Office of the Historian

226. Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

Taipei, 27 April 1955—11 a.m.

Message nr 9. Following dinner with Gimo Tuesday2 night, Radford and I had 2 1/2 hour conversation with Gimo with Minister Yeh and Madame Chiang present.

I reiterated main feature of US proposal emphasizing:

(1)
Urgent need to restore world opinion in favor of ChiNats,
(2)
Absolute necessity having US public support any military actions undertaken by US government,
(3)
Specific proposals would lead to position of strength by clearly placing responsibility for any hostile actions on Communists, thus to achieve 1 and 2 above.

Gimo indicated he understood fully details and implications of our proposal. He stated primary consideration was one of confidence and trust, secondly that any proposal must be within reasonable bounds of compliance to each party. He lacked faith in US ability to adhere in face of outside pressures to proposed interdiction of seaborne traffic after having given up islands. The abandonment of his little remaining territory at this time would be completely unacceptable to his people and to overseas Chinese everywhere shattering their confidence in him as well as United States.

Chiang reviewed long history of US-Free China relations, mentioning specifically Yalta3 and Marshall mission, pointing out that by series of agreements to meet expedient proposals by United States he found himself at point where further concessions would lead to ultimate calamity. He did not question motives of United States in past or in present situation but indicated very strongly and emotionally his conviction that further concessions impossible.

While Radford and I did best to gain approval, we were unable to sway Gimo from his rejection of our proposal. Separately Madame Chiang and Minister Yeh informed us Gimo’s decision unshakable.

Gimo concluded by requesting that I convey to President Eisenhower his great respect and personal faith in US motives, but offered his humble apology for not being able to go along with proposal give up Quemoy–Matsu which would be “surrender to Communists which would endanger support of overseas Chinese and his own people.”

Answering your number 7.4 Para 2. Gimo clearly understands President has altered his earlier decision and will not use US military forces in defense offshore islands. Para 3. Gimo reiterated several times he would abide by obligations mutual defense treaty and would not attack mainland airfield buildup without US consent. Para 4. If you refer to President’s earlier idea the answer is in negative. Gimos firm opposition to withdrawal strength from islands precluded such exploration.

Gimo and Yeh clearly understand US military forces will not be used in defense of offshore islands. They strongly urge and hope however that President will not make announcement to this effect [Page 525] either publicly or to members of Congress. If his decision should leak they consider it would mean green light to Communists to attack. We are departing today.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4–2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 270300Z from Chief MAAG Formosa to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:15 a.m.↩
  2. April 26.↩
  3. Reference is to the Yalta Conference of February 4–11, 1945, among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin.↩
  4. Document 224.↩