160. Editorial Note
On March 18, during a visit to Ottawa, Secretary Dulles discussed the situation in the Far East with the Canadian Cabinet. A memorandum of that date which Dulles dictated summarizing his remarks reads in part as follows:
“Mr. Pearson raised the question of whether or not it would not be better to get out of Quemoy and Matsu. I repeated that from a ‘map’ standpoint this had advantages but that I could not give any assurance that such a withdrawal could be practically effected at the present time, while at the same time not making the loss of Formosa much more likely because of internal factors. If the Chinese Communists gave time, then a new situation might perhaps be brought about. I was already working with the Generalissimo to try to change the psychology of the National Government. Also, Formosan Chinese were more and more being brought into the Army, and if that happened, there would be more interest in the defense of Formosa and less interest in going back to the Mainland. However, this transition required time, and I did not know the Chinese Communists would give us that time. So far, they had given every evidence of pressing on to the conquest of Formosa itself and were contemptuous of a settlement which might draw a line through the Straits of Formosa.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Dulles’ summary was incorporated in CV MC–7, March 22; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 440.)
Dulles also discussed the question of a United Nations-arranged cease-fire in a March 18 conversation with Pearson; a memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, CV MC–3, March 18, is ibid.