Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

259. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 29, 1955—9 p.m.

1483. Ref: Embtel sent Dept 1468 info Paris 283.²

1. In private conversation Sept 26, Diem indicated to me govt planning to proceed along lines described in para 2 reftel.³ No official announcement has yet been made.

2. I took occasion to remind PriMin of numerous conversations with him and other VN officials in which I and members of Embassy had endeavored to explain disadvantages in use of referendum to resolve imperial question. He countered with usual arguments. I said that submission of constitution for adoption by referendum was equally undesirable procedure and asked why he could not simplify process by having constitution dealt with by elected constituent assembly. Essence of his reply was that he feared an assembly would take too long and in the end produce an unacceptable document providing for too much parliamentary authority over the govt. Vietnam could not afford at this step to risk in the instability of parliamentary govt on the French model.

3. The only point he seemed to accept during course of lengthy discussion was my suggestion that if he felt compelled to hand down a constitution ex cathedra he might at least label it “provisional” and permit the assembly to work on the drafting of a definitive organic constitution to be adopted at some later date. Diem did not speak to me of substance his proposed constitution. Accordingly, our knowledge of draft reported in reftel remains unofficial.

4. Following is our thinking re above plan:

a. Program is somewhat cumbersome, involving as it does two referenda and two elections⁴ within three months. Mechanics may prove more difficult than Vietnamese anticipate in view lack experience such matters.

b. Undemocratic aspects of program will be apparent both internally and abroad. Referendum procedure clearly less democratic than having elected assembly decide on questions of Bao Dai and new constitution. Constitution concentrates power heavily in hands of President, who can dissolve house as well as govern through issuance ordinances in emergency. On other hand no presidential veto of legislation passed by house is provided for (although this may be added in later draft).

c. In spite of above shortcomings, implementation of program would result healthier situation than present, and program may very possibly represent greatest measure of democracy possible in Free Vietnam today constituent [consistent?] with maintenance of strong, stable govt.

d. Govt appears determined to proceed with program, and it is unlikely U.S. could bring about significant modification without exertion of greatest pressure.

e. Believe it essential some action be taken soon, and would therefore consider implementation above program preferable to further procrastination and haggling.

f. Most important that elections for assembly be held. Possibility exists that Diem may proceed with referenda and then postpone assembly elections. (It is clear that direct elections will pose many problems and he had, therefore, felt indirect elections safer and probably adequate.)

g. Believe our best plan of ensuring that Diem proceed with assembly elections is to make unequivocally clear to him importance we attach to assembly and fact our ability to continue supporting him effectively in such matters as Geneva consultations predicated in large part on his making progress on government programs such as election of National Assembly.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/9–2955. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. In this telegram, September 28, the Embassy reported receiving Vietnamese Government plans for two national referenda. The first was to be held on October 23 to decide whether Bao Dai should be deposed and Diem designated Chief of State. The second, to be held November 27, was to decide on a draft constitution prepared by the Diem government, establishing in Vietnam a strong presidential system. A draft preamble to the proposed constitution provided that individual rights would be exercised “to the extent compatible with requirements of independence, public security and general interest.” The two referenda were to be followed by direct elections for a National Assembly. (Ibid., 751G.00/9–2855)
3. This paragraph contained the schedule for the successive elections.
4. Communal and municipal elections were scheduled to be held simultaneously with the second referendum.