335. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1
Dear Felix: I am inclosing for your information a copy of the “Broad Outline Plan for U.S. Military Participation in the Event of Viet Minh Aggression in Viet Nam” which I presented to the National Security Council on Thursday, 7 June.2 This plan incorporates my concept of operations for the defeat of Viet Minh aggression south of the 17th Parallel. This concept is, in general, the same as I discussed with you during your recent trip here. I also discussed this plan in considerable detail with Mike O’Daniel, who concurs in the concept set forth in the plan.
The plan was quite well received by the National Security Council and was approved by the President. Implementation of this decision is now underway by the Joint Staff, and a planning directive3 is being prepared which will incorporate the concept of operations contained in this Outline Plan.
I have seen both your comments on my plan4 and a draft of your plan (CINCPAC 49–56)5 and note there are basic differences in the two concepts which I am sure you will recognize. Since your plan will, in effect, be overtaken by the planning directive to be issued you as a result of the decision by the President, I think it would be desirable to give you some of the thinking behind this plan, and certain additional information not contained in my presentation.
This plan is designed to be implemented on a very austere basis, and with forces immediately available in WesPac. This is a point that I am quite concerned about since it has been my experience that unless you keep a critical eye on them, your staff logistic people will come up with a plush set of logistic requirements, particularly in supporting troops. This will apply not only to U.S. forces, but also to the Viet Nam forces. An example of this type of thinking is the statement made by Taylor during our discussion of this plan, that the three RCT’s would require a division slice of 40,000. We must learn to conduct this type of operation with tailored forces and on a minimum support basis, and this applies particularly to indigenous forces.
Another aspect of this concept which is most important and does not appear in the presentation, is that of having the commanders [Page 713] of the RCT’s that are earmarked for this operation sent to Viet Nam to look over the terrain and to acquaint themselves with the tactical setup. They should be accompanied by their staffs and the battalion commanders, and should be authorized to discuss tactical problems and plans with the Vietnamese commanders. Similarly, the air unit commanders should familiarize themselves and their staffs with the bases to which they may be deployed. Not only would this provide invaluable information to these commanders, but the impact on the Vietnamese would be tremendous.
I have seen Williams’ comments on the Outline Plan (ChMAAG Vietnam 070701Z June6) and if this really represents his considered thinking on the military aspects of this area, I have grave doubts as to his ability and as to his being a proper representative in this important area. His comments are typical of the “requirements” type of thinking that is giving us so much trouble everywhere. I won’t attempt to comment on his message other than to say he has completely missed the point of the concept. I intend to discuss this whole matter with you in detail when you come back here next month.
I am delighted that you were able to revise the date for the Cubi Point commissioning and am looking forward to being there.
Sincerely,
P.S. Any action you initiate as a result of this letter should come from you and not using the letter itself. I am really giving you this for your personal use because I felt that the Navy Brief of my concept was not a good one.
- Source: JCS Files, CJCS 091 Indochina. Top Secret.↩
- Document 333.↩
- Memorandum from the JCS to CINCPAC, July 11, 1956; cited in Spector, The Early Years, p. 272.↩
- See Document 329.↩
- Not found. For a discussion of CINCPAC 46–56, the contingency plan as adopted in the fall of 1956, see Spector, The Early Years, p. 272.↩
- Supra.↩
- Printed from a copy with this stamped signature.↩