Office of the Historian

185. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, April 1, 1955—9 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • White House meeting, April 1, 1955.2

The Quemoy–Matsu situation was discussed this morning at the White House. The following were present:

  • The President
  • Secretary Dulles, State
  • Secretary Humphrey, Treasury
  • Secretary Wilson, Defense
  • Deputy Secretary Anderson, Defense
  • Admiral Radford, J.C.S.
  • Under Secretary Hoover, State
  • (Colonel Goodpaster, White House Staff)

The specific reason for the meeting was to discuss Admiral Radford’s proposal to send approximately 10,000 U.S. troops to Formosa for manning anti-aircraft and aircraft warning equipment which has recently been delivered, and to train Chinese Nationalist personnel in its use. The President suggested consideration of a more limited number of U.S. troops, with the thought that the Chinese Nationalists would have to fill in more quickly, and the training cycle would thereby be expedited.

The entire Formosa and offshore island situation was then explored in some detail. After an extended discussion, and without coming to any decision, the President summarized the U.S. position in the following terms:

1.
The paramount consideration was to preserve the morale and the desire to fight on the part of the Chinats. An immediate withdrawal of potential U.S. support for the Nationalists on Quemoy and Matsu would probably result in the collapse or subversion of their forces, with a correspondingly drastic impact throughout East and Southeast Asia.
2.
On the other hand, it was recognized that an all-out fight with the Chicoms, involving the United States, in an effort to retain Quemoy and Matsu, would be undesirable from the following viewpoint:
(a)
The military position of the islands is not favorable and the ultimate objectives of such an operation are obscure.
(b)
Little or no support from our allies is forthcoming to support our position.
(c)
Public opinion within the U.S. would be divided.
(d)
Impact on the domestic economy could be serious. (Secretary Humphrey)
3.
A desirable solution would be to convince Chiang that he should:
(a)
Voluntarily evacuate Quemoy and Matsu.
(b)
Entrench himself on Formosa, await internal developments on the mainland, and provide a constant military and psychological threat to the Chicom régime.
4.
To aid Chiang in reaching such a decision, the U.S. would be willing to:
(a)
Land a division of Marines on Formosa.
(b)
Augment the U.S. Air Forces and aircraft defenses on the island.
(c)
Extend the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalists to include other powers, such as Australia.
5.
The President suggested having someone like General Wedemeyer,3 who had Chiang’s confidence, attempt to convince him of the U.S. sincerity of purpose, and the desirability of following a course such as that outlined.
6.
While no decision was reached in the discussion, it was pointed out that time for action by the U.S. was becoming acute. Further Chicom build-up of airfields on the mainland posed a real problem as to whether or not the U.S. would permit the Chinats to attack and neutralize them before, in turn, they were used by the Chicoms for mounting an attack on the offshore islands. It was entirely possible that the U.S. could be drawn into a fight to protect the offshore islands, whether it liked it or not.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Note: If an exercise such as (5) above were attempted, it seems to me we should drive as hard a bargain with the UK as is possible. Some ideas are:

(a)
Strengthening blockade against Chicoms.
(b)
Greater UK support for U.S. position in Indochina, Korea, Japan, etcetera.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. The time of the meeting is from the President’s appointment diary. (Ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)↩
  2. Also recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, April 4. (Ibid., Whitman File, ACW Diaries)↩
  3. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer (retired), served from 1944 through 1946 as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme Commander, China Theater. In 1947 he headed a fact-finding mission to China and Korea for President Truman,↩