Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

107. Telegram From the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Department of State¹

New York, February 11, 1955—6 p.m.

473. For the Secretary. Reference: Off-Shore Islands. Hammarskjöld asked to see me this morning to convey further word re his private communications with Chou. He sent a reply to Chou apparently closely along lines of text he spoke to us about as reported our telegram 447, February 6.² Content of his message was approximately as follows:

1. “I have formed the conviction that discussion beyond the scope of the New Zealand item could not be proposed with any chance of success”. (Hammarskjöld took pains to emphasize the “I”.)

2. He noted the reasons stated by Chou for excluding the SC. He assumed that other procedures under UN aegis were not excluded. (Secretary General emphasized this last point had been formulated as statement rather than question.)

Secretary General then read portions of Chou’s latest reply, pointing out that he was not “transmitting” it to us, and commenting that it was “curiously open and non-diplomatic” in its language.

Gist of Chou’s message as follows: First, he regretted that situation was as Secretary General supposed. Secretary General’s point number two was contrary to what Chou had in mind. In Chinese Communist view even New Zealand item imposing cease-fire cannot go on Council’s agenda. A recognition of “two Chinas” was unacceptable to him. “US must sit down with China in face-to-face negotiations.”

There followed a long portion, which Secretary General did not read, and which apparently contained standard Communist line regarding “US threats to China”. Chou then returned to two China idea stating it was impossible so long as American forces remained in the Straits of Formosa. Chou said that present scheme, which he still attributes to US, to induce Chinese participation in discussions and thereby bring about recognition of two Chinas was out of question.

The UN, Chou said, must not intervene in this internal matter. China was determined to resist the war-like threats of the US.

The UN, Chou went on, would one day have to recognize his government and recognize also the mistake in having excluded him. Chou drew unfavorable comparison between mere invitation to him while Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives had seat in Council.

Chou then recalled his talks with Hammarskjöld and stated that since he, Secretary General, appeared concerned, he should not “lack understanding” of Chou’s attitude. In this there were two elements: (A) The New Zealand item was unacceptable and (B) presence of Chiang’s representative was equally unacceptable. For Chou to have someone sit down with Chiang’s representative would be to recognize existence of two Chinas. USUN comment: Note the repetition.

As for the methods of conducting negotiations, Chou said this was a subject for study in which connection he referred to Soviet role and referred also to Indians. He said China would facilitate any endeavor considered by China to be useful.

Swedish Ambassador Peking commented on above message that Chou’s attitude re UN had noticeably stiffened and that in emphasizing negotiations outside UN Chou hoped some means would provide possibility of coming to terms closer to those he desired.

Hammarskjöld’s comment re Chou’s reply was that it was most interesting in that it clarified that Chou’s main trouble was in sitting down with Chinese Nationalists, since that implies to him recognition of two Chinas, with which he was not prepared to agree. This was, in Secretary General’s view, new element in situation. Only other new element was that Chou was trying to get things outside UN where he could hope for better deal.

Hammarskjöld felt that relatively informal style of Chou’s reply, plus contents thereof were not “the reaction of a man intent on wild adventures”. If Chou could not get negotiations, however, that would seem to be another matter, according to Hammarskjöld. But Chou’s behavior during Tachen evacuation should be noted as supporting theory Chou really desired negotiation.

Recalling again that he was not “transmitting” it, Hammarskjöld said he regarded this message as the end of their exchange on this subject. In his opinion, therefore, Sobolev (USSR) would not bring up possibility of outside negotiation in his SC interventions. Secretary General also felt Chou would not use his proposal for direct negotiations for propaganda purposes. Hammarskjöld seemed much relieved at this development since he feared this matter might come out in public. In his opinion Chou had barred himself from such development.

Hammarskjöld regards this operation as a useful clarification without having paid any price for it.

Comment: Contrary to Hammarskjöld’s assumption that Chou has barred himself from making propaganda out of his exchange with Secretary General, it seems to us that Chou may well have laid groundwork for possible future use in public to claim US is not peace-loving.

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1155. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:45 p.m.
2. Document 95.