277. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 19551
SUBJECT
- Constancy of U.S. China Policy
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
Ambassador Koo said that his Government felt some anxiety at the prospect of U.S. negotiations with Communist countries. This concern was a natural result of the efforts being made by Menon and others who were known to be sympathetic to the Communist side. He said he would like to be able to report to his Government that the U.S. position on Far Eastern policy questions, particularly those directly affecting his Government, remained unchanged. Specifically he would like to be able to report that there was no change in U.S. opposition to the seating of Communist China in the UN, and in the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.
Mr. Robertson said there was no change in attitude on the policy matters mentioned by the Ambassador. The Secretary has explicitly stated that this Government would not negotiate on matters affecting the essential interests of the Government of China without the participation of that Government.
The Ambassador said he was convinced that the Chinese Communists are using the American prisoners as political pawns. He hoped that the U.S. would not compromise its principles as a result of Chinese Communist attempts to use the American prisoners for [Page 612] political purposes. He recalled that the Secretary had stated that the U.S. desired peace, but that it would have to be “peace with honor”.
Mr. Robertson said that he of course agreed that the Chinese Communists were trying to exploit the prisoners for political gain. He said that he considered the Chinese Communists to be gangsters, kidnappers, and extortioners. There were three courses which we could follow: (1) we could use force against the Chinese Communists if the prisoners were not released; (2) we could appease and accommodate the Chinese Communists, thus probably securing the release of all our people by giving in completely to the Chinese Communist demands; (3) we could use a policy of pressures, diplomatic representations through friendly third countries, and direct conversations with the Chinese Communists, as we are now doing. The first two alternatives are of course out of the question. Use of force would probably not bring about the release of the prisoners. It would more likely have an opposite effect and might easily spread into the disaster of a global atomic war. Appeasement of the Chinese Communists would also be catastrophic in a different way and was equally unthinkable. The only sensible course was No. 3, which we have been following consistently. This takes much patience because it is exasperating and frustrating, but it gradually gets some results. 23 Americans have been released since last June. There is no sound alternative to this course, unsatisfactory as it is. We intend to continue working along this line.
Mr. Robertson asked if Foreign Minister Yeh would come to Washington after the termination of the UN special session in San Francisco.
The Ambassador said he had urged Dr. Yeh to come to Washington for at least a brief exchange of views, with Mr. Robertson and other Departmental representatives. This would undoubtedly be very useful. However, Dr. Yeh felt that he could not well spare the time to come to Washington now. The Ambassador doubted that he would come, although no final decision had been made. The Ambassador mentioned that Dr. Yeh intends to stop off at Saigon en route back to Taipei.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–2355. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The source text bears Robertson’s initials. Separate memoranda of conversation by McConaughy record discussion of two other subjects during the same conversation: a proposal for the construction of a new airbase at Kung Quan (Kung Kuan), in which Ambassador Koo expressed interest, and a Chinese request for supplemental defense support funds. (Ibid., 711.56393/6–2355 and 793.5/6–2355, respectively)↩