Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

270. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

Paris, October 31, 1955—8 p.m.

2157. ReDeptel 1704.² Roux seized occasion our visit this morning to raise subject Franco-Vietnamese relations. Speaking personally, he said he aware “equivocal” nature French policy towards Vietnam in March/April period this year, Binh Xuyen role etc, and he wished tell us he had been personally distressed by it (this first time key French official has made such statement and we would appreciate source not being quoted). However, Roux said, French had adopted different line thereafter as we well knew. But, he said, Diem’s handling of France recently making job French officials concerned with IC affairs almost impossible. Roux said he wanted us to know that it had not been easy obtain French position supporting results referendum and jettisoning Bao Dai. French elements traditionally hostile Diem and favorable Bao Dai had been overpowered, but not without difficulty. Instead of any gesture on Diem’s part to release two French officers³ following referendum as had been hoped, Roux noted that Diem had only seen fit thus far to renounce Franco-Vietnamese commercial agreement⁴ (we gathered Hoppenot will approach Diem re opening talks this score).

Re FEC (and we took occasion confirm to Roux substance Dept’s conversation Pelletier contained reftel), Roux made clear that internal French political situation militated against French Govt agreeing talks prior settlement two officer question plus fact it unlikely military talks could take place in favorable atmosphere while this question still in abeyance. Roux reiterated that as soon this question settled, France ready begin talks and continued remain disposed consider Vietnamese request for retention residual force. Re latter consideration, Roux said they under impression training and development VNA thus far had failed come up to expectations, that VNA ability fill gap that would be created by FEC withdrawal questionable, and that MAAG Saigon shared this view (we declined discuss on basis no info). Roux stressed, however, French political pressures mounting for complete and immediate withdrawal FEC and that if two officer question not resolved soon so that talks could begin, there would be nothing talk about.

(In talking subsequently Roux’s deputy, latter reiterated impossibility obtaining French Govt agreement open military talks until question two officers resolved, and questioned utility holding such talks until air cleared this regard. We asked what effect complete FEC withdrawal would have on Fr military missions Cambodia, Laos, and French units Seno. Roux’s deputy stressed while complete FEC withdrawal from South Vietnam would not affect French military training missions Cambodia and Laos, it likely result in pressure pull French units out of Seno as part policy liquidation all French military bases IC.)

Comment: With IC affairs now lodged in Quai, Jacques Roux becomes in our opinion key voice as regards IC in French official circles. We have always found him disposed take objective view IC matters and we have gained impression he has always taken lead in French official circles to effect rapprochement between French and United States views when divergences occurred. He in effect this morning admitted that while past hadn’t been all that it might, basis for continued Franco-Vietnamese cooperation can still be found if Vietnamese willing and if Diem prepared take into account French position sensibilities and follow more adroit line in dealing with French. Roux conveyed impression he thought question two officers had been allowed assume level out of all proportion merits and that Diem might have handled denunciation commercial agreement in manner less likely offend French sensibilities and at least not timed it for morrow referendum.

We feel Roux and Quai disposed try help and cooperate with Diem govt; for that reason we feel Diem should try strengthen hand this group to extent possible. From here, it looks as though law diminishing returns has long since run its course on two officers and that gesture from Diem this regard only practical hope getting military talks under way. We continue see no way getting French agree to begin talks until question officers resolved.

It not entirely clear to us here, however, exactly what Vietnamese trying achieve in military talks. If Vietnamese feel VNA not ready take over responsibilities now assumed by FEC and really wish see French military presence retained, they must realize that the burden is upon them to convince French military keep residual force South Vietnam since, according our info, French are not prepared pay very high price for privilege retaining troops South Vietnam for prestige reasons with risk possible eventual involvement in hostilities with Vietminh. In fact, all evidence points to early and complete withdrawal FEC unless Vietnamese persuade French remain. We presume that Vietnamese Delegation would not have been willing to pursue and exhaust in course some two months at Paris possibility obtaining French agreement Vietnamese terms for retention residual force South Vietnam if they had not hoped way might be found do so. Otherwise, we presume Vietnamese Delegation on arrival Paris in Aug would have expressed desire to negotiate purely and simply terms withdrawal FEC along lines agreed prior departure and would not have engaged in what was perhaps a useful but unrealistic exercise to satisfy themselves French not prepared enter into written engagement of nature desired by them as basis retention FEC force South Vietnam. As consequence, we strongly feel that when and if military talks do begin, Vietnamese Delegation come Paris either prepared seek complete withdrawal FEC or if they wish retention FEC force, they reconcile themselves to reaching compromise solution with French on Vietnamese preconditions posed by Nhu.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.51G/10–3155. Secret. Repeated for information to Saigon and London.
2. In this telegram, October 27, the Department informed the Embassy of the gist of a conversation on that same day with French Embassy officials in which Department officers expressed concern that Franco-Vietnamese military discussions were suspended. (Ibid., 751G.00/10–2555)
3. The reference is to a Franco-Vietnamese difference over the arrest by Vietnamese authorities of two French military officers charged with bombing electric power stations in Saigon. Diem announced his intention of trying these two officers in Vietnamese courts and the French refused to proceed with the military talks until the officers were turned over to their custody. (Telegrams 1460 and 1757 from Paris, September 29 and October 14; ibid., 751G.00/9–2955 and 751G.00/10–1455, respectively)
4. According to telegram 1927 from Saigon, November 2, the Vietnamese Government on October 31 denounced the Franco-Vietnamese Monetary and Commercial Agreement which was to come into effect December 31. If not renegotiated, denunciation of this agreement would eliminate the 15 percent French customs tariff preference and the requirement that all foreign exchange, including U.S. dollar aid to Vietnam, pass through the French stabilization fund. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/11–255)