108. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
101238Z. Ambassador Rankin at Tachen sends.
Evacuation of Tachens proceeding better than expected. Particularly US Navy and MAAG but also Chinese military and civilian organizations handling troops and refugees are all doing splendid jobs. However this is not operation to be [repeated?] if Formosa and other areas of Asia are to be saved from communism.
Militarily, Tachens may not be particularly important but psychological effect of new Communist advance evidently is most damaging to US cause. Still further enemy advance would compound bad psychological effect and also bring serious military disadvantages to Free China and US. Reds evidently are moving their military strength south once more, this time along coastline. Air bases are being developed to control sky over coastal areas and eliminate any serious interference with coastwise shipping which is essential to supplying those bases and for any other military buildup close to Formosa; this in view of totally inadequate internal communication in Chekiang and Fukien as well as absence any prospect of a significant Communist naval power in this area. Elimination of Nationalists from offshore islands evidently is intended secure coastal supply route and permit eventual dispute air control over Formosa Strait. This would be pre-requisite to attack on Formosa itself or to securing flank during Communist adventures farther south where Formosa being saved for future attention.
Offshore islands have little significance in themselves as jumping off points for possible Nationalist invasion of mainland or as springboards for Red attack on Formosa. But they are extremely important to defense of Formosa. Only valid military argument for evacuating Tachens it seems to me is that distance from Formosa makes fair support and supply difficult and costly. Next significant island group to south (Nanchi or Nanki) is 75 nautical miles nearer and correspondingly easier to support. MAAG is restudying defense of Nanchi as matter of urgency but tentative conclusions are that it can and should be held, along with Matsu and Kinmen groups. “Groups” include nearby positions essential to defense of main island in each group.
When Nationalist Air Force and Navy have received additional equipment already scheduled for delivery in next few months they [Page 269] be able to assume full responsibility for defense of offshore islands against anything short of major Red effort. Even Nanchi, most distant island, presumably can be given adequate air cover from bases in North Formosa, thus eliminating need for carrier support. Meanwhile, I believe Commander Seventh Fleet should have orders to extend any necessary air and naval support to defenders of 3 principal remaining offshore island groups.
I still do not believe Reds intend to provoke large-scale conflict in near future but it may require some military engagement to convince them of our firm intentions. If such engagement should occur, then Nanchi might well be as favorable location as any since in all probability action would be over in few hours; it would be around friendly rather than enemy territory; it should give us a much longer breathing spell than any new withdrawal: Communist move southward would be interfered with more than 100 miles north of Formosa Strait to advantage of Formosa itself and points south. Essential steps to implementing above include making clear to Chinese Nationalists what kind of effort we want them to make in holding offshore islands; also US undertaking to replace, within reason, military equipment lost by Nationalists in carrying out our wishes.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–1055. Sent through Navy channels. Received at the Department of State at 7:46 a.m. on February 12. Repeated for information to the Naval Attaché in Taipei and to CINCPAC.↩