Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

184. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 11, 1955—8 p.m.

Secto 36. Second tripartite meeting on Vietnam took place Hotel Matignon 10:30 p.m. May 10. US Delegation headed by Secretary, Robertson, Dillon, Merchant, and MacArthur; French by Faure, Pinay and Laforest; UK by Caccia and Allen (in Macmillan’s absence).

Faure opened conversation by expressing regret at Diem’s initiative in reorganizing govt while conversations taking place Paris.² Commented on increasing violence anti-French propaganda in Vietnamese press Saigon. Since previous meeting French had given careful study to question and would have something specific to say. Regrettable that Diem was facing us with fait accompli before we could agree on plan.

Secretary replied that he had made some notes which gave general lines of US thinking. They did not put forward suggestions of concrete character and were not to be considered as official document, aide-mémoire or otherwise (Secretary gave copy to Faure). Principal points Secretary’s paper³ (full text will follow in minutes) was that (1) Indochina as important as it is does not justify being source serious discord between France and US; (2) both France and US have offered to withdraw their interests if it would improve matters. US offer stands. If French withdrew US would continue support anti-Communist nationalist govt in Vietnam but would hope Franco-US cooperation would not make it necessary for US do so alone; (3) US would use its influence with any Vietnamese Govt to protect French lives and property if French forces should be withdrawn. US does not believe Vietnamese army yet in position to control situation and notes that Geneva Accords may preclude introduction of any fresh US military forces; (4) US hopes that common Franco-American policy can be arrived at. US could not accept arbitrary removal of Diem from power. Could not French bring themselves to support Diem with strengthened govt pending representative process to establish new govt which might or might not include Diem? US would use its offices to support such electoral procedures. US has already urged moderate policy upon Diem and will continue do so.

Faure expressed agreement with (1) and (2). Commented that it was difficult for one country to abandon its deeply-held convictions in favor those of another. Expressed conviction that if one country should leave Vietnam would in effect mean abandonment by both. Would be deeply regrettable for common interest.

Secretary reiterated that US would continue support independent anti-Communist Vietnamese Govt even if French should evacuate Vietnam but observed that chances of success would be less.

Faure stated that when he had suggested that French withdraw he realized that implementing such step would entail delays. Would have to be accomplished in manner designed avoid any indication that it was result of Franco-US clash. Would be progressive. During French review of last few days it was generally agreed that situation although very bad did not preclude finding certain common ground in Franco-US views and, if developed, this common ground might permit eventual support by both countries of common policy. Last paragraph Secretary’s paper provided such common ground. Prospect of reenforced govt until electoral procedures for formation National Assembly established appeared to French as acceptable policy. Could lead to eventual govt which might or might not include Diem. French do not consider steps Diem took May 10 to enlarge govt as those which they regard as necessary. They involve increase in personnel without increase in political representation.

Faure observed that during last few days there have been indications in press that France had chosen policy of collaboration with north as against that with south. He wished deny this emphatically. Completely false that France is playing “double game”. French now prepared to take specific steps to disprove it. French proposal is as follows: Taking last paragraph of Secretary’s paper as framework French agree: 1) Abandon demand that Diem be replaced. Faure prepared to make this concession in recognition difficulties US Congress and public opinion. Represents very hard decision for Faure personally and his govt politically. Earlier during day delegations of Deputies had called upon Faure demanding that he hold firm. Nevertheless Faure now agrees not only to relinquish demand that Diem go but to support him fully as head of govt. However France agrees to this only on condition that: (1) Govt is broadened into real govt of national union; (2) Vietnamese Govt cease its anti-French propaganda.

Faure enlarged upon foregoing, stating that if it is agreed French will make conscientious effort support Diem. He observed that this means that if there are complaints about individuals on both sides who do not conform to policy, attention will be drawn to this fact and changes of personnel will take place. French and Americans must admit to each other that certain individuals make policy difficult. French prepared guarantee they will carry out their share and if necessary remove individuals concerned on understanding US will reciprocate. Broadening of Diem govt must be political broadening. Personalities must be admitted to govt who represent political factions and not simply individuals, no matter how highly qualified.

