Office of the Historian

245. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1

Taipei, May 9, 1955—5 p.m.

799. Reviewed cease-fire possibilities once more with Foreign Minister Yeh today, emphasizing I was not acting under instructions from Department. He believes GRC must continue oppose any formal cease-fire agreement and any negotiations between his government and Reds. However Yeh noted GRC commitments to US would bring about actual cease-fire if we so desired and if Communists stopped shooting.

It would if some other country could obtain commitment from Chinese Reds corresponding in effect to that we have from GRC, de [Page 559] facto cease-fire would be possible without need for direct negotiations between Communists and either US or GRC.

I remarked to Foreign Minister that to obtain de facto cease-fire along above lines it presumably necessary US ask GRC suspend its “port closure” as applied to portion of China coast since 1949. Latter not particularly effective in any case due limitations of GRC Navy, to British action which encourages Chinese-owned Hong Kong ships in breaking port closure and to US reluctance extend avowed support, even moral, to GRC in this connection. Suspension of port closure for duration of cease-fire therefore would involve yielding no important present advantages but should please British and provide face-saving device for Reds if they were ready for any reason to stop shooting at least temporarily. Perhaps more important, GRC willingness suspend port closure should remove, for many of our friends, what doubtless appears as major objection to GRC retention of Kinmen and Matsu. There are numerous similar “offshore islands” situations but where they do not serve as bases for active interference with nearby territory there is no urgent case for transfer of sovereignty.

Yeh pointed out that since UNO imposed embargo on Red China, port closure had been in effect GRC’s contribution to its enforcement, although not at UNO request. I observed it not generally so regarded and that GRC suspension of port closure need not affect UNO embargo.

I doubt Chinese Communists would go along in good faith with above scheme or any other practicable cease-fire proposal, but such approach might help us with our friends.2

Rankin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–955. Secret. Repeated for information to London, New Delhi, and Hong Kong and repeated to Paris for Robertson by the Department as Tosec 13, May 9. (Ibid.)↩

  2. Telegram 800 from Taipei, May 9, reads as follows:

    “If cease fire effort along lines mentioned Embtel 799 proved abortive, thereby making clear once more who was aggressor, better basis should exist for tightening control on traffic of military significance along China Coast with avowed purpose strengthen defense of Taiwan and points south. With adequate moral and logistic support from US, including replacement of equipment lost in action, it should be possible GRC Navy to do creditable job from Swatow to Wenchow without direct participation US forces.

    “Understand US Navy prefers any shipping interception in which it directly involved should be maintained at some distance, outside range shore-based fighter aircraft, which would imply blockade of entire China Coast.” (Ibid.) It was repeated to Paris for the Secretary and Robertson by the Department as Tedul 11, May 9. (Ibid.)

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