131. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Dulte 10. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. For President.
“Dear Mr. President:
[Here follow personal remarks and a summary of developments at the SEATO Council meeting. This portion of the telegram is scheduled for publication in the Asia regional compilation in a forthcoming volume.]
Last night Eden and I, each with three advisers, discussed at length the Formosa situation. I read to him a memo, text of which I am cabling to Department and which you may want look at. It summarizes our efforts towards a peaceful solution and total lack of any co-operation from Communist side. Eden asked make a copy, which I [Page 312] authorized, making clear however that my memo was merely my own talking paper and nothing like a diplomatic note. I think he may make an effort get Chinese Communists to agree not seek a violent solution of Formosa matter, and I encouraged him do so, because I think that if he makes the effort and fails, he will then be better able justify our position before British Parliament and public. If he succeeds, so much the better.
“He believes that this effort would not be helped if we should press proceedings in UN, and I therefore told him that we would agree to suspend for a further brief period request for a cease-fire resolution so as to permit this other initiative of his to have best chance of success. I said, however, that if this did not succeed at some fairly early date, I felt we would want to have a cease-fire resolution actually introduced and voted upon so as to make even more clear our own desire for a peaceful solution and that responsibility for rejecting a cease-fire rests upon Communists.
“In general, Eden’s line was that a further fall-back by abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu would be justified by increased support of resultant position by Commonwealth and Western European public opinion. He naturally attaches to this an importance which I feel fails to appraise adequately dangers to non-Communist morale in Far East, notably in Taiwan, Korea, Japan and the Philippines.
“I told him that as matters now stood, while we hoped Chinese Nationalists would alone be able hold remaining islands, that if they failed do so and if it seemed that attack upon them was part of an attack against Formosa itself, you would have to consider active US intervention. I also told him that in view steady Communist build-up of artillery emplacements and airfields, we had about reached a point where we did not feel we could assume the moral responsibility of preventing Chinese Nationalists from attempting interfere with this build-up by mainland attacks against hostile positions.
“Conversation was throughout in best of spirit with mutual comprehension different viewpoints and difficulty problem.
“I reminded Eden that there must come a time in these matters where will to stand must be made manifest. In case of Hitler, Eden himself recognized that this had come too late. It should have come in relation to Czechoslovakia rather than Poland, and if it had come earlier, there might not have been the Second World War. Eden agreed that there was a parallel but still seemed feel that we could afford a further retreat. I said this was a grave decision where you would have to exercise final responsibility and that all the world could know you would do so with the sober sense of responsibility and dedication to peace with freedom.
“Faithfully yours, Foster”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 BA/2–2555. Top Secret; Priority.↩