Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

89. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, April 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Draft telegram for General Collins

I am attaching a draft telegram which I suggest you send to General Collins.…

On reviewing the recent telegrams from Saigon, I have the uneasy feeling that the French in particular and our people to some extent have overcautioned Diem on taking actions against the Binh Xuyen. Ely arranged a truce which I am not sure was well-timed. Collins has been using very strong pressure on Diem not to take action against the Binh Xuyen. My hunch is this has all been bad advice. The Binh Xuyen have to be dealt with severely and often with bloodshed, if necessary, sooner or later. Their leader will rebel against any central authority he does not absolutely control. While it might have worked out better if this challenge had come three or four months later, when the national army is in better shape, it is obvious to me from my talks in Saigon that the sect leaders knew the jig was up and moved before it was too late.

I don’t think the State Department can directly encourage Diem to take forceful action against the Binh Xuyen and its leader. However, I am baffled as to how we must continue—whether Diem should not be thwarted in putting down this rebellion. Attempts for a reconciliation will just put off the evil day unless the Binh Xuyen leader, General Vien, submits without reserve to central authority.

The best thing I know to do is to get a telegram off to Collins asking him to evaluate the situation. Furthermore we have not received from Saigon any over-all estimate of the situation.

[Attachment]

Draft Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins)²

Washington, [April 1, 1955].

Would appreciate estimate of national government’s capabilities vis-à-vis Binh Xuyen in Saigon–Cholon area. Can government rely on national army battalions in this area? Are they adequately equipped and supplied with ammunition? If so, can government bring Binh Xuyen under full control by whatever means necessary? We have seen … report, … that French have consistently refused issue sufficient reserve ammunition to national army battalions which, according this report, have only four hours reserve supply for heavy fighting. Can French action be verified? Would also appreciate whatever assessment can be made of Viet Minh infiltration and instigation Binh Xuyen or otherwise Saigon area.

Now that Cao Dai leaders appear to have rallied to Diem, what are estimates outcome of Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao challenge to government?

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–155. Top Secret.
2. This draft telegram was classified Top Secret. See Document 99, which is in response to it.