77. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
4159. 1. I called on Ely 27th to review developments. Ely said he had been rendered uneasy by telegrams received in Paris and although he had seen Daridan and other subordinates since returning, he did not have a very clear picture of local situation. I told Ely that while I did not discount seriousness of situation, I had never viewed it as seriously as the French. Moreover, press accounts have tended to exaggerate crisis out of all proportions. Ely said that press had caused difficulties for him likewise, since at time disturbing dispatches began to appear he was in Paris telling government that situation was improving.
2. I reviewed events leading to present crisis, and said I thought Diem in past two days had put sects on the defensive psychologically and politically. Some of our newsmen have been to see Ba Cut in Southwest Cochin China and now have some appreciation of what a pirate he, for one, is. I said I had advised Diem to continue to express willingness to carry on discussions with sect front. Diem in fact has handled himself well so far but should not be allowed to become over-confident. I added I was disturbed that Vietnamese Army morale might have been shaken by the present reduction in force. [Page 152] On the other hand, sect troops are no less uncertain of their own future and so may not be eager to move against army.
3. With respect to position of the FEC, Ely said he was disturbed by press accounts which tend to indicate FEC is not taking position in present crisis and accordingly is useless. He said that in his view Binh Xuyen had to be handled with great care otherwise there was danger of their going into Viet Minh underground, where they were 10 years ago. I asked Ely what he thought govt should do if Binh Xuyen forced its hand. He replied that govt should call on Bao Dai as Chief of State to intervene. He said without going into larger question of ultimate role of Bao Dai, present situation which finds chief of govt and chief of state 12,000 kilometers apart at time of crisis is inadmissible. I said I thought govt would not call upon Bao Dai, but on contrary would take action against Binh Xuyen if necessary. If that should develop, I asked Ely, would the FEC prevent Binh Xuyen from being reinforced by troops moving in from outside Saigon. Ely said that I was asking whether FEC would fight with Binh Xuyen. I said this was not my question; I was asking rather if fighting broke out in Saigon whether French would let reinforcements enter. Ely said he found this question rather theoretical and could not undertake to answer it until he knew how political situation was likely to evolve. He continued by asking whether I thought FEC should fire on any troops attempting enter city. I reminded Ely that last September FEC blocked Cao Dai forces which were attempting enter Saigon to support govt against General Hinh. At that time it was not necessary to fire on would-be reinforcements, nor in all likelihood would that be necessary now. Ely said he would endeavor to keep out his reinforcements, but would not enter into direct conflict with Binh Xuyen. I countered by saying that if Binh Xuyen were reinforced, FEC might be obliged to intervene within city. In that case would it not be better to keep out reinforcements entirely and warn Bay Vien in advance? I said I was convinced that if Bay Vien knew he could not be reinforced, he would not act. Ely said it might be necessary for him to take a strong position, but he was concerned that nothing should be done to cause Bay Vien to lose face. If latter felt he could avoid losing face only by military action, he would probably be tempted to take such action. He said that he hoped and thought he could restrain Bay Vien. Exactly how this could be done would depend upon evolution of political situation. I said I was much less concerned with Bay Vien’s loss of face than that govt should lose face. I felt sure govt would not bow to Bay Vien; [garble] it was dangerous to allow reinforcements to enter city, and that if Bay Vien took the initiative, govt would react. Ely said he believed situation was more complicated than that and could not be resolved simply by preventing reinforcements from entering Saigon.
[Page 153]4. (Ely appeared be not fully aware of precautionary measures already taken by Jacquot, who told me 26th that he was guarding road from Saigon to Bien Hoa and from Bien Hoa to Cap St. Jacques. Jacquot said he was taking over larger share of guard duty than Vietnamese have anticipated. He had told Defense Minister Minh that latter did not have to concern himself with assuring protection east of Donai River. Jacquot told me also he was keeping an eye on concentrations of empty junks on waterways which were more likely to be used than roads to transport sect reinforcements into Saigon. Additionally, Jacquot told me he had relieved Vietnamese of responsibility for guarding large sectors of Saigon. I did not mention any of these details to Ely and do not know how he will react when he learns of them. I am hopeful, however, of being able to soften his position that FEC should be used only for direct protection of French property and lives.)
