Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

269. Letter From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, October 27, 1955.

Dear Fred: The first stage in Viet-Nam’s political transformation has taken place, perhaps with better results and in a more convincing manner than what had been expected, although I am sure we have not heard the last from Bao Dai and his entourage. This plebiscite and the rejection of Bao Dai in Free Viet-Nam came upon us rather suddenly and obliquely. It turned out all right but it might have run off the tracks. I wish that Diem and his people had given us a little more forewarning and official notification of their intentions and their program. There were one or two tricky aspects of this plebiscite. For example, it now may mean that the Republic of Viet-Nam is limited de facto to the area south of the 17th parallel, for that is the only territory in which the voting was conducted, while the State of Viet-Nam has covered the entire territory of Viet-Nam juridically speaking. However, this may not be of much real importance since it has clarified Diem’s status, removed Bao Dai’s hand, and the Viet Minh control of the north anyway. At this point we are not certain what, if anything, will happen at the Foreign Ministers talks in Geneva. According to Walter Robertson and Doug MacArthur, the Secretary was adamant against any four power discussion of non-agenda items.² However, Molotov told Pearson Viet-Nam should be taken up at Geneva,³ and the British, somewhat chagrined over their dangling role of co-Chairman, seem resigned and susceptible. Perhaps we can hold off until an assembly is formed in Viet-Nam.

We are now thinking here of what comes next politically in Viet-Nam, but we are not altogether clear about the next two stages as reported in your 1468 of September 28.⁴ The second referendum is a little over four weeks away if still held. Again the press will plague us for comments and guidance on the draft constitution as well as elections on the national assembly. I hope that the Embassy can send in copies of the constitution as soon as available. Also we would depend a great deal on the normal reporting of the political thinking and decisions regarding the constitution and the elections.

I was very interested in your 1672 of October 14⁵ replying to our 1192.⁶ There certainly are a number of unknown and variable factors which confirm the practical advantage of the government’s program of proceeding in stages from the safest to the most risky step. I am still worried about the complexion and consequences of an assembly, although I appreciate the need for some democratic process. The lads in Policy Planning are also worried about this same thing. So, in my view also, indirect elections would seem best suited at this time, or perhaps the timing could be pushed back. If a national assembly is created in December or January, then political problems as well as economic matters will probably come to a head in the first six months of 1956. We assume here an assembly would oppose the Geneva declaration on elections and also direct consultations with the Viet Minh. What will the latter do then?

In connection with my comment above on the reporting, I wonder if we in the Department were not too critical and stringent when we were talking with you and Dan Anderson regarding telegraphic volume while Collins and Sturm were in Saigon. We spoke of this so often and with such feeling that we may have inadvertently left the impression that telegraphic correspondence to and from Saigon should be cut to the bone. Perhaps we have gone to the other extreme in our own telegrams to you. I wonder if we are filling you in adequately and quickly enough on the Washington aspects of Vietnamese as well as general problems. If we are not, please let me know. By the same token, I would not be at all adverse to seeing some increase in the political reporting by telegram from the Embassy. I think there are some aspects of the plebiscite that could have been reported to us that would have helped in establishing our general outlook towards it and in our handling of the press. Just for example, it would have helped us if we had had a report on the type of ballot, the organization of the referendum and the conditions under which it would be held. These were all questions which the press began asking us as soon as the announcement was made in Saigon. We were somewhat handicapped in not having a summary from the Embassy. I mention this matter of reporting because there continues to be a very great interest in the future of Viet-Nam in high levels in the United States Government, and we need plenty of background information in dealing with the British and French Governments which we do via the Embassies here. I have discussed this item of reporting with Bob Hoey and Paul Kattenburg to be sure I have the right perspective.

Sincerely,

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Viet-Nam Correspondence—1955. Confidential; Official–Informal.
2. The formal expression of the Secretary’s view that the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955, should limit its discussion to the agenda questions of Germany and European security, disarmament, and developments of contacts between east and west is set forth in telegram 1397 to Paris, October 12. (ibid., Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–1255)
3. A report of Pearson’s discussion with Molotov in Moscow, including reference to Indochina, is attached to a memorandum of discussion between Dulles and the Canadian Ambassador, by Outerbridge Horsey, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, October 14. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
4. See footnote 2, Document 259.
5. Document 266.
6. Document 264.