Mao’s position under the new constitution requires a less active role in the formal direction of governmental affairs, and important areas of influence appear to have been delegated to other leaders. Liu Shao-chi, who ranks next to Mao in the party hierarchy, seems to control the party organization; Chou En-lai, who ranks third in the Politburo, has become the dominant figure in government administration and foreign affairs; and Chen Yun seems to have the largest role in economic affairs. Although Chu Teh is a venerated military leader and Vice Chairman of the “Peoples Republic of China,” he is nearly 70, and Peng Te-huai, newly appointed as Minister of Defense, has assumed active leadership of the armed forces.

18. The first high-level party purge since 1938 took place during 1954 when Kao Kang, state planning chief and sixth-ranking member of the Politburo, and Jao Shu-shih, party organizational chief, were removed from the party and imprisoned together with a number of their associates. Kao’s death has since been announced, but Jao’s fate is unknown. Kao and Jao had both been veteran members of the Central Committee and had been the ranking party leaders in Northeast and East China respectively until 1953.

19. While the actual details of the Kao-Jao affair still remain shrouded in mystery, the chief reason for the purge was probably an effort by Kao, Jao, and their supporters to broaden their own power. Despite official denials, some differences over issues of domestic policy may have been involved. Kao and Jao may also have attempted to make common cause with some of the military leaders, but apparently with little success, since no ranking military men have yet been involved in their disgrace.

20. In any event, there is no evidence that the purges have had any lasting effect on the stability of the inner core of party leadership or its ability to control the party. Simultaneously with the purge announcement in April 1955, the party announced a new control commission to check on party discipline. As the regime confronts the problems of socialization, shifts in the influence of leaders may occur and purges may be expected, especially at lower levels.

21. The question of Mao’s successor will grow in importance since Mao is now 62 and possibly in poor health. It is doubtful if any individual in the event of Mao’s death would be in a position for some time to assume the full authority held by him, and an effort would probably be made to establish some sort of collective leadership.

22. Liu and Rockefeller would probably be in the best positions to bid for pre-eminence. Liu, second only to Mao in formal party listings, is known as a theorist whose attention has been largely focused on internal party matters. Rockefeller has had a broader range of experience and contacts and has a reputation for tactical elasticity. However, their expressed views on major policies have not been in conflict. Barring any major setbacks to the regime, the differing backgrounds of these and other leaders appear more likely to serve as complementary forces in implementing agreed policy than as causes of serious conflict.

23. Although the prestige of the army and the role of its leaders remain great, the direct role of the army in planning and policy has been steadily curtailed, particularly since the dissolution of the regional governments in 1952–1954. The newly created National Defense Council appears to be largely an advisory body less powerful than its predecessor, the People’s Revolutionary Military Council. Control of most of the internal security forces has been taken away from the armed forces and placed under the Minister of Public Security. There appears to be increasing integration of the civil and military elements of the government.

24. There is firm evidence of actual conflict between professional military leaders and the primarily political group. It is possible that there may have been some sympathy among military commanders for the alleged belief of Kao Kang that “the party was created by the army” and that those with party experience in the old revolutionary base areas should take precedence over nonmilitary leaders. However, the high party status of many military commanders gives them a vested interest in the regime, and the long established system of political officers within the army provides a constant check on the activities of military leaders. We believe that there is little prospect of differences which would seriously affect the cohesion or stability of the regime during the period of this estimate.

25. The Chinese Communist Party, with a membership of over eight million or 1.33 percent of the population, is substantially smaller in proportion to population than Communist parties in other Bloc countries. Although there is no shortage of potential members, there is a serious problem in quality and political reliability. An eight-year program of systematic political indoctrination was initiated in 1955 for some five million party members and nonparty intellectuals. Despite these efforts to improve the quality of the party, governmental efficiency will continue to be hampered by low levels of literacy and by friction between old revolutionaries and new bureaucrats.

26. Popular attitudes and support. Tight control and a series of repressive campaigns since 1951 have dissipated some of the support the regime initially enjoyed, leaving much of the populace disillusioned or disaffected. Discontent mounted during 1954 and civil disobedience at the local level increased. Official announcements allege that there were 364,604 cases of “subversion” and “economic sabotage” from February 1954 to May 1955. These activities occurred in both urban and rural areas throughout Communist China. The principal causes appear to have been local food shortages resulting from the floods and droughts of 1954, the pushing of grain collection and agricultural socialization, and the forced austerity program. Discontent seems to be particularly marked among the peasantry, and at least one open “peasant revolt” is admitted to have taken place in April 1955.

27. Communist efforts to remold the traditional Chinese social system have also met with considerable resistance. Their attempts to destroy family proprietorship and family cohesion have generated widespread resentment. The regime has slackened its efforts to enforce its marriage law, and reform of the family is now being attempted primarily by the indoctrination of youth.

28. Chinese intellectuals, many of whom have been educated in the West or exposed to Western thought, also pose a serious problem to the regime, which is still dependent on their skills. The campaign to obtain their conformity was accelerated in May 1955 when Hu Feng, a writer who pressed for greater freedom of expression, was accused of leading a vast conspiracy against the state. Abject confessions by intellectuals were published and mass meetings were organized to denounce and expunge “the remnants of Hu Feng thought” in such widely diverse fields as medicine and plant management.