5. I said there appeared to me to be tendency in Paris to consider sects and govt as on a par. In US view sects are rebels against legal govt. Ely said that this was not the view in Paris. However, sects have military force, perhaps relatively more than the govt, and will probably use it rather than lose face. However, he said he did not believe situation had yet become that serious.
6. Ely asked me how I thought the situation was likely to develop. I said there had been no incidents yet. I had urged Diem to keep door open, as he is doing. The sects are not really united. Accordingly, I believed there would be negotiations, but no violence during next few days.
7. Ely agreed with that analysis but went on to say that we must face up to problem of how to treat basic question of what place there is in Vietnamese society for the sects. In this connection Diem has not followed our advice (1) to broaden his govt, and (2) to proceed cautiously in dealing with sects. I said I agreed with point (1), but not with point (2), and felt lack of prudence had been shown by sects rather than Diem. Diem has said he is willing to change his govt but not to accept dictation from sects. Ely agreed that Diem’s present attitude with respect to sects is a good one.
8. I told Ely that US-French group studying possible solution of sect problem (Embtel 40112) has completed its work and has proposal to make to Ely and me. After this proposal has been presented and agreed to by us, I suggested it be communicated to Diem and elected ministers. If accepted by Vietnamese Govt Diem should present it to sect leaders. However, this is a program designed principally to help sect troopers when demobilized not the leaders. Big problem remains of finding some admissible advantages capable of tempting sect leaders. [Page 154] Ely said he thought sect leaders already have too much money to be tempted by that means, and moreover that to remove 2 or 3 leaders would not solve sect problem. I asked Ely what suggestions he had in this regard. He said he could think of nothing except what Diem had already done, namely to leave door open for discussion. I asked what these talks should be about and whether we should advise Diem in respect to them. Ely said he thought it better to let these discussions develop naturally.
9. Ely said he believed long range sect problem could be solved only by return of Bao Dai under conditions carefully stipulated in advance by French and US Govts. I asked how precisely this would solve sect problem. Ely said he did not know but that he believed Bao Dai could get the sects to accept many things which no one else could impose on them. I said I doubted that Diem would remain in office if Bao Dai returned, unless latter returned as constitutional monarch in accordance with terms of a constitution.
10. I asked Ely his view of the joint démarche proposed Paris tel to Dept 4107 rptd Saigon 600,3 saying I thought it contained nothing new except one remark to be addressed to sects regarding their unacceptability to head a govt. Ely said that since neither of us had received instructions, discussion of this matter could be postponed until later. I had the impression Ely is not keen to go ahead with joint démarche.
11. With reference to his trip to Paris, Ely made following points:
- (a)
- He believes that govt policy of support for South Vietnam will be clearer. He said he did not wish to accuse Mendes govt of playing a double game with respect to Vietnam. However, since Mendes govt was so often accused of that, Faure govt is determined to act so that it will not be subjected to same accusation.
- (b)
- Ely has received French Govt agreement that when FEC has raised [reached?] 75,000 level June 1, it will remain at that strength for some period, during which plans will be worked out for ultimate disposition of FEC.
- (c)
- Certain funds were made available to Ely for economic purposes, including refugee relief.
12. Ely said that removal of Charbonnages equipment had been completed 26th. I congratulated him on this and said it was owing to him that program had succeeded. I went on to say that I felt things were not going well for Communists in north and therefore felt we should not allow ourselves to become too discouraged with regard to situation in south. Ely cordially agreed with this analysis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–2855. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.↩
- Dated March 21, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/3–2155)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 73.↩