Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

158. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100–4–55

Washington, March 16, 1955.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN²

The Problem

(a) To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to territory occupied by the Republic of China;

(b) To estimate Communist reaction to possible US courses of action in defense of territory occupied by the Republic of China; and

(c) To estimate actions or reactions of the principal non-Communist powers with respect to possible future developments in the Taiwan-offshore island situation.

Conclusions

1. The Chinese Communist regime appears firmly committed to the seizure (“liberation” as they call it) of the offshore islands and Taiwan. It regards as basic and continuing national objectives the final destruction of the Chinese National Government as a symbol of resistance to the Chinese regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a potential base of attack against the mainland. The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard the eventual attainment of these objectives as essential. (Para. 14)

2. In view of the US commitment, the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not attempt an invasion in 1955. However, the Chinese Communists have the capability for air strikes and might undertake air raids against Taiwan either on their own initiative or in retaliation to military action elsewhere. (Para. 37)

3. We believe that the Chinese Communists with the forces now in place or readily available in the east China area have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups³ assuming that these islands were defended by the Nationalists alone and the Chinese Communists were willing to risk heavy casualties. Timely warning might not be available that final preparations for an assault on either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed. We believe that the Nationalists cannot absorb sufficient military end-items and training during 1955 to change this estimate of relative capabilities. (Paras. 22, 23)

4. The Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these groups. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and, more importantly, to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should become convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure and retention of these islands, taking whatever military action was necessary, including, if required, all-out attacks on any part of China, they would probably be deterred from attempting an outright seizure during 1955. However, they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion.⁴ (Para. 38)

5. It may not be possible for the Chinese Communists, as a result of their probing actions alone, to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure of an offshore island. If the US did not respond to initial probing actions, the Chinese Communists might estimate that the US would not in fact commit its own forces to the defense of the island. Or, even though there was some US military reaction to a probing attack, the Chinese Communists might still estimate that US counteraction to an actual invasion of offshore islands would remain limited and localized. Or, the Chinese Communists might estimate that they could overrun an offshore island before effective US counteraction could be brought to bear and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. In any of these circumstances, we believe the Chinese Communists would probably attempt to seize or complete the seizure of the offshore islands.⁵ (Para. 39)

6. If the US and Chinese Communist forces became engaged in hostilities, the Chinese Communists, while taking defensive measures which might include attacks on US and Chinese Nationalist forces and bases directly involved, would attempt to prevent the expansion of hostilities. Initially the USSR would almost certainly give the Chinese Communists political and military support but without open military intervention. (Paras. 42–45)

7. Ultimately, if Moscow and Peiping had come to believe that US military actions were gravely threatening the existence of the Chinese Communist regime, we believe that the USSR would openly intervene in the war in the Far East, but would still try to confine hostilities to that area.⁶ (Para. 47)

8. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US defense of Taiwan would in general be favorable. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US action in defense of the offshore islands, or to US attacks on Chinese Communist military concentrations prior to a Communist attack, would be unfavorable. If the US bombed military targets throughout east China, non-Communist reactions would be considerably more unfavorable, reflecting a fear of the immediacy of general war. Even in these circumstances, however, and despite increased strains between the US and its allies, we believe existing US alliances would remain intact. However, if the US became involved in defense of the offshore islands before the ratification of the Paris agreements, the ratification might be jeopardized. (Paras. 48–56, 58–60)

9. If the US used nuclear weapons against Communist China, the predominant world reaction would be one of shock. These reactions would be particularly adverse if these weapons were used to defend the offshore islands or destroy military concentrations prior to an all-out Communist Chinese attempt to take the offshore islands. However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the US use of nuclear weapons to stop an actual invasion of Taiwan.⁷ The general reaction of non-Communist Asians would be emotional and would be extremely critical of the US. In the case of Japan, the Government would probably attempt to steer a more neutral course. (Paras. 62–66)

10. If, however, the US succeeded in curbing Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan area without becoming involved in protracted, full-scale hostilities, and without employing nuclear weapons, US prestige and the confidence of the non-Communist world in US leadership would be enhanced.⁸ (Paras. 57, 61, 67)