29. At present, popular discontent is too sporadic and disorganized to pose a serious threat to the stability of the Peiping regime. The recent emphasis on security and the heightening of vigilance during the past year may have been partly intended to provide a rationale for continued austerity and stringent economic controls by creating an atmosphere of fear and tension. The regime now has a large and effective control system, including an internal security force of about 500,000 men in addition to the army. At the local level, a system of “security defense committees,” “urban residents’ committees,” and other mass organizations provides additional controls which extend into every street and small community. As the process of socialization progresses over the next five years, popular discontent, particularly in rural areas, is almost sure to increase. However, the regime will almost certainly be able to repress such discontent.

The Economy

[Here follow paragraphs 30–67, which discuss the Chinese domestic economy, including the Five-Year Plan and prospects for its implementation in the industrial and agricultural sectors, manpower problems, and transport facilities. The major conclusions are summarized in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.]

68. Foreign trade and Soviet assistance. Communist China is dependent on imports for essential elements of its industrial and military programs. Fifteen percent, or $2.75 billion, of capital construction expenditures under the Five Year Plan are allocated for imports of machinery and equipment, while expanding industrial output is increasing import needs for raw materials and other production requisites. However, except for grants and credits supplied by the Soviet Bloc, Communist China’s ability to obtain such goods is presently limited by its dependence on agricultural exports. Agricultural commodities accounted for about two-thirds of total Chinese Communist exports in 1954. Chinese Communist ability to trade is also adversely affected by the complete closure of the US market and by lesser restrictions maintained by other Free World countries on exports to Communist China. Finally, Bloc markets are apparently having difficulties absorbing certain Chinese Communist exports.

69. The Chinese Communists announced that their total foreign trade in 1954 amounted to the equivalent of roughly $3.4 billion. Although they claim that their foreign trade was “fundamentally in balance,” we believe there was probably an excess of imports covered by Soviet Bloc credits. While the nature of such imports and Soviet property acquired by such credits in 1954 is not known, there are indications that the total value could have been as high as $400 to $500 million.

70. Communist China’s trade became increasingly oriented toward the Bloc in 1954. Trade with the Asian and European Satellites increased significantly over 1953 levels and remained at approximately the same level with the USSR, excluding that covered by Soviet credits. Even after taking into account Satellite resales of Chinese Communist goods to non-Bloc countries, the Bloc still accounted for about three-fourths of Communist China’s trade.

71. In 1954 the value of Chinese Communist total trade with the Free World was greater than in 1952 and probably approximately the same as in 1953. However, there were sharp increases in trade with Japan and Pakistan. The recorded exports of the principal non-Communist countries to Communist China in 1954 were:

	(in US $ millions)
Hong Kong	67
Ceylon	48
Pakistan	26
West Germany	21
Japan	19
UK	18
Egypt	11
France	8
Malaya	7
India	6
Italy	5
Other	36
Total	272

The tonnage of Free World exports to Communist China has increased steadily from 497,000 tons in 1952 to 692,000 in 1953, and to 858,000 tons in 1954.

72. The Chinese Communists have stated that their foreign trade in 1954 totalled over 9 million tons. We believe that this is an incomplete figure, and that the total may have amounted to between 10 and 11 million tons. About 5.1 million tons moved by sea compared to 4.8 million tons in 1953. Almost all of Communist China’s trade with the non-Communist countries, and about 25 percent of its trade with Bloc countries, was carried by sea. The bulk of Communist China’s trade with the Bloc was carried overland.

73. To meet requirements of the Five Year Plan, the Chinese Communists propose to increase total foreign trade by 65 percent during the period, primarily through expanded exports of minerals, handicraft products, and agricultural products. It is estimated that Communist China could readily expand its exports of coking coal and iron ore (e.g., to Japan) without substantial new investment. However, Communist China may have trouble marketing increased quantities of handicraft and higher priced agricultural products to Bloc countries because there is a question of the ability of the latter to absorb such increases or profitably to re-export them. The decline of Chinese Communist exports to the Free World has stimulated Free World production and use of substitutes for some traditional Chinese Communist products.

74. Although increased trade with the Free World would almost certainly develop if present trade controls were relaxed to the level maintained with the European Bloc, such increases would probably not constitute a substantial reorientation of Chinese Communist trade. Such a relaxation of trade controls, if it included those of the US, would not greatly increase Communist China’s ability to secure commodities not now available through transshipment, but would permit an increase in exports to markets not now open and would reduce import costs on certain items. We believe that such a relaxation of controls could increase Communist China’s annual import capabilities by about $150 million, of which about two-thirds would be due to the reduction of US controls. The total of $150 million is roughly equal to about a quarter of Communist China’s imports of capital goods, including iron and steel, and about 5 to 10 percent of the adjusted value of Communist China’s capital investment program in 1955. To that extent, the buildup of Communist China’s economic and military potential could be accelerated. There would also be a reduction in internal Bloc transport costs, amounting to approximately $100 million equivalent. It is impossible for us to allocate such savings as between Communist China and the other Bloc countries. A relaxation of controls would increase flexibility in planning, procurement, and shipment. However, it probably would not result in any significant changes in Communist China’s basic foreign or domestic policies.

