Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

331. Memorandum From the Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board (Bowie) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Defense Presentation: “Capability to Deal with Local Aggression in Vietnam”—NSC Agenda, June 7, 1956

Background

1. In the review of NSC 5501² last fall, one of the basic issues isolated by the Planning Board for an intensive study was the problem of local war.

In order to deal with local war, NSC 5501, as adopted in January 1955, called for highly mobile U.S. forces suitably equipped for local war, including atomic capability, but not dependent on use of atomic weapons for effective action. The Planning Board considered it essential that the U.S. forces should be sufficiently flexible so that a decision to intervene would not automatically mean a decision to employ nuclear weapons. NSC 5602/1³ in general reaffirms the necessity for ready mobile units with selective and flexible capability and not inevitably dependent on tactical nuclear weapons. (See paragraphs 15 and 16 of NSC 5602/1 attached.⁴)

2. The Planning Board was not entirely satisfied that such mobile and flexible forces were receiving the amount of attention and resources which they deserved. In order to enable the NSC to determine whether this was the case, the Planning Board recommended that the Department of Defense should make a special presentation of such U.S. capabilities using Vietnam as a test case.

Purpose

3. The Defense presentation will be most useful to the NSC if it is organized to clarify:

a. Whether the U.S. has sufficient mobile striking forces in an adequate state of readiness;

b. Whether there is air lift available to move such forces immediately;

c. Whether these forces have been organized, trained, and equipped for local war conditions in vulnerable local areas;

d. Whether they have capability for conventional combat in situations in which it may be unfeasible to employ nuclear weapons;

e. What principles will govern any planned use of nuclear weapons in local war situations; targets, restrictions, political and military objectives.

Prospect

4. No papers have been circulated, and Defense is closely holding the substance of its presentation. The essential elements involved present peculiarly difficult service issues in the roles and missions of forces and in the allocation of budgetary and manpower resources. There is some reason to believe that the presentation may stress the particulars of the Vietnam situation at the expense of a basic review of U.S. local war capabilities. In addition, it may be designed to over-turn the existing policy which would enable decision regarding use of nuclear weapons to be made at the time in the light of political and other factors.

5. A previous Defense–JCS study, submitted to the Planning Board on September 15, 1955,⁵ estimated that with the use of atomic weapons, two to four U.S. divisions would be required for a period of a few months to one year “to check aggression”, with a longer time needed to clear out the Vietminh back to the 17th parallel. The study estimated up to eight US. divisions would be required, for a period of time which could not be estimated, to destroy Vietminh forces and take control of North Vietnam. The fourth U.S. division would not achieve readiness until D+180 and would not be available in the area until D+225. That study did not make clear how atomic weapons would be employed nor what practical effects their non-use would entail.

Recommendation

6. That in the discussion of the Defense presentation—

a. You attempt to have clarified the basic elements enumerated in paragraph 3 above as indispensable to subsequent determinations of U.S. policy and strategy with respect to areas which may become the objects of local aggression;

b. You resist any effort to obtain a decision that would make U.S. forces incapable of effective action in local war without nuclear weapons, or would commit us to their use without regard to political considerations.

Robert R. Bowie%%⁶

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519 Series. Top Secret. Bowie was also the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy”, January 6, 1955, is not printed.
3. NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy”, March 15, 1956, is not printed.
4. Not attached to the source text.
5. Printed as an enclosure to Document 254.
6. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.