Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

119. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 18, 1955—8:12 p.m.

4266. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister:

Dear Winston: I greatly appreciate the message from you and Anthony.² I have studied it long and carefully, as has Foster. Quite naturally, it distresses us whenever we find ourselves in even partial disagreement with the conclusions that you two may reach on any important subject. It is probable that these differences frequently reflect dissimilar psychological and political situations in our two countries more than they do differences in personal convictions based upon theoretical analysis. Nevertheless we clearly recognize the great importance to the security of the free world of our two governments achieving a step by step progress both in policy and in action.

Diplomatically it would indeed be a great relief to us if the line between the Nationalists and the Communists was actually the broad Strait of Formosa instead of the narrow Straits between Quemoy and Matsu and the mainland. However, there are about 55,000 of the Nationalist troops on these coastal islands and the problem created thereby cannot, I fear, be solved by us merely announcing a desire to transplant them to Formosa.

Foster and I have been working very hard over recent months, and he has been in close touch with Anthony, in the attempt to lay a basis for what we have hoped may prove a gradual but steady solution.

There are two important points that must be considered at every step of any analysis of this exceedingly difficult situation. The first is that this country does not have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands. We believe that Chiang would even choose to stand alone and die if we should attempt now to coerce him into the abandonment of those islands. Possibly we may convince him in the future of the wisdom of this course, but to attempt to do more at this time would bring us to the second major point, which is: We must not lose Chiang’s army and we must maintain its strength, efficiency and morale. Only a few months back we had both Chiang and a strong, well-equipped French Army to support the free world’s position in Southeast Asia. The French are gone—making it clearer than ever that we cannot afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that corner of the globe. This is unthinkable to us—I feel it must be to you.

In order to make an express or tacit cease-fire likely, we have, with difficulties perhaps greater than you realize, done, through our diplomacy, many things.

1. We rounded out the far Pacific security chain by a Treaty with the Nationalists which, however, only covered specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, thus making it clear to Chiang and to all the world that we were not prepared to defend the coastal positions as Treaty territory.

2. We obtained from Chiang his agreement that he would not conduct any offensive operations against the mainland either from Formosa or from his coastal positions, except in agreement with us.³ Thus we are in a position to preclude what you refer to as the use of these offshore islands as “bridgeheads for a Nationalist invasion of Communist China”, or as a base for “sporadic war against the mainland” or “the invasion of the mainland of China”. Under present practice we do not give agreement to any such attacks unless they are retaliatory to related, prior, Communist attacks. In these respects we have done much more than seems generally realized.

3. Furthermore, we obtained an agreement from the Nationalists closely limiting their right to take away from Formosa military elements, material or human, to which we had contributed if this would weaken the defense of Formosa itself.

4. We made possible the voluntary evacuation of the Tachens and two other islands.

5. Finally, we secured the acquiescence of the Chinese Nationalists to United Nations proceedings for a cease-fire, although the Chinese Nationalists were extremely suspicious of this move and felt that it could permanently blight their hopes.

All of this was done, as I say, in consultation between Anthony and Foster and in the hope that this would provide a basis for a cease-fire.

However, what we have done has apparently been interpreted by the Chinese Communists merely as a sign of weakness. They have intensified their threats against Formosa and their expressions of determination to take it by force. Also, they continue to hold, in durance vile, our airmen who were captured by them in the Korean War and who should have been freed by the Korean Armistice.

There comes a point where constantly giving in only encourages further belligerency. I think we must be careful not to pass that point in our dealings with Communist China. In such a case, further retreat becomes worse than a Munich because at Munich there were at least promises on the part of the aggressor to cease expansion and to keep the peace. In this case the Chinese Communists have promised nothing and have not contributed one iota toward peace in the Formosa area. Indeed, they treat the suggestion of peace there as an insult.

I am increasingly led to feel it would be dangerous to predicate our thinking and planning on the assumption that when the Chinese Communists talk about their resolve to take Formosa, this is just “talk,” and that they really would be satisfied with the coastal islands. I suspect that it is the other way around. What they are really interested in is Formosa—and later on Japan—and the coastal islands are marginal. They do not want to have another Chinese Government in their neighborhood, particularly one which has military power and which poses a threat to their center if ever they attack on their flanks.

Therefore, I think that if the Chinese Nationalists got out of Quemoy and the Matsus, they would not be solving the real problem, which is far more basic. I repeat that it would more likely mean that this retreat, and the coercion we would have to exert to bring it about, would so undermine the morale and the loyalty of the non-Communist forces on Formosa that they could not be counted on. Some, at least, might defect to the Communists or provide such a weak element in the defense of Formosa that an amphibious operation could give the Communists a strong foothold on Formosa.

You speak about our capacity to “drown” anybody who tried to cross the Formosa Straits. However, we do not and cannot maintain at that spot at all times sufficient force to cope with an attack which might come at any time both by sea and by air and which would presumably operate from several different points and be directed against several different points on what is a very considerable body of land. It took us two days to assemble the force necessary to insure the safety of the Chinese Nationalists evacuating from the Tachens. Now most of that force has returned to its normal bases which are the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa. The Chinese are past masters at the art of camouflage and, as bitter experience in Korea taught us, they can strike in force without detectable preparations. We must rely upon a loyal and dependable force of Nationalists on Formosa to deal with any who, for the reasons indicated, we might be unable to “drown” before the attackers reached that island.

And if perchance there should be any serious defection on Formosa, that would be a situation which we could not possibly meet by landing Marines or the like to fight the Chinese Nationalist defectors on the Island. Such a development would undermine the whole situation.

All of the non-Communist nations of the Western Pacific—particularly Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and, of course, Formosa itself, are watching nervously to see what we do next. I fear that, if we appear strong and coercive only toward our friends, and should attempt to compel Chiang to make further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will be that they had better plan to make the best terms they can with the Communists.

… But this is a situation which we have worked with and lived with very intimately. We do have considerable knowledge, and the responsibility. Surely all that we have done not only here, but in Korea with Rhee, amply demonstrates that we are not careless in letting others get us into a major war. I devoutly hope that there may be enough trust and confidence develop between our two peoples so that when judgments of this kind have to be made, each could, in the last analysis, trust the other in the areas where they have special knowledge and the greatest responsibility.

It would surely not be popular in this country if we became involved in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon as “colonies”—which to us is a naughty word. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue were ever framed in this way, we would be at your side.

We are doing everything possible to work this situation out in a way which, on the one hand, will avoid the risk of war, and, on the other hand, preserve the non-Communist position in the Western Pacific, a position which, by the way, is vital to Australia and New Zealand. However, if the Chinese Communists are determined to have a war to gain Formosa, then there will be trouble.

I see I have made this as long, and perhaps as complicated, as a diplomatic note. For that I apologize!

With warm regard, As Ever, Ike.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–1855. Top Secret; Priority. The message to Prime Minister Churchill was drafted in the White House and incorporated several revisions suggested by Dulles and Hoover, as set forth in a memorandum of February 18 from Dulles to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)
2. Delivered on February 15; see Document 110.
3. Reference is to the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on December 10, 1954; see Document 3.