75. Peiping has exploited the issue of trade controls to divide the US from its allies and has charged that US insistence on controls is responsible for economic difficulties in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and other Asian countries. If controls were relaxed, Peiping would continue its propaganda campaign against the US, but would seek to expand trade contacts with other Asian states, especially Japan, and would continue to use trade as a means of penetration and trade offers as an instrument for political warfare.⁵

76. An increase in trade controls on Communist China alone would probably increase the volume of transshipped goods but would not appreciably retard Communist China’s internal development. However, if all Western countries now applying controls were to apply an embargo on Chinese imports similar to that now observed by the US, Communist China would lose markets now taking almost 20 percent of total exports. Since Bloc markets are not believed to be readily expandable, it is probable that Communist China’s import capabilities would be reduced proportionately, unless Soviet Bloc credits were increased. Such a reduction in export earnings would probably significantly retard Communist China’s internal development.

77. Soviet credits have been an important factor in helping Communist China obtain imports. The value of announced Soviet economic aid totals $430 million, made up of a $300 million credit extended during 1950–1954 for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and a $130 million credit extended in 1954. In addition, Chinese Communist budget announcements since 1950 have indicated that other Soviet credits have been given to Communist China. In 1954, the amount appears to have been $400 million. In 1955, the amount apparently was larger, with the major portion earmarked for military purchases.

Military Situation

78. The power of the Chinese Communist regime is based on the strength of its armed forces and its great reservoir of potential military manpower. Since the end of the Korean War, Communist China has strengthened and to a large extent modernized its military establishment. However, it continues to depend on the USSR for heavy armaments, complex equipment, POL, and almost all naval and air equipment.

79. Army. The Chinese Communist army consists of about 2,500,000 men organized in 115 infantry, 22 artillery, 4 cavalry, 3 armored, and 1 to 3 airborne divisions, as well as other miscellaneous units. Approximately 40 percent of army strength is located in North and Northeast China and Korea, and another 40 percent in East and Central South China, with relatively few troops in the interior. (See Map 2.)

80. Substantial improvements in organization, equipment, and training have been made since the end of the Korean War. Actual strength of most infantry divisions is estimated at 15,000 men, and division organization includes an artillery regiment of 36 field pieces. Tank regiments are believed to be organic to the army troops of 2 of the 37 armies and to 16 of the 115 infantry divisions. Standard armored division equipment includes 80 medium tanks, 8 heavy tanks, and 8 self-propelled guns. Twelve of the artillery divisions are field artillery, standard equipment of which includes 108 pieces of calibers up to 152 mm. However, the amount of equipment actually present in armored and artillery units is believed to be somewhat less than TO&E.

81. General army morale is believed to be high because of increased professionalization and ideological indoctrination as well as the privileged social status accorded the soldier. The adoption of universal conscription in July 1955 will probably increase service morale by fixing the terms of service and rationalizing induction methods. However, a significant increase in general popular disaffection, particularly among the peasants, might adversely affect the morale of many servicemen.

82. The numerical strength of the Chinese Communist army will probably not increase through 1960 unless the Chinese Communists feel themselves faced with imminent large-scale war. However, beginning in 1958, the conscription law will increase the body of trained reserves by requiring reserve duty of most of the estimated 450,000–600,000 troops to be discharged annually and an unspecified number of men under 40 with no previous service.

83. By 1960 the army is expected to have completed the process of incorporating a tank regiment and increased artillery and heavy weapons into each infantry division. Standardization of light weapons of Chinese Communist manufacture and heavy armaments of Soviet manufacture will be virtually complete.

84. Chinese Communist vulnerability to air attack has caused them to place considerable emphasis on antiaircraft defense. Most combat divisions now include antiaircraft battalions for local protection. Five antiaircraft divisions and some 19 independent antiaircraft regiments have been identified. Fire control equipment, especially radar, appears to be in short supply. With expected increases in equipment and further training during the period of this estimate, the Chinese Communists will probably develop a substantial antiaircraft capability.

85. Air Forces. Chinese Communist air (including naval air) forces have an estimated total strength of 2,270 planes (including 1,485 jets) and about 80,000 personnel. Through 1960 the principal offensive air weapon will be the jet light bomber force, which presently consists of an estimated 310 Beagles and which will probably reach approximately 590 by 1960. Although presently stationed mainly in bases near Korea and Taiwan, this bomber force could be redeployed so as to reach any target in [Southeast] Asia north of the Malay Peninsula and the southern Philippines. (See Map 2.) It is handicapped by lack of combat experience and fighter escort capability. Communist China has only 10 piston medium bombers (Bulls), and is expected to have no more than 60 by 1960. These could reach targets as far away as Guam and Singapore. It will probably not acquire its first jet medium bombers before 1960.

86. Communist China’s air defense capability lies mainly in its estimated 1,175 jet fighters, and its core of combat veteran pilots. This force is considered combat-ready under visual operating conditions. Replacement of the few remaining piston fighters with Soviet jets should be completed by mid-1956, and the development of an all-weather force will probably begin shortly thereafter. Some 570 all-weather fighters may be added to the air force by mid-1960. Total fighter strength will probably reach a peak of about 1,600 jet fighters in mid-1958. Despite difficulties in construction and supply, Communist China has greatly improved its base structure in the coastal area opposite Taiwan.

