Office of the Historian

134. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State1

Washington, February 28, 1955.

I had a brief visit with the President this afternoon.

[Page 315]

He had read your cables (Dulte 8 to 16, inclusive)2 this morning after returning from a weekend out of town. I stated that analysis of all information available here indicated a rapid ChiCom buildup opposite the offshore islands and that we had the feeling time was getting short before we would have to reach a decision to participate in their defense, one way or the other, whether we liked it or not. I said that it looked from here that Quemoy and Matsu were becoming a symbol, throughout Asia, of our intention to back up our allies in the face of Communist probing and expansion.

The President mentioned again that he had discussed with you the possibility that Robertson might stay on in Taipei in an attempt to reorient Chiang’s thinking. He thought it was to the Nationalists’ own advantage to withdraw from the offshore islands, and consolidate their position on Taiwan.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–2855. Top Secret; Eyes Only.↩
  2. For Dultes 8, 9, and 10, all from Bangkok and dated February 25, see Documents 129 ff. Dulte 11 from Bangkok, dated February 25, reported that Eden gave Dulles the operative paragraph of a draft message to Trevelyan for communication to the Chinese. The paragraph inquired whether the Chinese Government would state publicly or privately that, while maintaining their claims, they did not intend to prosecute them by force and stated that if so, the British would be ready to approach the U.S. Government with what they believed was a good hope of finding a basis for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the coastal islands. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2555) Dulte 12 from Bangkok, February 25, reported a meeting among Dulles, Australian Foreign Minister Richard F. Casey, and New Zealand Foreign Minister Thomas L. Macdonald, in which Dulles set forth the U.S. position on the Taiwan situation along the lines of his conversation with Eden the previous evening. (Ibid., 793.00/2–2555) Dulte 14 from Rangoon, February 26, and part of Dulte 10 from Bangkok, February 25, concerned the SEATO Council meeting. Dulte 16 from Vientiane, February 27, concerned Dulles’ visit to Burma. Dulte 13 from Bangkok, February 25, concerned an unrelated matter. (All ibid., 682.87/2–2555) Dulte 15 from Rangoon, dated February 26, for the President, reported that Dulles had just received a message from Eden stating that London approved the proposed approach in Peking. (Ibid., 110.11–DU/2–2655)↩