157. Memorandum Received From the British Ambassador (Makins)1
UNITED KINGDOM APPRECIATION OF FAR EASTERN SITUATION
Our own reading of the position is as follows. We agree that the Chinese Communists will not accept the retention of Formosa by the Nationalists; but it is our belief that given the clear United States determination to defend Formosa (and the Pescadores) they will not in fact contest the issue by force. In South East Asia the situation is not unsatisfactory from the Chinese point of view and there would seem little advantage for them to launch an attack and thus lay themselves open to probable retaliation by the Manila Treaty powers. It will surely suit them better to try to win over Asian opinion and lull [Page 375] Asian suspicions by appearing moderate and peace-loving while at the same time pursuing their objectives under cover. The Bandung Conference will give them an opportunity to mobilise Asian opinion on their side in favour of such aims as non-interference, respect for national sovereignty etc. They must know that they cannot take on the U.S.A. in open war with nuclear weapons. Their objective seems more likely to be to isolate the U.S.A. and to consolidate opinion on their side.
Therefore instead of our being faced with a showdown, the prospect in the Far East seems to us more likely to be a long drawn-out struggle for the support of Asia accompanied by Communist subversion and the constant threat of war. There may always be an explosion, but it seems to us that that would be more likely to come at present from miscalculation than deliberate policy on the part of the Chinese.
That is why in our view it is so important to exercise moderation in our statements and attitudes lest we frighten the Asians into China’s arms. This is also one of the reasons why we would like to see the coastal islands evacuated. We agree with Mr. Dulles that our difference on this question is a matter of factual judgment rather than principle. But our judgment is based not only on the military case for evacuation, but also on the fact that the American position would be easier to justify vis-à-vis world and Asian opinion were these islands not in question.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–1655. Secret. The source text bears a note that it was handed to the Secretary by Makins on March 16.↩