87. Navy. With the aid and technical advice of the USSR, the Chinese Communist navy has reached a present modest strength of 4 destroyers, 13 submarines, 50 patrol escorts and gunboats, 118 motor torpedo boats, 13 mining vessels, and 56 amphibious craft. A number of small Soviet vessels may recently have been delivered to the Chinese Communists along with the transfer of Port Arthur.

88. Although there are indications that the USSR may have recently helped the Chinese Communists launch an accelerated program of naval construction, the development of the navy through 1960 will probably continue to depend primarily on material received from the USSR. The Chinese Communists will continue to possess sufficient air and naval strength to control the air and sea spaces necessary for amphibious operations in the Taiwan Straits and offshore island areas provided the US does not intervene. They will develop a capability for medium range submarine operations and will probably further develop their mine warfare and surface capabilities for conducting defensive operations in coastal waters. These factors, coupled with existing air power, will probably give them during the period of this estimate a significant capability to oppose hostile forces operating in coastal waters.

89. Naval air force strength (included in paragraph 85) is 185 planes and 4,700 personnel. The development of Chinese Communist naval aviation has recently received considerable emphasis, probably reflecting a need to perform standard naval missions such as support of amphibious landings, antisubmarine patrol, convoy escort, search and rescue, reconnaissance, and mining. It is also possible that, following the Soviet pattern, the defense of certain coastal areas and bases is assigned to naval air. In any event, it is known that re-equipment of the naval air force with jet aircraft is being given high priority.

90. The Chinese Communists have sufficient conventional amphibious type ships to provide lift for 35,000 to 45,000 troops with some armor, supporting weapons, and limited transportation, or a maximum of 70,000 lightly armed infantry troops. As of mid-1955 the Chinese Communist merchant marine included 111 vessels (1,000 GRT upward) totalling 278,000 gross tons with an estimated cargo capacity of 417,000 long tons. Utilization of this shipping could provide additional lift for about 200,000 troops. However, considering the special problems of phasing, control, and protection of forces peculiar to an amphibious operation and the necessity for logistic re-supply and reinforcement lift capacity, it is estimated that a Chinese Communist initial assault force would be limited to 75,000-100,000 troops.

91. Nuclear capabilities. We have no evidence that Communist China possesses any nuclear weapons, and it has only a primitive nuclear research capability. However, if the USSR were to provide the necessary equipment and technicians, the Chinese Communists could in a short time achieve the capability to use nuclear weapons. A recent Soviet pledge to supply a 6,500 kilowatt nuclear reactor, a laboratory for handling radioactive materials, and an unspecified number of 25 Mev cyclotrons to Communist China in the next few years and to train Chinese Communist atomic scientists could, if carried out, lead to a small Chinese Communist nuclear research program by 1960. This aid appears to be of most use in such fields as medicine and biology, and additional Soviet assistance of a different nature and on a scale much larger than announced would be required to initiate a nuclear weapons or power program.

Communist China in 1960

92. Through 1960, the Chinese Communist economy, barring such unforeseen contingencies as a major war or a series of natural disasters, will probably have continued to expand, although at a lower rate than during the first Five Year Plan. The bulk of modern industry will probably be state-owned and most peasants will be in some form of cooperative. From 1952-1960 Communist China will probably have about tripled its electric power output, more than doubled its coal production, and increased the value of its machine industry some two and one-half times. However, even with these substantial increases, Communist China’s industrial base will remain small. Crude steel production probably will not be more than 5 million tons, or some 2.8 million tons below Japan’s 1954 level.⁶ Its estimated electric power output of about 21 billion KWH will be 39 billion KWH below the 1954 Japanese output. Moreover, at best the rate of increase of agricultural production will only approximate the growth of population. Under these circumstances, the regime will continue to have great difficulty in meeting its increasing investment and export requirements. Finally, continued dependence on the sources outside Communist China for a wide range of complex industrial items and a shortage of skilled technicians will complicate planned economic developments.

93. The Chinese Communists will have greatly increased their military capabilities. Against indigenous military forces, Peiping will remain capable of overrunning South Korea, Taiwan and the offshore islands, and mainland Southeast Asia. However, Communist China will still suffer from military weaknesses, particularly air defense deficiencies and lack of an adequate indigenous armaments base. Chinese Communist dependence on the USSR for vehicles, POL, and almost all complex military equipment will continue through 1960. Communist China will probably be self-sufficient only in light weapons and individual equipment.

94. The control system will be under increasing pressure. In particular, increased demands for food will conflict with the regime’s program to develop large reserves and to increase exports of foodstuffs and the acreage devoted to industrial crops. Although the regime might make some modifications of its investment program in the event of a series of bad crop years to increase the availability of consumption goods, it probably would not make major concessions. Its control mechanism will probably be adequate to enforce progress toward its economic goals, but the regime will probably have to resort to purges and to terror, particularly against the peasants. Popular support for the regime is likely to decline further among peasants and intellectuals, and the party itself may lose much of the esprit that characterized the revolutionary period.

