Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

129. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, February 25, 1955—5 p.m.

Dulte 8. For Hoover. Reference: Dulte 9² and 10.³ Thursday⁴ evening I discussed Taiwan situation at length with Eden. Following were present: Eden, Harding,⁵ Caccia,⁶ Denis Allen,⁷ Robertson, MacArthur, Admiral Stump and Young.⁸ I led off with following summary.

1. Whereas up to few weeks ago we had believed Chinese Communists were not seriously intending take Taiwan by force, we now believe they intend to do so. So in fact we are in a battle for Taiwan. Admiral Stump’s briefing in Honolulu on this situation was disturbing because it showed considerable Chinese Communist build-up and preparation. They are skilled at camouflage and may be able to conceal timing. I informed President of this briefing and pointed out grave responsibility we assuming for holding Chinese Nationalists back from hitting Communist concentrations on mainland opposite Taiwan in face of continuing build-up and that we cannot continue this indefinitely. President authorized me to explain this to Eden.

2. I read to him a memo (see immediately following telegram) indicating the steps the US has taken during past few months aimed at reducing tension Formosa area so as to prevent war, which President of course strongly wished avoid.

3. Despite all these actions Chinese Communists still give every evidence intention take Taiwan by force and no indication willingness seek possible settlement. They have done nothing contribute to peaceful settlement. Thus we have reached situation where line of retreat nears its end. May be from technical viewpoint we are not choosing best position but further retreat would be even worse. If we give up offshore islands, defense Taiwan even more difficult. Further retreat would have grave effect on Taiwan and in Asia. Very considerable factor in situation now is possibility of deteriorating morale at Taiwan. Withdrawal from islands might have critical effect on ability Chinese Nationalists hold islands if morale disintegrated and groups there made deals with Communists. It would be virtually impossible retain islands. US has no ground troops there and is not disposed to put any in. Further retreat could swing Asia. Trends in Japan are already disturbing. Further retreat or loss of Formosa would convince Japan communism wave of future. Consequent effect on Okinawa and other parts of Asia obvious. Overseas Chinese would turn to Peking.

Eden’s views during course discussion summarized as follows:

(A) Agreed Taiwan should not be lost to Communists although remarked Churchill does not think island strategically important but will go along with us if we think so. If Chinese attack Taiwan and we resist, Eden believes public opinion in Commonwealth and Free World generally will clearly understand and support US, whereas they will not if war results from defense of offshore islands.

(B) His only concern is over fighting for offshore islands. Most of his comments and questions revolved around disposition of Matsu and Quemoy. He reiterated his belief public opinion in Commonwealth and elsewhere does not see necessity of stirring up row over these islands and would not support our fighting for them. This is apparently difficult question for him at home as well as in Commonwealth. Secondly, he emphasized to me several times his speculation Chinese Communists will not become involved with our military power to attack Taiwan but may see advantages in embroiling US over offshore islands. Militarily they can take these islands and will ignore cost of manpower and equipment. Involving US in these islands will put US on weakest ground with its allies and public opinion generally. He also mentioned Russians would probably find this situation to their advantage. Eden made it clear he did not see any necessity hold these islands and pointedly asked Stump and myself why US wants to defend them. He ended his general comments by suggesting some step be taken to seek out Peking’s real intention, to see if something could be worked out.

Admiral Stump explained to Eden defense relationship between offshore islands and Taiwan. They block launching attack on Taiwan, provide advance warning and are closer to hostile area in case of fighting. Field Marshal Harding interjected to differ with Stump. Comparing situation to Allied assault in Operation Overlord, Harding expressed opinion critical question is not launching or lodging initial attack across water but in being able afterwards sustain assault forces. He thought Chinese Communists military leaders would advise against attack on Taiwan as long as Seventh Fleet commanded sea and air. Hence he did not believe possession offshore islands would have much to do with whether Chinese Communists would or would not attack Taiwan. I pointed out his analysis neglected critical factor of effect on morale of loss of offshore islands.

Eden’s comments on offshore islands led him to suggestion, which he apparently came prepared to make, that something should be done to see if Chinese Communists would give up their declared intentions to take Taiwan by force if certain circumstances developed. He outlined vague proposal that, if Chinese Communists would give assurances not to use force against Taiwan, UK would sound out US as to whether there could be peaceful settlement offshore islands.

He did not know if this feasible or if Chinese Communists would even consider it but thought it worth trying in case it did work. He stressed point we would all be in better public and moral position if we at least tried some such approach should it fail. He had not thought out channel to use but was considering possibility going through UK Chargé Peking rather than Indians.

I said his general suggestion might be worth exploring. I agreed to talk with him further about it before leaving Bangkok. This was initial approach on his part and he will follow it up for I am sure that he is searching for some formula along above lines.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2555. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 12:01 p.m.
2. Infra.
3. Document 131.
4. February 24.
5. Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the United Kingdom.
6. Sir Harold A. Caccia, British Deputy Under-Secretary of State.
7. William Denis Allen, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
8. Kenneth T. Young, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.