Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

179. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris¹

Washington, May 9, 1955—5:58 p.m.

Tedul 9. Eyes only Secretary. Re Dulte 8² following is text of JCS paper submitting their views on Indochina.³ Paper has been concurred in by Secretary of Defense.

• “1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the military aspects of the problem presented in the attached excerpt from a telegram from Mr. Dulles to the Department of State.
• 2. The situation as depicted in the telegram from Mr. Dulles appears to present the United States with a choice between:

  a. Continuing to support the Diem Government in Vietnam—which would result in the withdrawal of French forces from that country; or

  b. Withdrawing United States support from Vietnam—allowing the French to deal with the situation as they deem fit.

• 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the question as to whether the United States should or should not continue to support the Diem Government, or any other particular Vietnamese regime, is one for resolution at the governmental level. Their comments relative to the alternatives set forth above are, therefore, limited to their military implications.
• 4. It is considered doubtful that the Vietnam National Army (VNA), in its present state of development and unassisted by other forces, can continue to maintain internal security under the conditions of near-civil war now prevailing in Vietnam. There is even less likelihood that the VNA could offer more than a token resistance to external aggression. Further, it is open to question whether the VNA would be loyal to the Diem Government under all circumstances. The presence and cooperation of an outside military force is therefore essential at this time if Vietnamese security and integrity are to be assured. The United States is debarred by the provision of the Geneva Agreement from providing such forces, and could therefore give no assurances regarding the protection of lives and property of French or any other foreign nationals. While the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps is ultimately to be desired, it is considered that a precipitate withdrawal now would be likely to result in an increasingly unstable and precarious situation. This situation would undoubtedly be exploited to Communist advantage, with the probable eventuality that South Vietnam would be lost to communism.
• 5. In the face of the strong anti-French sentiment which has developed in Vietnam, there now seems little prospect that France alone can provide either the leadership or the resources required to establish a stable Vietnamese government. Without United States moral and material support it cannot be expected that the VNA would develop into a cohesive military force or maintain even its present limited effectiveness. Without effective indigenous forces and without a Vietnam government which can command the loyalty and support of its people, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), judged by past performances, would be incapable of preserving the security and integrity of Vietnam. It can therefore be expected that, following the pattern which led to the loss in the North, South Vietnam would, in due course, fall to the Communists.
• 6. For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the alternatives suggested represent acceptable solutions to the problem of Vietnam at this time. They feel it to be in the best interest of France as well as of the United States that every reasonable effort be exerted to preserve South Vietnam from communism. It is their opinion that the present situation, involving armed resistance against the established governmental authority and the dangers inherent in the role assumed by the Revolutionary Committee, requires the utmost in cooperation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, United States, and French Governments toward the restoration of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam. It is considered that this should constitute the immediate joint objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. Dulles be advised that from the military point of view:

  a. The government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam.

  b. The United States could not guarantee the security of the French nationals should the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn.

  c. Possible United States actions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty could ultimately afford security to South Vietnam equal to that provided by the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps.

• 7. The above comments are submitted without benefit of the specific views of Ambassador Collins, which have been requested by the Secretary of State. They should, therefore, be considered as tentative and subject to possible revision in the light of his reply.”

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–955. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Walter K. Scott, the Executive Secretary of the Department of State.

2. Dulte 8, May 8, reads as follows:

   “Re Dulte 2, it would be useful to have the views of Defense and Joint Chiefs on military aspects Faure’s proposal re Vietnam, if it is possible before our next discussion on this matter Tuesday, May 10, 4 p.m.” (Ibid., 396.1/5–855)

   For that part of Dulte 2 which deals with Vietnam, see footnote 5, Document 177.

3. In its original form the JCS paper was a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, May 9. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–955) The text is printed in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 971–974.