II. Sino-Soviet Relations

95. During the past five years the relationship between Communist China and the USSR has become a concert of interest and action in which a substantial degree of mutual dependence has developed. The two allies are linked not only by ideological bonds, but by common hostility to the US, by a military interdependence involving Communist China’s manpower and strategic location and the USSR’s industrial and technical capabilities, and by the mutual advantages of concerted diplomatic and “revolutionary” activities. While we believe that policies of mutual concern are mutually determined, Peiping’s dependence on Moscow for arms, industrial resources, and technical assistance will cause it to continue to give Moscow’s views great weight on major questions of global policy. But Peiping’s tactical position in many areas probably gives it considerable potential for influencing Moscow.

96. From the beginning, the Chinese Communist regime escaped Satellite status both because of the size and remoteness of China and because the regime rose to power primarily through its own efforts. The Communist Chinese role in the Korean War gave Communist China additional bargaining strength in dealing with the USSR.

97. Since late 1950 Soviet writers have accorded Mao special honor for his contributions to the “treasury of Marxism-Leninism” in the field of strategy and tactics for revolutions in “colonial and semicolonial” countries. There were indications in the late summer of 1954 of unusual Soviet solicitousness towards the Chinese Communists in Malenkov’s public reference to the “new situation in Asia” created by the emergence of Communist China, and in the unprecedented visit to Peiping of Khrushchev and Bulganin. Communist China’s stature in the Bloc was further enhanced by Molotov’s subsequent reference in February 1955 to the “world camp of socialism and democracy” as “headed by the USSR—or more correctly said—headed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic.”

98. Traditional Sino-Russian territorial rivalries along their 1,400-mile common border are a potential source of friction between the allies. Since the 18th century, China has regarded Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia as Chinese territory. Although the Chinese Communists now appear to have accepted Soviet control of these areas, they may still be apprehensive about Soviet influence in Sin-kiang and possibly about the recent Soviet interest in developing previously neglected regions adjacent to Sinkiang and Manchuria. However, the well-publicized Soviet withdrawal from Dairen and Port Arthur indicates that the Soviet leadership has taken steps to reduce Chinese Communist sensitivity in the border areas.

99. Sino-Soviet economic relations are another area of potential friction. There have probably been disagreements over the level of Soviet aid to Communist China’s industrialization, and the Chinese Communists have almost certainly pressed for much greater aid than the USSR is willing to grant.

100. Although there is no evidence of serious friction or lack of coordination in Chinese Communist and Soviet relations with other Communist parties in Asia, there is a latent possibility of strains developing in these relations. In North Korea the Chinese Communists increased their influence during the Korean War, but Soviet-trained figures still hold the most important positions. In North Vietnam, geographic proximity has fostered Chinese Communist influence, and the volume of Chinese Communist propaganda support and projected aid exceeds that of the USSR. Chinese Communist influence on Japanese Communism may also have increased with the recent return of some Japanese Communist leaders from Communist China. The Chinese Communists apparently control the Malayan Communist Party, but their influence on the Indonesian Communist Party may be offset by long established channels leading to Moscow.

101. The intensity of the “liberate Taiwan” movement in Communist China on a number of occasions may have created apprehensions among Soviet leaders. Chinese Communist willingness since the Bandung Conference to use diplomatic tactics to further their objectives in Taiwan probably indicates that this possible difference of emphasis is not now a serious source of Sino-Soviet friction.

102. During the period of this estimate, Communist China’s power and its potential for pursuing courses of action which could conflict with Soviet interests or desires will probably increase. Communist China will probably exert an increasing influence on Asian opinion independent of that exercised by the USSR. The growth in Chinese Communist prestige might encourage some Chinese Communist leaders to attempt to extend Chinese influence over other Asian Communist parties beyond the point desired by the USSR. However, no major differences of interest in Asia seem likely to develop during the period of this estimate.

103. For a considerable time to come mutual advantage, the existence of common enemies, and a single ideology will almost certainly prevail over lesser considerations to preserve close Sino-Soviet ties which will probably continue to be relatively impervious to outside manipulation. Peiping probably believes that its alliance with the USSR prevented UN forces from broadening the Korean War and restrains the US from action against the mainland. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly feel the need for continued protection until their own power in the Far East is much further developed.

104. Therefore, at least through 1960, Peiping will almost certainly adhere to the alliance. A lessening of East-West tensions would probably not significantly affect Peiping’s estimate of the continued need for the alliance, and might ease pressure in Sino-Soviet economic and military negotiations. A heightening of tensions could create new problems for the alliance, but would strengthen Peiping’s desire for solidarity, unless the USSR proved unwilling to insure the security of the Peiping regime.

III. Probable Chinese Communist Courses of Action in Asia

105. In pursuit of its basic foreign policy aims, Peiping will, during the next five years, probably concentrate on eliminating the Nationalist government and gaining control of all Nationalist-held territory, eliminating Western (and especially US) influence and power in Asia, extending its own influence in the area, and achieving acceptance as the legitimate government of China. The Chinese Communists probably believe that time is on their side. This conviction is based on a belief both in the ultimate victory of the world Communist movement and in the power of China under strong central government. Leninist doctrine and their own interpretation of recent events have probably convinced them that flexibility and even tactical retreats will not seriously compromise their long term prospects.