11. In the event the Nationalists, with or without US assistance or pressure, evacuated the Matsu and Quemoy Groups prior to a large-scale Communist attack, there would be a deterioration of morale on Taiwan and great disappointment in the ROK. In the Philippines such an evacuation would stimulate concern that the US was not prepared to commit its forces in forward areas. To a lesser extent this reaction would occur in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. However, the dominant reaction among other interested non-Communist states would probably be one of relief followed at least for some time by increased support for US policies with respect to the defense of Taiwan.⁹ (Para. 50)

[Here follow paragraphs 12–66, consisting of more detailed discussion of the subject matter summarized here; a map of Taiwan and East China with airfields indicated; and annexes “A”–“H”, concerning Chinese Communist aircraft strength and performance, estimated Communist and Nationalist aircraft sortie rates, Nationalist artillery and anti-aircraft on the Quemoy and Matsu groups, Communist artillery opposite the Quemoy and Matsu groups, Communist naval strength and port capacity, and weather conditions in the Taiwan Straits.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting appraisals of foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by inter-departmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

   A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

   “Submitted by the

   Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 16 March 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.”

2. Wherever Taiwan appears in the text it should be taken as reference to Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores). [Footnote in the source text.]

3. In the context of this estimate the term “Matsu Group” or “Matsus” denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying essentially between 25 and 27 degrees north latitude and consisting of Tung-yin Shan, Lang Tao, Kao-teng Hsu, Pei-kan Tang, Matsu Shan, Pai-chuan and Lieh Tao (White Dogs), Wu-chiu, and Hsia Wu-chiu. “Matsu” used singly applies only to Matsu-Shan proper.

   Similarly, “Chinmen Group” or “Quemoy Group” denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying between 24 and 25 degrees north latitude and consisting of Chinmen Tao (Quemoy), Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy), Ta-tan Tao, Erh-tan Tao, and Tung-ting Hsu. “Quemoy” used singly applies only to Chinmen-Tao. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army, believes that this paragraph underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists, supported by the USSR, to assume the risks of war to attain their objectives and would substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5 the following text:

   “The Chinese Communists will intensify air and artillery attacks and possibly minor naval operations against Quemoy and the Matsus. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should not be able to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure, they might consider that they could overrun either, or both, of these island groups in spite of local US counteraction and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. Even though the Chinese Communists were convinced that the US is determined to prevent the seizure of these offshore islands, it is believed they will attempt to seize them, although not necessarily during 1955.” [Footnote in the source text.]

5. See footnote 3 on previous page. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 4 above.]

6. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that this paragraph should read as follows:

   “Should the conflict progress so far that the Communists believed the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was gravely threatened, we believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open intervention on their part against US forces sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve grave risk of general war with the US. Their decision would probably be based on existing military, political, and economic strengths, with particular emphasis on the current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities. We believe that the Soviet leaders would probably conclude that if they intervened the conflict could not be confined to the Far East, and that Soviet strengths were insufficient to risk their own regime in this manner.” [Footnote in the source text.]

7. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this sentence should read:

   “Certain Asian and European allies would probably condone US use of nuclear weapons, particularly if used tactically, as firm evidence of US determination to put a halt to further Communist expansion wherever occurring.”

   The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, believes that this sentence should read as follows:

   “However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the tactical use of nuclear weapons by the US provided that they were convinced such weapons were necessary to stop an actual invasion to Taiwan and that the US was exercising the utmost restraint and attempting to spare civilians.” [Footnote in the source text.]

8. The Deputy Director of Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that the following additional sentence should be added to paragraph 10:

   “Even though the US had used nuclear weapons to achieve the result noted above, the non-Communist world’s adverse reaction to the use of nuclear weapons would in time be modified.” [Footnote in the source text.]

9. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that the last three sentences should read:

   “Such an evacuation would stimulate concern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam that the US would in the future also withdraw from other forward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the dominant reaction would probably be one of relief that threatened hostilities had not occurred, but with undercurrents of concern of varying strength in different countries at this further instance of Communist expansion. Particularly in non-Communist Asia, the net impression of an evacuation, whether manifest or latent, would be one of further growth of Chinese Communist prestige and power, with a commensurate decrease in US prestige.” [Footnote in the source text.]