Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

266. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 14, 1955—6 p.m.

1672. Ref: Deptel sent Saigon 1192 Paris 1314.²

1. We fully share Department’s concern that central authority of Diem govt not be weakened by premature creation unruly Assembly. We believe, however, that Diem govt can be depended on not to permit such situation to arise, and that greater danger exists that once government has developed stable executive leadership, it may postpone broadening democratic base of govt beyond point where this both feasible and desirable. Optimum procedure and timetable clearly dependent on a number of variables, many of which we cannot hope to influence, and some of which are not yet fully known.

2. Assessment of when Assembly elections can and should be held depends on type of elections (which not yet decided), evidence (yet to be shown) of govt ability to organize elections, and indication (as yet inconclusive) of general temper of electorate.

3. Present govt program has advantage of proceeding in stages from safest to most risky step, and of permitting thereby progress in implementing subsequent steps to be predicated on results of earlier ones. It can be assumed that govt’s decision regarding both date and type of elections for National Assembly will be dependent on: (a) results of referenda and communal and municipal elections; (b) progress in development efficient party organization with suitable candidates; and (c) general political climate prevailing at time, including internal and external pressures for such elections.

4. Actual method of bringing about National Assembly, choice of which will depend on factors mentioned in para 3, could vary from actually holding direct elections to extreme of appointing one and having it confirmed by third referendum. Plan to hold direct elections in December seems highly unrealistic in view of: (a) time required to prepare mechanics of elections (including screening of candidates) and government’s lack of experience in field; (b) inadequacy of present organization of government parties in terms waging campaign and presenting suitable candidates; and (c) unstable security conditions still prevailing in parts of south and center. We believe that, if direct elections are held, they will be postponed beyond December, and that if original schedule adhered to, some procedure other than direct elections will be resorted to. Subject to evidence yet to unfold in coming weeks, we continue to view indirect elections as best suited to overall situation, and solution most likely eventually to be adopted.

5. Kind of Assembly which would result from elections at any specified time depends, of course, on factors mentioned in para 2 and on degree to which elections are controlled (i.e. screening of candidates and voters, intimidation of opposition, freedom of electioneering, etc.). As Department is aware, any estimate of actual relative strength of parties and groups in Free Vietnam today is highly speculative in view of absence of any previous free expression of popular will and absence of any legal means for anti-Diem elements to voice their views today. It is highly doubtful, however, that Diem supporters would command a majority in South Vietnam today in completely free direct elections for an Assembly. Diem would presumably fare better in center. As stated above, however, we believe Diem can be counted on to proceed cautiously, and to see to it that Assembly if and when created contains comfortable govt majority. Cao Dai have already indicated that they would like to form focal point of legal opposition to Diem within Assembly around which other anti-Communist elements opposed to Diem could gather. Diem himself has indicated a preference for the emergence of a two-party system similiar to US model rather than a plethora of parties along French style. Whether Diem would ever permit creation of opposition of type envisaged by Cao Dai is questionable. It would certainly depend, at very least, on his conviction that his own majority would be substantial.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/10–1455. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. Document 264.