The Chinese Communist Estimate of the Situation

106. The primary factor in determining the manner in which Peiping will pursue its foreign policy objectives is its estimate of probable US actions and reactions. It probably considers the ultimate US objective in Asia to be the elimination of the Chinese Communist regime, but probably estimates that the US does not intend, unprovoked, to attack Communist China within the next several years.

107. Peiping almost certainly estimates that open aggression on its part against either Taiwan or the ROK would lead to strong US counteraction, probably including action against mainland China and possibly including the use of nuclear weapons. It probably further estimates that an overt Chinese Communist attack on any other non-Communist Asian state would also entail risk of US military counteraction against the China mainland. It probably also estimates that an overt attack by the Viet Minh against any of the Indochinese states might result in at least local US military reaction, with such reaction particularly likely in the case of South Vietnam. The Chinese Communists probably also estimate that US military capabilities for the concentration and effective application of force in the areas of Korea, Taiwan, Indochina, and even the China mainland are still superior to their own. However, there almost certainly remain twilight areas in which they are uncertain as to the intention or the ability of the US to react, as in the event of attacks on the Nationalist offshore islands or intensified subversive efforts in non-Communist states.

108. Moreover, the Chinese Communists probably estimate that they have certain advantages over the US in any primarily political struggle in Asia. They almost certainly believe that the prestige of Communist China in Asia will increase along with the military and economic strength of their regime. They probably estimate that the indigenous Communist parties and, to a lesser extent, the 12,000,000 overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia provide them with unique instruments for undermining non-Communist governments. In their view differences among the non-Communist powers on Asian policy will make it difficult for the US to take effective measures against Communist expansion conducted through measures short of overt aggression. Moreover, they probably estimate that anti-colonial, neutralist, and nationalist sentiment will continue to aid their efforts to discredit US motives in Asia. They probably also estimate that American diplomacy is complicated by commitments in other areas and by external and internal political pressures which make it less flexible than their own.

109. At the same time, the Chinese Communists may recognize that serious obstacles exist to the extension of their power: (a) in most non-Communist states in Asia, nationalism is the dominant force and most leaders of these states recognize the threat of a domestic Communist movement to their independence; (b) despite occasional well-publicized offers of technical and material aid, Chinese Communist capital resources are insufficient to help these countries gratify their desires for industrial development; and (c) less importantly, in several of these same countries, the influential local Chinese community is still regarded with envy and suspicion.

110. The Chinese Communists are probably not as concerned with the present strength of SEATO as with the future possibility of an expanded and strengthened anti-Communist bloc in Asia. Their apprehensions on this score probably center on Japan, in their view the only Asian power which might significantly augment anti-Communist power in Asia during the period of this estimate. The Chinese Communists probably also view India as a rival for Asian leadership. They probably also estimate that India would resent a substantial extension of Communist influence in South and Southeast Asia and be alienated by overt Chinese Communist aggression in these areas. Peiping apparently feels that an attitude of outward respect for the positions of Japan, India, and other Asian powers will encourage their passivity and a tendency to think in terms of Asian solidarity. It appears to believe that such ostentatious maneuvers as mutual declarations of fealty to “the five principles”⁷ are likely to help allay Asian distrust of Peiping’s motives.

111. In Communist China’s view the probable basic hostility of France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and probably even the UK is unlikely to be effectively manifested because of their political and military weaknesses and, to a lesser degree, because of their desire for trade with Communist China. Chinese Communist hostility to these countries has therefore been subordinated to hostility to the US. The Chinese Communist regime probably estimates that so long as it exercises restraint toward these countries, they can be of considerable value to it, both in trade and in inducing the US to modify its policies in the Far East.

Main Lines of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

112. During the period of this estimate, Peiping will almost certainly wish to avoid serious military involvement with the US. For this reason, we believe that Peiping is unlikely to initiate open hostilities with its own forces, except perhaps against the offshore islands. Peiping probably would also be unlikely to encourage the North Koreans or the Viet Minh to undertake large-scale military action because it would probably estimate that such action could not be carried out without ultimate large-scale involvement of Communist China with the US. However, during the period Peiping will probably encourage expanded guerrilla activity in Indochina. Although Peiping will probably continue to sanction other guerrilla movements now in existence it is unlikely, at least in the early part of the period, to provide the support necessary for large-scale expansion of these activities.

113. Although the Communists may again resort to military action whenever they estimate that the benefits will outweigh the military disadvantages of such action, Peiping will continue to pursue policies emphasizing political rather than military action as long as its objectives are acceptably served by this means. The major factor in this consideration will be their estimate of the risk of US military counteraction; thus Communist China will probably emphasize political action over the next two or three years. In collaboration with the USSR, Communist China will pursue a policy of “competitive coexistence with the capitalist bloc.” The Chinese Communists will endeavor to have their approach to international problems characterized as conciliatory and flexible, but joint Sino-Soviet policy will in fact permit no major concessions to the West. Moreover, both parties may feel that the development of occasional crisis situations would weaken the diplomatic position of the US and strengthen neutralism, without seriously prejudicing their own “coexistence” posture. Communist China will also be under some pressure, more so than the USSR, to manufacture crises in its external affairs to provide a pretext for imposing new production and austerity drives at home. For these reasons, we believe that although Peiping will continue to profess support for the “five principles” there will be times when it will assert its power ostentatiously, but within the general limits of Bloc strategy, in order to reaffirm its particular claims and pretensions.

