104. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill 1

Dear Winston : I have heard how earnestly you supported throughout the Conference of Prime Ministers the proposition that nothing must create a serious rift in British-American relationships. Not only do I applaud that sentiment, but I am most deeply grateful to you for your successful efforts.

I realize that it has been difficult, at times, for you to back us up in the Formosa question and, for this reason, I want to give you a very brief account of our general attitude toward the various factors that have dictated the course we have taken. You understand, of course, that we have certain groups that are violent in their efforts to get us to take a much stronger, even a truculent position. The number that would like to see us clear out of Formosa is negligible. I know that on your side of the water you have the exact opposite of this situation.

Because the Communists know these facts, there is no question in my mind that one of the principal reasons for their constant pressing on the Asian frontier is the hope of dividing our two countries. I am sure that we, on both sides of the water, can make quite clear that, no matter what may be our differences in approach or even sometimes our differences in important convictions, nothing is ever going to separate us or destroy our unity in opposing Communist aggression.

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We believe that if international Communism should penetrate the island barrier in the Western Pacific and thus be in a position to threaten the Philippines and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us, including the free countries of Europe, would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now. Certainly that whole region would soon go.

To defend Formosa the United States has been engaged in a long and costly program of arming and sustaining the Nationalist troops on that island. Those troops, however, and Chiang himself, are not content, now, to accept irrevocably and permanently the status of “prisoners” on the island. They are held together by a conviction that some day they will go back to the mainland.

As a consequence, their attitude toward Quemoy and the Matsus, which they deem the stepping stones between the two hostile regions, is that the surrender of those islands would destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. This, then, would mean the almost immediate conversion of that asset into a deadly danger, because the Communists would immediately take it over.

The Formosa Resolution, as passed by the Congress, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists is important to us, so for the moment, and under existing conditions, we feel they must have certain assurances2 with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, which was overwhelmingly passed yesterday by the Senate.3 We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has only as its objective the capture of an off-shore island and one that is primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.

Whatever now is to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.

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I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in an effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from your country. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia’s treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. She would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion. But all this is no excuse for fighting China. We believe our policy is the best that we can design for staying out of such a fight.

In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right—if we can figure out the right—and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world’s intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.

Though thus sketchily presented, this has been the background of our thinking leading up to the present day. I devoutly hope that history’s inflexible yardstick will show that we have done everything in our power, and everything that is right, to prevent the awful catastrophe of another major war.

I am sending you this note, not merely because of my realization that you, as our great and trusted ally, are entitled to have our thoughts on these vital matters, but because I so value, on the more personal side, the opportunity to learn of your own approach to these critical problems.

Again my thanks to you for giving Thomas Stephens4 so much of your valuable time, and my apologies that he appeared in London in what was, I know, a most difficult and exhausting week for you.

With warm regard,

Your devoted friend,

Ike 5
  1. Source: Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Ambassador Aldrich with a covering note from John W. Hanes, Special Assistant to the Secretary, requesting that he deliver the letter to Prime Minister Churchill.
  2. A memorandum by Secretary Dulles of a conversation with Ambassador Makins on February 11 reads in part as follows:

    “I told Ambassador Makins of the President’s letter to Churchill and let him read a copy. He asked about the word ‘assurances’ made to the Nationalists. I said that the word was not used in any technical sense of an agreement or commitment but merely that present circumstances were somewhat reassuring to them and thus partly offset the damage to their morale instant to the evacuation of the Tachens.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

  3. The Senate approved the treaty on February 9 by a vote of 64 to 6. Secretary Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the treaty on February 7, and the Committee reported the treaty favorably to the Senate on February 8. The record of those sessions and the report are printed in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vol. VII, pp. 309–380 and 782–793.
  4. Thomas E. Stephens, the President’s Appointment Secretary.
  5. The signature on the source text, a carbon copy, is not in the President’s handwriting.