Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

89. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, Washington, February 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m.¹

Washington, February 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Hoover
• Admiral Radford
• General Cutler
• Colonel Goodpaster

Secretary Hoover and Admiral Radford reported the details known of the incident just west of North Korea wherein two U.S. Sabre jets of a force consisting of one RB 45 and four Sabre jets shot down two of eight attacking MIG aircraft without damage to our forces.² The incident occurred over international waters in the afternoon of 5 February (Korean time). Secretary Hoover asked authority to make a public statement in the matter, and the President approved this action.³

Secretary Hoover then reviewed the efforts to have Chiang initiate his withdrawal from the Tachens before any Communist attack (which from reports might occur at any time). The President indicated he would not want to be dragged into hostilities through deliberate delay on the part of Chinese Nationalist forces. He thought we should consider whether we should inform Chiang that if he delays too long, it may not be possible for us to help in the evacuation; if we were to attempt to carry out an evacuation after an attack by the ChiComs had begun in the Tachen area, we would be close to breaking the terms of his message to Congress.

Secretary Hoover showed the President the message sent to Ambassador Aldrich last night,⁴ and Ambassador Aldrich’s reply.⁵ Mr. Hoover indicated that the U.K. seems to be trending toward a Geneva-type conference. He was inclined to think we should go through with the present effort in the UN.⁶ He pointed out that the commitment we have given to the British not to announce publicly our intent to take combat action in case the Chinese Communists attack Quemoy and Matsu in strength was linked to the effort to obtain a UN cease-fire, and that if the latter proves unsuccessful, we are no longer committed on the former. The President pointed out, however, that UK public opinion restricts the choices open to Sir Anthony Eden. Were he to take too firm a line, public opinion might reverse it through elections.

Admiral Radford stated that it may be necessary to retire our carriers to Okinawa for refueling and resupply. We might then keep them there, since this would involve only twenty-four hours delay, no longer than the ships for the evacuation would take to get up to the Tachens from Formosa.

At this point in the meeting, Telegram No. 529 from Taipei⁷ was brought in to Secretary Hoover who read it to the group. Upon request by Admiral Radford, the President confirmed that the CINCPAC had authority to proceed to implement plans at once. The President indicated that State Department should make a brief factual announcement concerning the ChiNat decision to evacuate and request for assistance of our armed forces, together with the fact that we have agreed to do so and are initiating operations.⁸ This announcement should be made at about the time Admiral Pride’s Naval units begin their movement and operations. Admiral Radford left the meeting briefly to advise Admiral Carney to have the operations initiated.

The President indicated there should be no general notification until the announcement had been made. However, Ambassador Aldrich might be informed if State considers it necessary, together with Ambassador Lodge. The President observed that the initiation of the Tachen evacuation will tend to improve the U.S. position before the world should it now become necessary to take combat action against the Chinese Communists in the Matsu or Quemoy area.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conference on Formosa. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.
2. The U.S. planes were under the U.N. Command in Korea; the attacking aircraft were North Korean. A statement issued by the Department of State on February 23, a U.N. Command statement issued on February 21, and a U.N. Command letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1955, pp. 426–429.
3. No press release on this subject was issued by the Department of State until the February 23 statement cited in footnote 2 above.
4. Document 84.
5. Document 87.
6. A memorandum of February 5 from Hoover to Secretary Dulles reported this meeting and related actions which had been taken; it describes this portion of the conversation as follows: “We discussed briefly the reported desire of the UK to undertake a Geneva type of settlement of the entire Formosa and offshore islands problem. It was the President’s preliminary reaction that such an exercise would be highly undesirable from our standpoint and it was his tentative preference to proceed with a cease-fire in the UN, even though the ChiComs would not be represented. He stipulated that this was merely his preliminary reaction and should not in any way prejudice our recommendations after your return.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–555)
7. See footnote 2, supra.
8. The announcement, issued February 5, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 1955, p. 255. It is identical to the draft announcement transmitted in Document 78, except that the phrase “has informed the U.S. Government” was substituted for “has announced” in the first sentence.