244. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council Planning Board1
Washington, August 16,
1955.
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in
Vietnam
REFERENCES
- A. NSC 5429/5, para. 5–d2
- B. NSC 55193
- C. NSC Action No. 14154
- D. Record of Planning Board Meeting, August 15, 1955, Item 15
At its meeting on August 15, 1955, the NSC Planning Board adopted the enclosed report calling for
various studies on the subject, required to carry out NSC Action No. 1415–c.
The enclosure is accordingly transmitted to the Planning Board for
information and to the State, Defense and ODM Members and the JCS and
CIA Advisers for implementation as
indicated in paras. 4 and 5 thereof.
[Page 515]
[Enclosure]
Report by the National Security Council Planning
Board6
U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF A RENEWAL OF AGGRESSION IN
VIETNAM
- 1.
- NSC Action 1415, June 9, 1955
noted that U.S. policy in the event of a renewal of hostilities
by the Communists in Vietnam would be governed by the provisions
of paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5
pending a review of that paragraph by the Planning Board.
Paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5
reads:
“In the event of Communist overt armed attack in the area
covered by the Manila Pact prior to the entering into
effect of the Pact, take actions necessary to meet the
situation, including a request for authority from
Congress to use U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and
feasible. When the Pact is in effect, be prepared to
oppose any Communist attack in the Treaty area with U.S.
armed forces if necessary and feasible, consulting the
Congress in advance if the emergency permits.”
- 2.
- There is a possibility that the Vietminh, possibly in
connection with the election issue, may embark on a course of
more forceful action against South Vietnam. While such action
might take the form of infiltration and insurrection within
South Vietnam, it could also take the form of overt aggression
across the armistice line. In the light of this possibility, and
in connection with the review of paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5, it is necessary to
consider what action the U.S. should take in the specific case
of such overt aggression. Key factors bearing on this decision
include U.S. capabilities for action in relation to the
aggressor’s capabilities, as well as the implications and
effects of such action at home and abroad, including the
deterrent effect of a U.S. decision to intervene against the
aggressor. These key factors should be the subjects of special
studies as outlined in greater detail below.
- 3.
- The studies should be based on the following assumptions,
which are for planning purposes only:
- a.
- It is the objective of the U.S. to deter possible
Vietminh aggression against Vietnam or, in the event
such aggression takes place, to intervene swiftly and
decisively, in a manner and on a scale best calculated
to avoid the hostilities broadening into general
war.
- b.
- The Vietminh attack is by overt armed forces across
the armistice line, of such a character that it can
clearly be labeled as aggression and is generally
regarded as such by free world opinion.
- c.
- South Vietnam is developing and can continue to
develop the necessary strength referred to in paragraph
2 of NSC 5519, i.e.,
strength “to deter or defeat Vietminh insurrections in
its territory, to impose and sustain order in its
territory, and to win a free election limited to its own
zone and held under its own auspices and
control.”
- d.
- Although the Manila Pact is invoked, the French
Expeditionary Corps takes no part in the fighting aside
from such action as may be necessary for its own
protection, and other signatories of the Pact provide
only minor military contributions, thus leaving the main
burden on the forces of South Vietnam and the
U.S.
- e.
- South Vietnam forces are of the same strength as at
present.
- f.
- Vietminh capabilities are as estimated in NIE 63.1–55.7
- g.
- Communist China does not intervene with military
forces, except possibly in the event of para. 4–a(2)
below, but provides aid to the Vietminh in the form of
supplies.
- 4.
- The following specific but brief studies should be prepared as
promptly as possible:
- a.
- By Defense and JCS, a
study (to be completed by September 15 or as soon
thereafter as practicable) of U.S. military operations
required—with the use of nuclear weapons and
alternatively without such use—(1) to repulse the
aggression and punish the aggressor or (2) to destroy
the Vietminh forces and take control of North Vietnam.
This study should indicate the nature and duration of
operations, the forces and logistic support required and
their availability, and the effects upon other U.S.
military commitments. Preparatory military steps which
might be taken, both as preparation for action and as a
deterrent through manifestation of U.S. capability and
resolve to intervene swiftly and effectively, should
also be indicated.
- b.
- By State, a study of the political and economic
measures which would be required in support of the
operations in a above, including preparatory steps which
might have a deterrent effect.
- c.
- By CIA, an estimate of
the deterrent effect on the Communists of a known U.S.
decision to intervene against Vietminh
aggression.
- d.
- By ODM, a study of the
mobilization requirements for support of the actions in
a above.
- 5.
- In addition, CIA should review
and consolidate estimates of the effects of U.S. failure to
intervene in the event of overt, armed attack by the Vietminh
across the armistice line.
