Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1955, 10:39 a.m.¹

Washington, February 11, 1955, 10:39 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Area of Formosa

PARTICPANTS

• Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador
• Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. L. T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Sir Percy opened the conversation by saying that he had been instructed by Prime Minister Menzies to come in and relay to the Secretary certain views he held on these matters following the discussion at London and in turn to solicit the Secretary’s reaction thereto.

. . . . . . .

The Secretary said that the sole and only commitment we have is to hold Formosa and the Pescadores. Our treaty with Chiang as well as the Congressional resolution makes this clear. He said we are in agreement with the Australians on the premise that Formosa and the Pescadores must be held. Our only difference, therefore, is as to how this should be accomplished. Until September we had thought it might be accomplished without retaining control of the small offshore islands. We have altered this after taking into account a number of considerations. First was that it became clear that the evacuation or the conquest of the Tachen Islands would be inevitable as they are not militarily defensible without a commitment of U.S. power over and above their importance. Their location and the Communist air complex relatively nearby would, for instance, have made it necessary for us practically to anchor in the neighborhood of the islands a considerable part of our carrier strength. We then had to appraise the loss of these islands in the light of a number of factors; the important one being how big a victory could we afford to see the Communists win without imperiling the morale and the eventual security not only of Formosa but of the whole region. We had concluded that the Communists could not be afforded more of a victory than the Tachen Islands and that this could be afforded only if accompanied by a stronger U.S. defensive posture. The Secretary emphasized that this was a carefully weighed decision.

He commented that we do not yet know the full psychological impact of the loss of the Tachen Islands. When the Communists move in and take over they may launch a propaganda campaign which will multiply its effect on morale and might be very serious.

The Secretary then referred to the Prime Minister’s point that the islands are not vital from the military point of view. He said in the technical sense that their loss would not mean the loss of the Philippines and Japan but he said we had to consider the morale of the 400,000 Nationalist troops. He said these forces were vitally important. Neither we nor, for instance, the Australians would be in a position to replace them. We had concluded that additional losses beyond the Tachens would so gravely affect the morale of these troops that a climate might be established under which the Communists could obtain Formosa from within by subversion.

The Secretary then stressed that we are not committed to anybody as to what we do about the remaining off-shore islands. The decision is entirely ours. He said the [that] Foreign Minister Yeh had never made a statement such as attributed to him in today’s press.²

The Secretary then referred to the assumption sometimes made that the Chinese Communists would stop their aggression if they obtained the off-shore islands. The Secretary said there was no evidence whatsoever to back up such an assumption and he thought it was a very dangerous one. The Chinese Communists do not talk about taking Quemoy and Matsu but about conquering Formosa. We are in effect in a war today over Formosa and he thought it was dangerous to think we could win such a struggle by retreat.

Ambassador Spender inquired if we feel the Chinese Communists could mount an attack on Formosa. The Secretary while not replying directly said the important thing was that they might feel that they could do so. The Secretary referred to a statement made by a knowledgeable member of the British Labor Party group which had gone to China³ to the effect that the Chinese might feel that a considerable expenditure of men and treasure would be worthwhile in such an enterprise even if it failed because of the value they might attach to its propaganda value in Asia and its divisive effect among the Western allies.

The Secretary repeated that the battle was really on and that there will be no more privileged sanctuary as in Korea. He said the 16 Korean partners were now in agreement on that, as regards Korea. He said we were not prepared to accept a line say in the middle of the Straits beyond which we would have no interest. He added also that in this case there was no UN action and apparently no prospect thereof and that, therefore, the U.S. must use its own best judgment. He said the islands had been held for five years and with the exception of one incident in 1949,⁴ there had been no tension during this period. It was only when the Communists started their propaganda about taking Formosa last fall that the tension arose. He added that the islands blocked the harbors which are the natural staging grounds for an invasion. In summary the Secretary said that we felt to disengage from these islands would seriously affect morale in Formosa and in the area generally, there was no assurance that such an action would reduce tensions, that on the contrary it might aggravate the situation even more and that at the same time it would make an attack on Formosa easier. We may be right or we may be wrong but this is our best judgment and it is a considered judgment. The Secretary said our position was not necessarily one to be maintained for all time but that we must continue to use our best judgment on it in the light of developments. When a situation may be reached where the considerations outlined above do not in our opinion have the same force they have today we might be prepared to revise our position.

The Secretary referred to how Hammarskjöld had returned from his mission empty-handed and mentioned to the Ambassador the picture incident.

The Secretary said he hoped that Australia understood that the U.S. was not being reckless and that we did not want war. The Secretary said he felt we had been calm and careful. Our major interest is to see that the Chinese Communists do not succeed in driving a wedge into the island chain of defense. This would be an immediate disaster for a country such as Australia and an ultimate disaster for the U.S. He said in these days when some democracies were weak and divided that he felt countries having a direct interest in this situation should be glad to see the strength and the political unity on the matter which is present here in the U.S. We do not pretend perfection but we are strong and we are united and under the circumstances we deserve the support of countries in peril. He expressed the hope that minor difference with allies not be exploited or blown up into major ones.

. . . . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Raynor. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. The New York Times reported that morning that Yeh told reporters that the United States was pledged to defend all the offshore islands.
3. A British Labour Party delegation visited the People’s Republic of China in August 1954. The reference is apparently to a conversation with a member of the delegation reported in telegram 560 from Tokyo, September 6, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 573, footnote 3.
4. The Nationalists successfully resisted a Communist attack on Quemoy in October 1949.