149. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, March 11, 1955, 10:45 a.m.1
The President had the draft of a possible communication to President Coty2 which we went over together and which, after making some penciled interlineations, he gave me to bring back to the Department.
I said I wanted to discuss further the question of the Formosa situation. I realized that the decision of what to do was a very difficult [Page 354] one. It was somewhat parallel perhaps to the situation in Europe in the Thirties where it was hard to know to what extent one was justified in giving way in the interest of peace and of flouting world opinion. It seemed that in the case of Europe there had been too much retreat and that the timing as to when to stand had been bad. In this situation it was also difficult to know and to pick the correct time. I was satisfied that from the standpoint of the position in Formosa and the general attitude of the Thailand and Indochina States that we could not, without great danger, seem to retreat further. However, I wanted to be sure that my thinking was in line with that of the President. I said I thought I should say there was not complete agreement within the State Department on this matter and that in particular Mr. Bowie was in considerable disagreement with my views. It was, however, essential that I be sure that I was in step with the President’s thinking.
The President said that he had the impression that Bowie was generally disposed to take a rather more sympathetic line towards the Chinese Communists than was the President and, therefore, this disagreement with me did not weigh strongly with the President.
With reference to the substance of the matter, the President said that he felt that the Quemoy-Matsu situation was a liability. He did not see any present way to liquidate it. He recognized that we probably could not now get the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate and also that it would be serious there and elsewhere for us to sit idly by as spectators while their positions were overrun by some massive Communist assault. Therefore, he shared my conclusions about the matter.
I referred to the Washington Post story3 attributing to Congressman Richards an allegation that the President and I differed on this matter. I stated that my testimony4 had given no basis for this whatsoever, and I pointed out that under the law the President was required to exercise his own judgment in the matter and that such a judgment could not be made prematurely. I went on to say to the President, however, that this situation created a problem from the standpoint of public relations in that it inhibited an adequate advance preparation for military intervention in the event that it was judged necessary. I said that probably the President would be faced with a question on this matter at his next press conference. The President said he would be disposed to reply along the lines that we had heretofore followed, mainly that he would make the judgment when circumstances required in the light of all the circumstances, but [Page 355] that he had not made the judgment yet because there was no need for it.
I said that I felt that it would be useful for the President and for me if we could get a clearer report from the military people as to what their estimate was as to the imminence of attack and the defensive capacity of the ChiNats and also with reference to our Intelligence. I said that from the standpoint of timing it would, I thought, be extremely important to avoid, if possible, any U.S. hostilities, particularly involving atomic missiles, while the WEU situation was still unsettled. After that was buttoned up he could have more freedom of action in Asia. I said also this could be one of the matters where he could do an educational job with the British and others if a meeting was held in Paris in May, as was being considered. The President agreed and said that this was, in his mind, one of the most important purposes of the meeting.
The President also arranged to have a meeting at 2:30 in the afternoon at which the JCS would be present.5