Faure continued to observe that as far as sects were concerned, their rallying to govt must be obtained, this task should be easier if govt is truly one of national union and enjoys support of French and US Govts. No further disorders can be countenanced and force must not be used to settle disagreements. Solution must not require “extermination of sects”, rather must they adjust themselves to new enlarged Govt. Members of sects are indeed in many instances “gangsters” but others have in past been loyal. Many have decorations for their gallantry in fighting Vietminh during war. We must take steps to prevent sects from going undergound into guerrilla activity. In French opinion primary effort should be made to rally them as soon as govt enlarged. French guaranteed to assist in bringing this to pass and not, as has been falsely stated in past, to assist sects in activity against Govt.

French agreement to this plan does not mean, Faure continued, that they are any more convinced than ever that Diem will prove to be good Minister. They still think that they should give him fair chance.

Faure turned to his third point remarking that French deplored Diem’s attacks against French. Diem used method of attacking Fr as means inflating himself and acquiring popularity. Fr cannot support govt if it pursues such tactics. Even if Faure personally agreed to do so French Parliament would not permit it. US must make Diem renounce such attitude. French believe that in excusing such methods Diem exaggerates importance anti-French propaganda in Vietnam. If French should agree to support him there is no need to carry on anti-French tactics.

Faure turned to question Expeditionary Corps, observing that France will continue plan of repatriation on gradual scale in order prove that they do not wish maintain armed force Vietnam as means holding on to their own authority. Expeditionary Corps will be withdrawn down to a certain level which US and French will agree to in advance. Such withdrawal should have effect proving to Viet Govt sincerity French intentions. One possible step, as suggested by Minister Laforest, would be gradual withdrawal French forces to Cap St. Jacques where they would be less conspicuous.

Faure then turned to Bao Dai, observing that in interest of formula suggested above it is best to use Bao Dai to provide legality needed to support program. This must not be interpreted as indicating French approval of Bao Dai personally. They think he about “used up” but nevertheless recognize fact that he represents legality and provides principle of legitimacy which may prove valuable in future. French believe that Bao Dai should be told of what has been decided in these meetings. Would welcome US view this regard.

In closing Faure resumed that difficult and most important point of their plan is to achieve true broadening of govt. Observed that it is difficult to view problem from Paris. Only experts on spot are really qualified to pass judgment and French hope that Ambassador Reinhardt and General Ely will be given full authority to take decisions on spot.

Caccia stated that main UK premise was that allied policy be fixed which all can support. UK did not believe that “game was lost” but rather that it had chances of being won if played together. UK had requested expression of views on subject from Malcolm MacDonald who had just cabled them from Saigon. His main points were (1) Diem is in very strong position and in fact in control whether we like it or not; (2) Paramount need is for broadening national admin, representing maximum possible control. Therefore, UK hopes Diem will enlarge govt by encouraging all elements with exception Vietminh; (3) Full discretion and authority should be given to Fr and US representatives on spot as to how this should be done; (4) If Diem after reasonable time still balks his replacement by another should be considered with Diem possibly retained to take ministerial post in Govt, but at this stage this need not be considered.

Caccia observed that MacDonald suggestions little different from those Dulles and Faure and should provide basis for moving ahead. He agreed fully with Secretary’s statements on Expeditionary Corps. UK agreed that Vietnam army not yet capable of controlling situation. UK and MacDonald believe that withdrawal FEC would create vacuum from which only Vietminh would profit. They are convinced that FEC provides stabilizing factor. Caccia added personal observation that from his experience in Greece in 1944 and 1950 it was proved to him how essential it was to have some reserve power on the spot to avoid putsch which is always possible against weak govt.

Faure observed that MacDonald’s views carried great weight because of his wide experience in area. He hoped MacDonald would cooperate with Reinhardt and Ely in formation future recommendations.

Secretary observed that since we were speaking very frankly in his opinion plan seemed acceptable, but he was not sure we see situation alike from standpoint of spirit of occasion. He observed that while Diem lacked many qualities and was by no means a perfect head of govt he should not be regarded as calamity which we must bear but rather as emergence of nationalist anti-Communist force which was needed if country was to be saved in end from Communist control.

