63. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 6:30 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Secretary Hoover
- Assistant Secretary Merchant
- Assistant Secretary Robertson
- Ambassador Lodge
- Mr. MacArthur
- Admiral Radford
- Colonel Goodpaster
Mr. Hoover opened by explaining to the President that he wished to bring him up to date on the situation with respect to the offshore islands and to review the understandings and commitments we had reached with Chiang and the British with respect to both our [Page 174] actions regarding the offshore islands and the action in the United Nations.
The President said that the world press and world opinion clearly differentiated between Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and the offshore islands on the other. Similarly, in the hearings before Congress there had been a differentiation between the two, and the Resolution had been based on the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, it being made clear that the U.S. would decide itself what related positions might be essential to the defense of Formosa in the light of the circumstances obtaining.
Mr. Hoover gave the President the Secretary’s testimony as set forth on page 72.2 The President said this expressed it very clearly. Admiral Radford then read to the President extracts from the Secretary’s original opening statement to the Joint Committee. Mr. Hoover observed that the Secretary’s subsequent statements in reply to questions modified the interpretation which might be placed on his original statement.
Mr. Hoover explained our commitment to the British that we would make no public statement concerning our present intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu in return for which they would support “Oracle”. At the same time, Mr. Hoover explained we had told the British that we must be free to let the Chinese Nationalists know of our present intention to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu if this were necessary.
The President intervened to say that Britain then does not expect us to say we won’t defend Quemoy and Matsu.
Mr. Hoover confirmed that Sir Roger understands that our present intent is to assist in the defense of these islands as essential to the defense of Formosa, but that we will not make any public statement to this effect since in the British view this would nullify any prospect of successful action on the New Zealand UN Resolution calling for a ceasefire.
Mr. Hoover explained that we had a message from Chiang indicating that he believed we had committed ourselves to make a public statement that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu at the same time the evacuation of the Tachens was announced. This message indicated that Chiang would not request our assistance in the evacuation of the Tachens until our position regarding Quemoy and Matsu had been clarified. Mr. Robertson explained in some detail the position the Secretary had taken with George Yeh in the various meetings [Page 175] with him, and stressed the psychological importance of how this question was handled in terms of its impact on the Chinese Nationalist morale and will to resist.
The President said we could not make a public statement specifying we would defend Quemoy and Matsu. While originally he recalled we had contemplated such a statement, we had changed our view on this as a result of further consideration. Furthermore, we should not be committed to hold these offshore islands since such a commitment could be construed as of indefinite duration and we should not tie ourselves down in what was only one incident of the great over-all struggle of freedom against Communist expansion. He went on to say that NATO and what we are trying to do in Europe is vital to our security and we must bear this constantly in mind in what we do in the Formosa area. The President said: “Our purpose in defending these areas is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores if they are threatened. It is not a permanent commitment to defend any of these offshore islands.” For example, the President was not certain that the Matsu group were as important to the defense of Formosa as Quemoy. If the present Chinese regime consolidated its power, the offshore islands might eventually fall under their control while Formosa and the Pescadores remained in the hands of the Nationalists.
The President thought we could draft a friendly message to reassure Chiang along the lines that we were pushing hard for the ratification of the Treaty, and that pending the results of the UN action on the off-shore islands we would examine and keep in touch with Chiang on all related areas under Chiang’s control so the US can assist in their defense if we believe that a situation has arisen threatening Formosa and the Pescadores. In other words, we will examine the situation continuously and keep under constant study all actions in the areas held by the Chinats and be in constant touch with him so as to see how we can assist in steps deemed by us necessary in the defense of Formosa.
The President said we must be sure we are not hooked into any agreement whereby we would have to join in the defense of Quemoy or Matsu just because they were attacked, by a battalion for example. He explained that the Chinese Communists could throw a relatively small attack against the islands which the Chinese Nationalists could repulse. The US should not be obliged to get into a war with Communist China on this basis. He said: “We must be the judge of the military situation that draws us in whether in Quemoy or elsewhere.” The President said that Admiral Stump must know we aren’t going to intervene in the defense of Quemoy or Matsu just because they are attacked, for example by a battalion or so. The President said he did not believe he had met Admiral Stump, but understood he was a good man. Admiral Radford confirmed that Stump was one [Page 176] of our ablest naval officers. The President said the conversation this evening made clear how complicated the problem was, and it was going to be necessary, but it would be difficult, to get this all across in orders to Admiral Stump.
The draft Chinese statement as amended by “it deems”3 was shown to the President by Mr. Robertson. The President said that it seemed all right.
Ambassador Lodge said there was thought that the President might send a message to the President of the Security Council of the UN, when we had reached agreement with the Chinats, announcing we were assisting in the evacuation of the Tachens. Ambassador Lodge thought this would be a good idea. The President agreed that this sounded useful and was worth considering. He said that in any such message it might be possible in some way to imply that the Tachens were being evacuated because they were off to the flank, and not essential to the defense of Formosa, but that other islands (Quemoy and Matsu, without mentioning them) were in a different category.
Ambassador Lodge said that with the New Zealand Resolution coming up in the UN tomorrow it would be helpful if no statement were made for two or three days.
The President concurred and said we would have to drag things on for at least a couple of days because we would have to send a message to Chiang, receive his reply, and reach agreement, etc.
It was agreed that Mr. Hoover would have a message drafted to send to Chiang which would be referred to the President tomorrow morning.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–3055. Drafted by MacArthur. The list of participants and the time of the meeting are from Goodpaster’s memorandum of this conversation, January 31. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series) His handwritten notes of the conversation are ibid., Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area.↩
- Reference is apparently to the Secretary’s testimony at the joint hearing held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services (see footnote 3, Document 36). The document under reference, apparently an unpublished transcript, has not been found in Department of State files.↩
- See supra.↩
- Transmitted in Document 69.↩