Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

90. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 1, 1955—11:14 a.m.

4284. For Collins from Secretary. Your 4263 rptd Paris 1141 and 4264 rptd Paris 1142.²

1. Re alternatives to Diem, we do not think that switch would be desirable or practicable at present time. We still think we should continue to back Diem. we particularly note from 4264 that Gen. Ely shares that view. While situation is complex and sensitive, it appears preferable to us to continue support for Diem and concentrate all our efforts to getting backing for his government. Every avenue should be explored, as you have been doing, to arrive at workable solution along these lines. We doubt that there is any acceptable alternative which we could back on the scale necessary for success.

2. However you should feel free, if situation becomes acutely critical, to speak frankly to Diem that unless he can do better than he is now doing we may have to cease U.S. support for Viet-Nam which will jeopardize not only himself but the whole country. Surely he must feel an obligation to all patriots who have come down by the hundreds of thousands in hope of getting refuge in Free Viet-Nam. We strongly hope this regrettable decision by U.S. will not be forced upon us.

3. In your discretion you may put question directly to Diem for me as to his intentions regarding broadening and strengthening of his government with competent ministers. You may say that U.S. Government is deeply concerned over present developments in Viet-Nam, hopes that effective government under his premiership can be immediately formed and that, as I mentioned to him in Saigon, U.S. has tremendous stake in success of his administration and Free Viet-Nam. We have consistently backed him.

4. With respect to settlement of sect problem, I wonder if we may not have been moving too fast in trying to establish strong central government and rapidly and substantially liquidate control and jurisdiction of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. I would like your further views and recommendations on developing workable relationship in civil and military matters between central government and two sect organizations. If there are any financial problems regarding integration of sect forces into national army, please inform me. But I do not see how Diem as Prime Minister can accept having Saigon and central police under jurisdiction of group not under control of central government.

5. Although Ely advocates continuing support for Diem, I am astonished at his remark that he might even have to put Diem under arrest to prevent civil war (para. 8, Part I your 4264), whereas he indicated he would not use FEC prevent Binh Xuyen reinforcement your 4159.³ we should not treat Prime Minister and government as inferior to rebellious sect leaders whom French apparently regard as immune from arrest by them. Fundamental challenge to central authority is involved, among other things, in this crisis.

6. For Achilles: I concur in Collins suggestion para, one, Part I [II] his 4264 repeated Paris 1142, and you should convey to Bao Dai in manner you consider most effective, views expressed in para. 1 and 3 of this telegram. If possible, it should be impressed on Bao Dai that he could make contribution in this critical situation by using his influence with Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen to accept authority central government and accede to political settlement.

7. You may inform Ely substance this telegram.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–3155. Top Secret. Drafted by Young and cleared, according to Young, by Dulles. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. Documents 84 and 85.
3. Document 77.