114. By 1960, if Communist China follows a course of political rather than military action, most non-Communist countries will probably have recognized Peiping and established normal economic relations with Communist China, and it will probably have been accepted into the community of nations as the major Asian power. In this situation, its position in the Sino-Soviet Bloc will have been enhanced and the Chinese Communists will probably have a greater degree of flexibility in their relationship with the Soviet Union.

115. Peiping’s diplomatic activities on behalf of the Bloc policy of “competitive coexistence” will be concentrated in Asia and the Middle East, where there is a disposition to accept Communist China as a “former victim of imperialist and capitalist oppression.” Communist China’s role in this effort will be to play up to neutralist and nationalist sentiment in Asia; to manipulate the Indochina and Taiwan issues to divide the West; and to exploit vulnerable aspects of intra-Asian relations such as ROK-Japanese and Indian-Pakistani tensions. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly continue their efforts to discredit US actions and motives throughout Asia, insisting that US policy is disguised colonialism and is directed toward a war in which “Asians will be used to fight Asians.” In particular, they will attempt to frustrate US efforts to develop a basis for military cooperation among free Asian states. Peiping will emphasize the advantages of technical and economic assistance from Communist countries as well as “mutual self-help” among underdeveloped countries. They will also seek a reduction in Western military, commercial, and other privileges in the area. Chinese Communist propaganda on these themes will seek primarily to keep anti-Communist Asians on the defensive over the issues of “colonialism” while the base for future Communist advances is strengthened. Communist China will encourage wherever possible the formation of popular-front type governments in which the Communist influence would be significant and the Chinese Communist pattern of anticolonial “people’s democracy” studied and admired. While to the US Peiping policy may appear uncompromising, to many Asian states it may appear conciliatory and flexible.

116. The possibility of a Communist-initiated war in the Taiwan Straits, Vietnam, Laos, and even Korea will continue to exist. Moreover, Peiping would almost certainly react with force if Communist control of North Korea or North Vietnam were seriously threatened. They would almost certainly retaliate to any sharp increase in the level of Nationalist attacks against the mainland.

Specific Courses of Action

117. Taiwan. Peiping is committed to the “liberation” of all Nationalist-held territory, and defines the Taiwan issue as an internal one in which foreign interference will not be tolerated. For the period of this estimate, however, Chinese Communist courses of action toward the offshore islands and Taiwan will be determined largely by their estimate of US reactions.

118. Since the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the Chinese Communists have attempted to advance their claims to Nationalist-held territories more by diplomacy than by military action. However, Peiping has emphasized that its current willingness to take over Taiwan “peacefully, if possible,” should not be interpreted as an abandonment of its basic objective. Chinese Communist efforts will be concentrated on reducing morale within the Chinese National government and within the mainland Chinese community on Taiwan, in the expectation that Nationalist leaders may ultimately be induced to negotiate with Peiping over Taiwan’s assimilation into Communist China. The Chinese Communists will also continue trying to force US agreement to a bilateral or multilateral conference, at which their object would be to induce the removal of US military protection from Taiwan.

119. The Chinese Communists will probably continue their buildup in the area opposite Taiwan and the offshore islands in order to increase pressure on the US and to weaken morale on Taiwan. While the Chinese Communists probably do not intend to attack Taiwan so long as the US maintains its commitments to the Nationalists, they will almost certainly conduct probing operations against the offshore islands. If the Chinese became convinced that the US would not assist in the defense of these islands with its own forces, they probably would attempt to seize them. Should Peiping’s forces successfully occupy the Nationalist-held offshore islands without incurring US military retaliation, there would be an intensification of the campaign to obtain Taiwan.

120. Indochina. We believe that the immediate Chinese Communist objective in Indochina was secured at Geneva when the Viet Minh were granted full control of North Vietnam. Peiping may have believed that it also received an implied commitment for the delivery of South Vietnam in July 1956, and that in any event conditions had been created which would make it difficult for the US to intervene. However, we believe that the Chinese Communists now estimate that the US would make a strong effort to frustrate an extension of Communist control to the south.

121. In conjunction with the Hanoi regime, Peiping will continue its efforts to expand Communist influence and control in South Vietnam. Through coercion, subversion, and propaganda the two Communist regimes will attempt to discredit and undermine the authority of the Diem government, and to embarrass that government and the US on the question of nationwide elections. In addition, the Chinese Communists will continue diplomatic efforts to isolate the Diem government from the Western nations and the Asian neutrals. Even if the Viet Minh are delayed in achieving a settlement, by elections or otherwise, favorable to the extension of their control over all of Vietnam, the Chinese Communists probably will not encourage the Viet Minh to renew open hostilities. However, at some point they probably will encourage increased Viet Minh guerrilla activity in South Vietnam. Their actions beyond that phase would probably depend on the effectiveness of Diem’s counteraction and the response of the US and the SEATO powers.

