Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

322. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 28, 1955¹

Washington, July 28, 1955

SUBJECT

• Forthcoming Negotiations Between American and Chinese Communist Representatives at Geneva.

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Ralph N. Clough, Acting Director, CA

Ambassador Koo said that he had just received a personal memo from Foreign Minister George Yeh for Secretary Dulles.² It had just been decoded and he expected to get it to Mr. Robertson before noon. He then summarized the contents of the message.

The Ambassador stated that he understood Ambassador Johnson would not be authorized to discuss anything involving the rights and interests of the Republic of China. Mr. Robertson assured him that he would not.³

The Ambassador then asked whether the question of a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait would be raised by us or be left to the Communists to bring up. Mr. Robertson replied that the President had been asked at a press conference last April his views concerning the cease-fire. He said at that time that the Communists must renounce the use of force in the attainment of their objectives.⁴ When the Secretary was asked the other day⁵ what were “other practical matters” which might be discussed at Geneva, he declared that one of these is the principle of the renunciation of the use of force.

The Ambassador asked whether Ambassador Johnson would be authorized to discuss a cease-fire, adding that this could not be an issue between the U.S. and Communist China since the forces of these two countries were not shooting at each other. Mr. Robertson replied that it was very much an issue since we have a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China which binds us to aid in the defense of Taiwan. If the Communists should attempt to take Taiwan by force, we would be bound to take action in accordance with our constitutional provisions and would find ourselves at war with the Chinese Communists.

The Ambassador inquired further what would follow if they should agree to renounce the use of force. Mr. Robertson replied that they have so far refused to do so, but if they should, it would mean that they would have to negotiate for territory they wanted rather than to take it by force. Of course, we could not enter into any such negotiation with respect to Taiwan except in company with the Government of the Republic of China. While the juridical status of Taiwan is in limbo, certainly the Chinese Nationalists have the best right to it of anyone.

The Ambassador interjected that the status of Taiwan had been determined by the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations which turned the islands over to the Republic of China. Mr. Robertson pointed out that it is just those declarations on which the Communists rely in pressing their claim to Taiwan. The Chinese Communists, and other Governments which recognize them, insist that they are the China referred to in those agreements, while we insist that it is the Republic of China.

The Ambassador asked whether he could inform his Government that we intend to raise the cease-fire question at the Geneva talks. Mr. Robertson replied that he would repeat the Ambassador’s words to the Secretary. He emphasized that the chief cause of tension in the Far East is the threat of force and that by the renunciation of the use of force, tension could be relieved. He went on to say that we have today a divided Germany and a divided Korea. We believe in their unification but the American people are not willing to go to war to unite them. The same applies to China. The American people would not support a war against the Chinese Communists for recovery of the mainland. We are, of course, obligated by treaty to go to the defense of the Government of the Republic of China if it should be attacked. Furthermore, we believe that the GRC has a very important role to play as a symbol of freedom to millions of Chinese all over the world. We know that there is deep unrest on the mainland and we think that the GRC should hold itself in readiness to take advantage of developments, but we cannot support an med conquest of the mainland. So far, both contending Chinese sides have refused to renounce force. The Ambassador asked again whether the cease-fire question would be raised at Geneva. Mr. Robertson replied yes, he expected so, although he emphasized that this was just a personal opinion. He said that we are still in the process of developing the tactics we will use at Geneva and it is impossible to say now what problems will come up. He referred to the Secretary’s repeated statements that renunciation of the use of force was necessary in order to release tension. He said that he would take up the question with the Secretary.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–2855. Secret. Drafted by Clough on July 29 and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

2. The message from Yeh to Dulles was transmitted in a note of July 28 from Ambassador Koo to the Secretary. Yeh’s message expressed concern at the possibility of discussion of a cease-fire at the pending Geneva talks; it reads in part as follows:

   “Our two Governments have a formal understanding that no major military action will be undertaken in this area by either of us except by mutual agreement. The withdrawal from the Tachens has not brought about peace. Aggressive action in the Taiwan Strait has come and can only come from Peiping. Any offer from your representative to discuss cease-fire is likely to invite further demands from Peiping.

   “We shall abide by the understanding reached with you as our trusted ally, but may I emphasize again that any open cease-fire pledge on our part will destroy the very basis of our being and kill all hope of our brethren on the mainland for eventual liberation. I believe it is to our interest and yours to keep such hope alive. Our pledge to you must not be used or hinted at to trade for any Communist promise, which we know they will not honor. I shall much appreciate your assurance on this point.” (Ibid., 793.00/7–2855)

3. A note dated August 28, from Sebald to Koo, acknowledged his July 28 note and confirmed Robertson’s assurances that the United States was not prepared in the Geneva talks “to make arrangements would prejudice the rights of the Republic of China.” (Ibid.)
4. Reference is apparently to the Secretary’s press conference of April 26; see Document 223.
5. On July 26; see Document 319.