Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

• MAAG Saigon Personnel Ceiling

The Department of Defense again is attempting to obtain from the Department of State concurrence to the assignment of personnel to MAAG, Saigon, in excess of the 342 ceiling at the time of the Geneva Settlement.

Defense thinking appears to be as follows:

(a) The United States should not “gratuitously place restrictions on the manner in which it chooses to carry out the replacement of military personnel under the 342 ceiling.”

(b) Personnel on TDY to MAAG regardless of duration of such duty should not be considered as part of MAAG strength.

(c) Replacement overlaps should not be chargeable to the ceiling.

Although a memorandum from General O’Daniel² states that our Embassy at Saigon concurs in his recommendations, Mr. Randolph Kidder, who was Chargé at that time, states that the position of the Embassy was that it could not concur in the absence of Department policy guidance.

In view of the assurances you gave Mr. Eden in Paris last December and our belief that at this time we should not invite criticism from the ICC and our allies by our disregard for the spirit and intent of the Geneva settlement,³ I believe we should assume that military personnel assigned to MAAG and in Viet-Nam, no matter what their designation, should be within the 342 ceiling. In answering the Department of Defense inquiry,⁴ I should appreciate your guidance and comment on our proposed answer which is as follows:

a) We cannot approve the Department of Defense suggested guide lines in toto.

b) To avoid accusations of purposefully trying to sabotage the Geneva Settlement, military personnel actually present in Viet-Nam should not exceed the 342 ceiling.

c) Military personnel assigned but not actually present need not be counted against the ceiling.

d) Overlaps when essential and of short duration might be justified.

e) Some flexibility may later evolve but at this time it appears desirable to pursue a policy which can accommodate the spirit of the Geneva Settlement.

Approve: J[ohn] F. D[ulles]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5—MSP/8—1055. Secret. Drafted by Lewis M. Purnell of PSA and cleared by Bell and Sebald.
2. A copy of this memorandum to CINCPAC, May 23, is attached to a memorandum from Brigadier General J.K. White, Director, Office of Military Assistance Programs, Department of Defense, to Robert C. Hill, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs, July 13. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/7–1355)
3. This was the view of members of the Legal Adviser’s Office of the Department of State, according to a memorandum from Katherine B. Fite and John P. Furman to Purnell of PSA, July 26, also attached to the memorandum from White to Hill, July 13.

4. On August 12, Robertson replied to the memorandum by General White, July 13, as follows:

   “The Department of State cannot approve in toto the guide lines set forth in the letter from Chief, MAAG, Saigon, attached to Department of Defense Memorandum of July 13, 1955.

   “In order to avoid inevitable accusations of purposefully trying to sabotage the Geneva Settlement, it is believed United States policy with regard to MAAG personnel should be such that the number of military personnel actually present in Indochina at any given time should not exceed 342 persons, the number called for in the table of organization at the time the Geneva Accord was signed.

   “Military personnel, including mobile training teams assigned on temporary duty mentioned in your memorandum of April 25, 1955, would appear to fall within the overall numerical limitation. Military personnel not actually present in Viet-Nam, whether carried on Saigon rolls or not, need not be charged against the 342 maximum. Replacement overlaps which result in personnel excess over the ceiling should not be encouraged. However, overlaps when considered essential to the effectiveness of MAAG operations and if held to the shortest possible duration might be justified.

   “While there may develop some flexibility in the interpretation of the Geneva Accord with respect to United States military personnel, since such personnel is not specifically covered by the Agreement and the United States is not a signatory, it is believed desirable that we pursue at this time a policy which accommodates the spirit of the Geneva Settlement.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/7–1355)