148. Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, The White House, Washington, March 11, 1955, 9–10:05 a.m.1

[Here follows a list of those present, including the President, the Vice President; Secretaries Dulles and Humphrey; Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.; Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield; Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay; Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson; Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks; Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Oveta Culp Hobby; Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Dennis A. FitzGerald, Deputy Director for Operations in the Foreign Operations Administration; Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the United States Information Agency; Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury; Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers; 14 members of the White House staff; and one member of the Vice President’s staff.

[The meeting opened with a report by the Vice President on his recent trip to Central America.]

Report on the Far East—Sec. Dulles said he was encouraged about our position in the Far East generally, that the treaty organization under the Manila Pact has had a good beginning and is going ahead, and that the people, and particularly the leaders, of Southeast Asia are vigorous and capable. He noted that Burma is an exception from the others in its neutralist spirit.

Mr. Dulles felt he had gotten increased insight of Chinese Communist purposes—that they were much more virulent than he had previously thought. Particularly from U Nu and from Mr. Eden, who has been working for a solution of the Formosa Straits problem, Mr. Dulles obtained the impression that the Chinese Communists have a fanatical determination to obliterate any U.S. influence in that part of the world.2

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Regarding Formosa, Sec. Dulles said that he had a distinct feeling, but without tangible evidence, that there could be much subversive activity in Formosa if we press Chiang too hard. Chiang does continue to talk of a return to the mainland, but he accepts the U.S. position and says that he will not attempt any return without U.S. concurrence.

Sec. Dulles thought the Chinese Communists would continue to exert pressure until they found the point where we would have to react by shooting; he added however that this might be merely a war of nerves. He continued to think that the Chinese, with their hatred for the West, aimed to take over Southeast Asia and would prefer to die in the effort than fail to accomplish it.

Mr. Dulles concluded that the United States must be prepared to face a quite serious showdown in that part of the world. While it is not possible to judge whether Russia is backing the Chinese effort or is without control over it, the evidence is that Russian actions are minimal. Nevertheless, there could be secret Russian support of the Chinese. In any event, any acceptance of further defeats or withdrawals, he said, would greatly jeopardize U.S. interests and position in Formosa and all of Southeast Asia.

LAM
L.A. Minnich, Jr.
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers. Confidential.
  2. This portion of Dulles’ presentation was described by Hagerty in his March 11 diary entry as follows:

    “I am concerned because the purposes of Red China are more virulent than I realized before I left this country. I had talks with the Burmese Prime Minister and with Eden who has been conducting conversations with the Communists of Peiping, and I must tell you this. The Chinese Reds have a fanatical determination to eradicate any impression of good will for the United States in their part of the world. I disagree with the British and I am sure that we are living in a fool’s paradise if we have any idea that we can make an easy trade with the Communists for the offshore islands. Chou En-lai flatly rejected such a trade, brands the United States as aggressors and will have nothing to do with the deal the British were trying to work out on the offshore islands. As a matter of fact, I received information just before I came over here that Chou En-lai in a recent talk with the Finnish Minister had said that China would be in war with the United States, that the United States would kill 100 million Chinese but that there would still be 500 million Chinese left.” (Ibid., Hagerty Papers)