Office of the Historian

186. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1

Washington, April 1, 1955.

Dear Cabot: I have received your letter of March 28, with which you enclosed copies of your latest letter to the Secretary General and of his communication to Chou En-lai transmitting the letters from the families of the fliers, together with Mr. Hammarskjold’s letter to you appraising the general situation at this time.2

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Please tell the Secretary General that I was very glad to receive his thoughtful appraisal of the situation, which I have read carefully. I want him to know that we appreciate all that he has done. Of course we share his hope that his efforts will result in the early release of the fliers, though so far there seems little reason for optimism. I agree that Mr. Hammarskjold should continue for the time being along the lines indicated in his letter, that is, to pursue what he calls “inner pressures” and “quiet diplomacy”. However, if neither the families’ appeals nor the need for the Chinese Communists to appear in the best light at Bandung results in the fliers’ release, I strongly concur in Hammarskjold’s view that we must then consider where we stand and whether there are other approaches that may bring about the fliers’ release.

Personally, I share your feeling that events so far are not particularly encouraging, but at the same time I think that Mr. Hammarskjold makes a convincing case that warrants our going along with him at least until the end of April.

Sincerely yours,

Foster
John Foster Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/3–2855. Limited Official Use.↩

  2. Lodge’s letter of March 28 to Dulles, his letter to Hammarskjöld of March 28 acknowledging the Secretary-General’s letter of the same date, and Hammarskjöld’s letter of March 25 to Chou are filed with the source text. Hammarskjöld’s letter of March 28 to Lodge reads in part as follows:

    “To sum up: I have still the same view of Mr. Chou En-lai’s frame of mind as I had immediately on my return from Peking and which I expressed publicly as well as privately to you. This is that my exposition of the prisoners’ case during our talks at Peking did succeed in correcting Peking’s misunderstandings as regards facts, and miscalculations as regards the political reactions to their handling of the case; that this had given rise to the prospect that he would find it to his own advantage to release the prisoners provided he could do so without loss of face; and that the question of prestige would weigh even more heavily with his Party than with him.”

    The Secretary-General recommended that “as long as Mr. Chou En-lai maintains the channel that was established as the result of our Peking conversations we should continue to use it for exercising the maximum inner pressure, attainable by ‘quiet’ diplomacy, till we are convinced that all the possibilities of achieving our goal have been exhausted.” He added that if after the Bandung Conference no progress had been made, it would be useful to review the situation. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 56 D 679)

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