Office of the Historian

90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1955, 1 p.m.1

Washington, February 5, 1955, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Formosa

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Merchant
  • The British Ambassador
  • Sir Robert Scott

The British Ambassador came in at 1:00 this afternoon to deliver copies of the attached papers: (1) a record of a conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the Soviet Chargé in London on February 2,2 (2) Ambassador Hayter’s record of conversation with Mr. Molotov on February 4,3 (3) a rough translation of Mr. Molotov’s statement to the Ambassador,4 and finally an oral communication in which Ambassador Makins made certain points in connection with these texts.5

The British Ambassador also stated that the communication given by Mr. Molotov to the Indian Ambassador on February 4 was identical with that handed Ambassador Hayter with the exception of the opening paragraphs which were addressed particularly to the well-known Indian desire for peace. The British Ambassador added [Page 224] that in Hayter’s view this proposal by the Soviets is a serious one and not designed for propaganda purposes.

The Ambassador then handed to the Acting Secretary the attached message from Trevelyan in Peiping giving his analysis of the Chinese attitude regarding Formosa.6

The British Ambassador was informed that word had just been received from Formosa that Chiang Kai-shek has formally asked for assistance in evacuating the Tachens. Reference was also made to the MIG incident well off the coast of Korea this morning.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–555. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Copies of this document and its attachments were given to Dulles upon his return, along with Hoover’s February 5 memorandum, cited in footnote 6, supra.↩
  2. Headed “Record of conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires on February 2, 1955” and dated February 5. It states that Eden expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would use its influence to persuade the Chinese to go to New York and urged that the Security Council discussions should aim at stopping the fighting without prejudice to the claims of either side, adding that this would increase the possibility of adjustment of the other problems of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–255)↩
  3. Headed “Record of conversation between H.M. Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Molotov on the 4th February, 1955” and dated February 5. It summarized Molotov’s statement to Hayter (see footnote 2, Document 86) and noted comments by Molotov that he was making a similar communication to the Indian Chargé and that preliminary consultation with the Chinese Government led him to believe that they would not refuse to consider this invitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–555)↩
  4. Attached to the document cited in footnote 3 above.↩
  5. Makins’ oral communication, dated February 5, stated that it was important that no misunderstanding should arise with regard to Eden’s February 2 initiative, which had been related solely to the Security Council invitation, and had not been a proposal for a special conference. It further stated that Eden commented that although the Soviet proposal in its present form could not be acceptable, it was at least welcome that they were considering ways and means to reduce the tension. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–555)↩
  6. The message, headed “Message from Mr. Trevelyan in Peking dated Feb. 2”, stated that Peking’s basic point was that Formosa was Chinese territory and that the whole situation was therefore an internal question; this was a national issue on which no open bargaining or compromise of principles could be expected. Among the points which followed from this basic premise, the message noted, was that the Chinese would not deal with the offshore islands separately from Formosa. They regarded the U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty as the occupation of Chinese territory and would not consider the accompanying exchange of notes to be a reliable safeguard because of their doubts about American intentions. They would not feel internally secure as long as the Nationalist regime existed under American protection. (Ibid.)↩