Diem is not person to whom one can dictate. US cannot undertake to force upon him govt or policies which he does not like. We will do best we can. He has mind and will of his own and fact that he has survived proves he has virtues not easily replaced. Any man who would blindly accept US bidding would not be worth supporting. We must reconcile ourselves to fact that Diem may be anti-French and may later become anti-American. Secretary cited example of Syngman Rhee⁴ who although at times anti-US and anti-Dulles represented independent qualities of man who not amenable to direction. These things are distasteful to US but they must be put up with. We must not believe that after electoral machinery formed we will be able to get rid of Diem. We should not look upon Diem as experiment to be got rid of. Even if we chose to, we might not be able to do so. Secretary said if Diem feels we are trying to get rid of him, like all orientals, he will naturally be suspicious and not take our advice and hoped that if we should try to put into effect Faure plan we should do so with knowledge that govt will be anti-West and not fully as efficient as we liked but it may have qualities which would help preserve country from Communism. Secretary observed that he did not know of another oriental govt where Western standards of coalition apply and not run by strong individual. It may be impossible to force coalition upon Diem and force him to take in men who oppose him. Secretary therefore hoped we would try as best we could to strengthen Govt’s influence. French must not consider that Diem is “in US pocket”. If he were he could not be reliably supported in future.

Secretary continued by turning to question of sects, stating that distinction should be made between Binh Xuyen and others. Binh Xuyen are gangsters like those known in large cities of US who exist on revenues from gambling, prostitution, etc. Control of police by Binh Xuyen is intolerable. Situation must be cleared up. US recognizes that Cao Dai and Hoa Hao are different and ought not be liquidated by force but rather through gradual processes amalgamation by diplomatic and political procedures. This did not mean we admire Hoa Hao. We deplore Ba Cut. Bao Dai if he requires allowances, which Secretary doubts, should obtain them from state rather than from a cut in vice ring. As regards Bao Dai Secretary shared French view that thread of legitimacy should be retained until new format is established but Bao Dai must accept a passive role. US does not wish to bring Bao Dai’s reign to end as long as it is compatible with independent regime in Vietnam. Secretary closed by suggesting that conversation should be terminated then to be continued at later date.

Faure expressed complete agreement and stated he would prepare memo May 11 in preparation for next meeting.⁵ Memorandum would outline French position. Faure remarked that he agreed that Diem is force and that individual force representing rise in nationalism is to be expected in country such as Vietnam. Agreed on “principle of concentrated power,” but did not agree that Diem is man to carry it out. French do not intend to play Bao Dai against Diem. If there were someone else who is really valuable both Diem and Bao Dai could be dispensed with. French understood that after initial period of supporting Diem there would be electoral consultations when it will be decided whether Diem is best solution or not. French trust it will be found that he is. French recognize that US hopes that it will be decided at time of National Assembly that Diem is the man but must state that French believe that he will not be. French are ready to concede that they are wrong if such proves to be case.

Secretary observed that US was not at all sure that Diem would succeed. He lacks essential qualities but fact remains that there is no one better to replace him. He will be lost if he is not backed wholeheartedly.

Caccia observed in closing that Secretary had confirmed MacDonald’s views.

Faure closed by stating that if US wishes to give Diem full chance French would subscribe entirely to doing so but only if France had guarantees and compensation as outlined.⁶

General discussion ensued regarding next meeting which is now scheduled for 9:30 p.m. May 11.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–1155. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information priority to Saigon.
2. According to Tosec 17 to Paris, May 10, South Vietnam’s reorganized cabinet, announced by Diem on May 10, was a compromise between representatives of political groups and technicians. The cabinet was not made up of men of stature; they were, however, all Diem loyalists. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–955)
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. President of the Republic of Korea.
5. See Document 186.

6. After this second tripartite meeting on Vietnam, two private conversations of interest took place between French and American officials. The first was between Dulles and Faure and, according to a signed memorandum of conversation by Dulles, May 11, it was as follows:

   “Following our talks at the Hotel Matignon last night, as we were leaving, Faure took me apart and said to me privately that as a result of our talks, he had been much shaken (‘ebranlé’) in his views. He also had been greatly impressed by my statement that in that part of the world, there was no such thing as a ‘coalition’ government, but one-man governments. However, he did not know how to meet us without having some political concession that he could point to, as he could not face his Cabinet and Parliament on a program of having merely ‘sold out’ 100 per cent to the Americans.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Indochina June 1954–April 1956)

   The second was reported in Secto 38, May 11, which reads:

   “As we were leaving meeting reported Secto 36, Margerie said privately we should know that in any event strength of FEC would continue to be gradually and unobtrusively reduced. He did not know what rate would be but seemed fully aware of dangers of precipitate or unduly publicized withdrawals.”

   “He commented that there was vicious circle. ‘Too many of wrong kind of French’ would stay in Saigon as long as they felt FEC was there to protect their interests and as long as they remained, presence of FEC was needed to protect them and their interests.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–1155)