Office of the Historian

178. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1

Paris, May 9, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 11. (1) Following yesterday’s tri-partite meeting2 we emphasized to Berard and Faure Collins’ estimate of situation as given in Saigon’s 5074 to Department3 including particularly his conclusion that unless wholehearted agreement and coordination between Viet Namese, Americans and French were secured, we should withdraw from Viet Nam. They commented that there seemed to be one basic divergence between U.S. and French estimate of situation. U.S. believed that events of past week had strengthened Diem; French information was that he was in weaker position than ever.

(2) This morning Achilles met with Berard at latter’s request, Dennis Allen of British Foreign Office and Riley of British Embassy present. Berard read parts of Ely’s latest telegram of which principal points were as follows:

Diem’s apparent success rests in fact on present disorderly and chaotic conditions. Army had not been able to follow up its success in Saigon by further operations to destroy Diem [Binh] Xuyen. Sect problem was unsolved with each in control in its own area and army unable to suppress them there. Present disorderly conditions provided [Page 379] fertile field for Communist efforts. At yesterday’s meeting of Revolutionary Congress Son4 had declared Ho Chi Minh only person really working for Viet Nam. Ely concluded that Diem could be saved if at all only by support of French, U.S. and U.K., sects, army and Bao Dai.

(3) Berard also read from what he described as summary of available French intelligence. High points were:

Diem’s use of force against sects had brought about conditions which facilitated Communist infiltration and Communists were now making most of it through Revolutionary Committee. Typical Communist tactics were in evidence. Information previously given concerning Communist background or connections of Son, Lang and Kon repeated. New themes being used by propaganda apparatus in South Viet Nam stressing peace, overthrow of Bao Dai and removal of FEC were typical Communist themes and similar to those which had been used for some time in North Viet Nam.

(4) Berard described French position as follows:

They were convinced Diem weaker rather than stronger as result of struggle against sects and current chaos. Anti-French sentiment was growing under Diem’s encouragement. As anti-French feeling was his only asset, it was naturally hard for French Government to support him. French questioned whether loyalty of army could be counted upon to serve under Ty or Don. It had supported Diem because he represented legal government. If Diem broke with Bao Dai, army would be faced with choice between loyalty to Bao Dai and going along with Revolutionary Committee. French thought it might still be possible to develop broadly based government and, while prospect of Diem heading it caused French doubts and difficulties, they could still envisage it. They continued to wish to utilize Bao Dai not as individual but as sole available source of legality for governmental changes and thereby as stabilizing influence.

(5) Achilles cited four possible alternatives:

a.
French withdrawal as suggested by Faure and of which President had been advised.
b.
U.S. withdrawal which Collins envisaged if new solution having wholehearted support of all concerned could not be obtained.
c.
Withdrawal of both French and U.S. efforts.
d.
Reorganized and broadly based government including Diem provided wholehearted French and Viet Namese support could be obtained. He emphasized that such arrangement would require much more wholehearted French support at all levels than in past since French, without acting in bad faith, had nevertheless permitted their doubts as to Diem’s ability to succeed to color their thinking for a long time. Berard remarked that Diem had been initially chosen by French because they thought he had best chance to succeed, that cooling of their support in recent months had been due to their growing belief he could not succeed, and that French support could [Page 380] be counted upon if new arrangement could be reached which they felt showed reasonable chance of success.

(6) British took no part other than to indicate general interest and desire to be kept informed.

(7) We are arranging further bilateral ministerial meeting Tuesday,5 perhaps with British observer present, and probably further tripartite meeting Wednesday.6

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–955. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Saigon.↩
  2. Reference is to the meeting described in Secto 8, supra.↩
  3. Document 173.↩
  4. Hom Pan Son, Vice President of the Committee.↩
  5. May 10; see Document 184.↩
  6. See Document 186.↩