245. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Revision in Force Levels and Costs for Vietnamese Military Forces
The JCS will soon be considering a proposal from the country team Saigon for a force level for the Vietnamese armed forces of 150,000.2 This would represent an increase of 50,000 above the level recommended by the Collins Mission.
Several factors point to the need for increased forces for Vietnam:
- 1.
- French forces in Vietnam are being reduced faster and to a lower level than anticipated.
- 2.
- Absence of any definite Manila Pact force commitments. However, a force of 150,000 in South Vietnam would increase capabilities to delay any Viet Minh advance in the initial stages of any invasion from the North, and constitute a significant deterrent to such armed invasion.
- 3.
- Need for Free Vietnam strength in year ahead. One of the principal supports of Diem has been the national army. The previous schedule of rapid demobilization in order to bring the force level down to 100,000 proved to be impossible because of the unforeseen open warfare with the sects, the need to integrate additional sect forces into the national army, and the problem of resettling discharged military personnel and their dependents. In addition, an increased force might be able to take care of any Viet Minh armed uprising in the South, and would certainly continue the trend toward a relatively more favorable power ratio in the South.
MAAG Saigon estimates that a force level of 150,000 in 1956 will cost $80 to $100 million more than a force of 100,000 was estimated to cost. Provided the original request for 1956 funds for Vietnam was not cut, the additional requirement for funds for the Vietnamese forces could be met from existing appropriations, if the following were earmarked for Vietnam:
- 1.
- $50 million the Administration requested from Congress for the French forces in Indochina. This fund should be transferred to the support of the Vietnamese forces, which will now be performing the function originally envisaged for the FEC. At present, ICA is [Page 518] considering using these funds as part of a reserve fund for Asia as a whole.
- 2.
- $25 to $40 million carryover of unspent balances obligated for support of the Vietnamese army in calendar year 1955 (FY 1955 funds).
- 3.
- $3 to $35 million carryover of unspent balances obligated for support of the Vietnamese army in calendar year 1954 (FY 1954 funds).
In addition, if necessary, financing the Vietnamese forces could be converted from a calendar year 1956 to a fiscal year 1956 basis. The foundation for such a change was laid in the Congressional testimony, and would reduce the needs for FY 1956 funds by approximately $100 million. However, if such a change were made, it would have to be presented in a way not to give the Vietnamese the impression we were planning aid only up to June 30, 1956,—20 days prior to the Geneva date for nation-wide free elections.
If it is decided that sufficient justification exists to reduce aid to the FEC below the $100 million figure now obligated for that purpose, those funds could be reprogrammed for other purposes. Therefore, it is not necessary to await a decision on the issue of aid to the FEC in 1955 in order to express our support for a higher force level in Vietnam.
Recommendation:
That the Department support the proposal of the Saigon country team for increased forces in Free Vietnam, and that Mr. Murphy so inform JCS at the next meeting of JCS.
Approve: J[ohn] F. D[ulles]3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/8–1655. Secret. Drafted by C. Hoyt Price of PSA and cleared by PSA and FE. Murphy, Merchant, and George S. Newman of S/MSA indicated that they concurred with the recommendation in this memorandum.↩
- For the JCS comments, see Document 247.↩
- The Secretary approved this memorandum with the following handwritten comment: “Primarily on the basis of Point 3, I am sceptical about validity of 1 and 2.”↩