122. In Cambodia and Laos, the Chinese Communists will combine pressure and inducements to encourage neutralist sentiment, to weaken ties with the West, and to stimulate subversion of the free governments. We believe that if the Pathet Lao position were threatened by Royal Government action, Peiping would encourage the Viet Minh to assist the Pathet Lao to the extent necessary to preserve the Pathet position. It is less likely that the Chinese Communists will encourage the Pathet Lao to undertake aggressive military action outside of their present groupment area, at least while the International Control Commission remains in being and in the absence of greater evidence of popular support for the Pathet Lao within Laos. Should South Vietnam fall to the Viet Minh, Communist support for subversion and paramilitary operations in Laos and Cambodia would almost certainly be increased.

123. Korea. The Chinese Communists, in common with the USSR, hope to secure a withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and a reduction of US influence there and eventually to subvert the ROK. As a means of putting pressure on the US to withdraw its troops, the Bloc will probably urge new negotiations on unification and “relaxation of tensions.” To further this end, there may be additional withdrawals of Chinese Communist forces. The Communists will almost certainly refuse any settlement in Korea which endangers Communist control of North Korea or fails to offer better prospects than at present for eventual Communist control of all Korea.

124. Japan. Communist China seeks to forestall the re-emergence of Japan as a major military and political power in Asia and, in the short run, to weaken Japan’s links with the US by exploiting US-Japanese policy difference. Peiping’s tactics will probably continue to rely upon the manipulation of domestic opposition to the policies of the Japanese conservatives, the inducements of Sino-Japanese trade, and the application of direct pressures upon the Japanese government. Communist China will probably be able to increase semiofficial contact with Japan through trade and cultural missions and will probably step up its campaign to normalize relations.

125. Communist China will probably continue to support the current line of the Japanese Communist Party in avoiding acts of violence and working for a popular front. However, should any Japanese government undertake an extensive rearmament program or reverse the present policy of permitting the expansion of unofficial relations with Peiping, Communist China might publicly revert to the position that Japan is a major threat to peace and launch a campaign of threats and intimidation designed to reinforce leftist opposition within Japan.

126. India. Although Communist China almost certainly regards India as a rival, it will, at least during the next two or three years, probably seek to encourage India’s present neutralist stand, which has furthered the aims of Sino-Soviet diplomacy by bolstering neutralist sentiment generally throughout Asia and the Middle East. Thus, Communist China will stress those interests it shares with India, and will probably keep its attempts to expand its influence in the Indo-Tibetan border area just short of the point where the Indian government’s antagonism could no longer be concealed.

127. Burma. In the next two or three years it will probably be Peiping’s minimum objective to prevent Burma from abandoning its present neutral position. Beyond that, Communist China will be working to distort Burma’s neutrality, by encouraging tighter Burmese bonds with Communist nations. The threat of its military power will continue to reinforce Communist China’s diplomatic campaign emphasizing offers of friendship and peaceful cooperation. Peiping will almost certainly attempt to exploit Burma’s financial and economic problems to bring about closer Burmese-Chinese Communist ties. Moreover, the Chinese Communists will retain their capabilities for subverting the minority peoples along Burma’s eastern frontier.

128. Indonesia. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the strongest indigenous Communist party in non-Communist Asia and the Chinese Communists probably estimate that its capabilities will continue to be maximized by emphasizing a “peaceful” attitude toward the Indonesian government. Communist China will probably continue its efforts to enhance the chances of PKI participation in a national front government by itself appearing to support Indonesian nationalist objectives. Even if the PKI were excluded from the new government which will come into office in the spring of 1956, the Indonesian Communists would probably be encouraged by the Chinese Communists to continue working for a popular front primarily by penetration, propaganda, and organizational work.

129. Malaya. Communist China probably hopes, by encouraging Malayan nationalism, to force a British withdrawal from Malaya under conditions that would increase local Communist prestige. Peiping probably estimates that its capability to achieve this end is enhanced by the continued colonial status of the area, and in Singapore by the predominant overseas Chinese population. Peiping will almost certainly continue to encourage Malayan Communists to work for popular front governments, to extend control over Chinese youth and the labor movement, and to maintain their guerrilla organization.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet states that NIE 13–56 superseded NIE’s 58, 13–54, and 10–7–54. For texts of NIE 58, “Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses”, September 10, 1952; NIE 13–54, “Communist China’s Power Potential Through 1957”, June 3, 1954; and NIE 10–7–54, “Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957”, November 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, pp. 97, 445, and 930, respectively.

2. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

   “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 5 January 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.”

3. Not printed.
4. None of the charts or maps are reproduced.
5. The political effects of reducing trade controls are considered in SNIE 100–56, “Political Effects of a Relaxation of Controls on Trade with Communist China,” 17 January 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. See note to table on page 12. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The “five principles,” first subscribed to by Rockefeller and Nehru in April 1954 as the general principles governing Sino-Indian relations, were defined as “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” Although reportedly inserted at Nehru’s insistence, the principles are standard Communist cliches, closely resembling those used in Soviet treaties both with Nationalist China in 1945 and with Communist China in 1950. Since mid-1954, the principles have been major slogans of Peking diplomacy and have been subscribed to by U Nu of Burma and Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia in joint communiqués with Rockefeller as well as by Ho Chi Minh and the USSR. [Footnote in the source text.]