Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

85. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, March 31, 1955—midnight.

4264. Part I.

1. I called on General Ely at 1230 March 31.² Ely reviewed events since meeting of March 30 and said at 1630 yesterday Diem summoned Wintrebert and asked him to have Ely name General Gambiez as mediator between the Binh Xuyen and government. Ely said he did so and as result truce had been reached which he thought would last 48 hours.

2. Diem asked Ely to help in working out reduction of Binh Xuyen forces in Saigon police posts. Ely commented to me that Binh Xuyen personnel were in fact in the process of being reduced in these posts even before Diem’s request reached him.

3. Ely then said Do had called morning 31st and informed him that during conversation with Diem earlier, latter had been very abrupt. Accordingly, Do’s resignation still stands but remains in suspense. I commented I regarded the situation as most serious and stated I believed if Do and his group did resign government could not last very long.

4. I asked Ely if my suggestion that National Sûreté HQ building be isolated had been studied. General Ely replied it had been investigated but it was found it would not yet be practical to cut off utilities to that building. I then suggested perhaps communications to this HQ could be cut. Ely replied that Binh Xuyen, occupying strategic positions outside city, would probably react by cutting much of Saigon’s communications with outside world.

5. I then said I believed we must accept principle that Diem relieve Sang and that this would be less dangerous if new chief were temporarily established in a new Sûreté HQ perhaps in Commissariat on Boulevard Gallieni. Ely stated he agreed Sang should be relieved but felt this was not the proper time. He feared that if Sang is relieved now it will only increase tension. I suggested Ely inform Diem that, when Sang can be replaced without risk, Ely will establish necessary communications for new Chief of Sûreté to operate someplace other than the present Sûreté building. Ely said he would do this.

6. Ely then stated he felt we must continue support Diem not only for well-known international political reasons but because within country his departure might have effect causing rupture between Central and South Viet Nam. However, he said, Diem must be persuaded to be more conciliatory and enlarge government, otherwise the country would become enmeshed in civil war. As possible solution to current situation, Ely suggested that Diem give Do the mission of contacting all political sectors of society to determine how best to arrive at such enlargement of government. He feels that this offers best possibility for getting Diem to strengthen Cabinet. I said I would consider proposal and discuss with him later.

7. Ely said he was aware of reports that Diem might resign and take blast at U.S. and France. He added that Diem would also no doubt try to drive wedge between France and U.S.

8. In course of conversation Ely stated forcefully he intended establish and maintain order and prevent civil war even if that involved putting Diem under arrest.

Part II.

1. I called on Diem 1700 March 31 at his invitation. He told me he had received two telegrams from Bao Dai, one in clear and one in code, referring to armed conflict night 29/30, expressing grave concern and saying no previous government had permitted armed clash between Vietnamese leading to bloodshed. Last sentence of coded message said Bao Dai would be waiting for indication of Diem’s “intentions”. I asked Diem what this meant. He said he didn’t know, perhaps Bao Dai was asking whether he intended wage war on sects. (Colonel Lansdale, who had been at Palace all morning, said that brother Luyen had said this meant Bao Dai was asking Diem if Diem would resign. He said he believed Bao Dai thought Vietnamese army was responsible for starting conflict.) (This is becoming official French line.) He said that purpose of his inviting me to call was to ask if I would agree send telegram to Bao Dai explaining present situation and saying government has affair well in hand. I said that I had reported fully to my government my belief that Binh Xuyen forces were responsible for conflict but I could not agree to act as intermediary between him and Bao Dai. However, I said I would see what I could do. (If Department approves I suggest Embassy Paris be instructed to brief Imperial Cabinet representatives Paris, on basis my recent telegrams.)

2. Diem said Cao Dai were best element among sects, as they had proved by their adherence to his reply of 24th to sect ultimatum of which principal element was concept of single army. Cao Dai ministers, he said, had resigned in order permit complete secularization of Cao Dai military and political activities and even Cao Dai Pope had signed private agreement with his colleagues releasing Cao Dai forces for integration into National Army. I said I wished I could be as optimistic as President as to validity and lasting quality of any such agreement.

3. I asked Diem where he stood with Tran Van Do. He said he had invited Do to call this morning. Do had insisted on urgency of solving political question and Diem asked him to submit in writing plan to resolve impasse. I asked if Tinh Than ministers were remaining in government. He said yes and that resignations had been submitted only to free Diem hands in forming new Cabinet. I warned Diem that if Do and his associates left government it would be difficult for him to continue as Prime Minister. (Do had informed me that he was still opposed to the use of force in dealing with sect problem, as were some of Diem’s generals.) I urged him have complete Cabinet discussion before he took any further action and to seek a political solution in next week or ten days. If Diem determined on military operations he would find no French support and probably little National Army support.

4. I said that he must quickly get new blood in his Cabinet and delegate authority to competent ministers. Otherwise there was danger of imminent collapse of government. I told Diem that U.K. and Australian diplomatic representatives as well as Ely agreed with me in this regard. Diem said that he intended to reform his government “now that sect front is dissolved”. I reminded him that he had dealt only with Cao Dai and that Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao still opposed him. I encouraged him to move ahead quickly on political front, announce new government and re-state his programs. Diem said he was proposing to make indirect political contacts tonight with various circles to see what were the possibilities for forming a new Cabinet. I asked if he intended to invite into his government men of caliber of Quat, who might not always agree with him. He gave no direct answer but said he was willing to consult with Quat. I suggested that he consult his Cabinet fully on all major policies saying that unless assurance to that effect was given he could not get good men. I suggested he use one of his ministers, in particular Tran Van Do, to take political soundings for him and to draw up list of possible members. Diem said he would not do this until he had seen Do’s plans for government reorganization (mentioned above) but he agreed to discuss matter with Do soonest.

5. I told him I thought sects would never agree to renounce all participation in government and asked him if he would consider establishing some sort of Council of Elders, without power, but in which membership would confer some prestige. Diem said that he had already thought of that and would give it further study.

6. Diem indicated that he was still highly irritated that French had not allowed him storm National Police HQ in central Saigon. He muttered threats to effect that if he was much longer frustrated in his plans for dealing with Binh Xuyen he would resign and write a “white paper”.

Part III.

I met with Tran Van Do later night 31 March and told him of conversation with President. He indicated that while he had left his resignation and those of his colleagues with President, they would remain in government unless President took some drastic action that might lead to civil war. He agreed to undertake with help of Embassy staff officer to draft plan for reorganization of government and to suggest list of new Cabinet ministers for submission to Diem. He will consult with President about this morning 1 April. (We hope some good may have come of this, but still are somewhat skeptical of Diem’s acceptance of idea.)

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Collins

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1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–3155. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information priority to Paris.
2. A memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Sturm, is in Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VIII, Memos for Record.