Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

224. Message From the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), at Taipei¹

Washington, April 26, 1955—2:12 p.m.

[Message No. 7.] Your no. 8.²

1. Appreciate your and Radford’s good presentation and effort.

2. We assume Gimo clearly understands that President’s earlier decision communicated January 31 (last part para. 3 our 421 to AmEmbassy Taipei) is now altered and that there can be no future charge of bad faith.

3. Does Gimo understand and accept President’s decision not to agree to preventive attacks to interfere with mainland air field buildup?

4. Have you explored at all the “outpost” theory and logistical assistance we could give in its implementation if Gimo adopted it?

5. I have impression Gimo will prefer to gamble that an attack on coastal islands will not come or if it comes will be combined with attack on Formosa itself so that in fact we will be involved.

6. You are authorized return your discretion.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4–2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Emergency. Drafted by Dulles. Transmitted in telegram 261912Z from CNO to Chief MAAG Formosa.
2. Supra.

3. Notes prepared by Phyllis Bernau of a telephone call from Secretary Dulles to the President at 12:23 p.m. read as follows:

   “The Pres. said he was just getting to read the cables from Taipei. The Sec. said he has another one which says they had a talk with Yeh—there was no further opportunity to talk with the Gimo. In absence of other instructions, they plan to leave tomorrow. The Pres. said he has no further instructions.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)