Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

186. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 12, 1955—8 p.m.

Secto 42. From USDel. Third trilateral meeting on Vietnam took three hours Wednesday² evening with the three Ministers making similar general proposals. Some details are still ambiguous.

In late afternoon French delivered to us informal paper summarizing Faure’s points of previous meetings. French paper stated French Government can accept Secretary’s formula on following conditions: (1) An enlargement of the Diem government and an acceleration of an electoral process. (2) Peaceful solution of the problem of the sects. (3) Cessation of anti-French propaganda. (4) Continuation of the present role of Bao Dai. (5) Reciprocal removal from Vietnam of French and US functionaries who are deemed disturbing to Franco-US harmony. (6) US assurance that French economic, cultural and financial relations in Vietnam will be nurtured.

Secretary opened trilateral with following comments on the French paper: (1) We must recognize revolutionary spirit prevailing in Vietnam. We cannot deal with this if we have a government to which we can dictate. (2) Conditions in French paper are desirable, but US could not guarantee to get them unless Diem were our puppet. But if he were our puppet, the whole enterprise in Vietnam would fail. (3) We have to take gamble we can succeed with Diem who is there as the man who may develop an acceptable moderate government. Alternative may be sheer disaster for everybody. Any government that could give guarantees desired by French would not survive but would be followed by violently extremist revolutionary movement resulting in Communist control. (4) We do not see how we can get rid of Diem and there seems nobody to take his place. There is hope if we can win his trust and confidence. (5) The Secretary strongly urged France not to ask US for guarantees we cannot give without turning Diem into a puppet and total failure. Secretary emphasized Diem is independent force on whom we cannot arbitrarily impose our views. It would be very false to assume we could give dependable assurances on the French conditions. (6) Relationship with Vietnam should not arise out of exacting commitments but through mutual confidence and trust. Secretary strongly hoped US and French could work together on formula he had suggested without specific obligations from the US.

Macmillan then stated that UK’s interest was matter based on two main considerations: (1) What happened in Vietnam was of vital concern to all of Southeast Asia where UK had interests and (2) UK’s particular interest in Geneva Accords in which Prime Minister Eden had taken role in negotiating. UK agreed with us that latter govt could not guarantee what Diem could or could not do for independence of Diem govt was essential point but UK did believe that US could influence what Diem govt did or did not do. US and French appear to be in accord on what should be done but question was how. UK view was that question should be accomplished by establishing principle that US and French must work as team. This would start with Reinhardt and Ely and work down line where cooperation would serve as example to Vietnamese. If this were done common purposes could be carried out. Diem could not be ordered about but he could be influenced by example that it is possible for US and French to work together in friendly cooperation. Future program should not depend on written guarantee but on mutual sense of cooperation. Local representatives of France and US should be given full authority. As far as Vietnam Govt is concerned no one should be ruled out from taking part in it except Communists. Successful program does not depend on signed agreement but rather on good will displayed on both sides in Saigon as well as Paris and Washington. Vietnam Govt must be prepared for forthcoming talks with Vietminh. Vietminh must not be allowed to seize initiative and above all problem must not be thrown back to Geneva Co-Chairmen for solution.

After making several comments on Secretary’s outlines, many of which were repetition of what had been said in previous sessions, Faure indicated agreement in principle. He confirmed that French conditions were not meant to entail engagement by US. He said he would like to reach specific agreement. He hoped Diem would prove to be dependable force and not weakness. Bao Dai should be used only to extent needed. Edgar Faure then read following paper which includes French six-point program.

French Govt desiring to approach its point of view to that of US Govt is disposed to accept suggestion made by latter that it give its support to reenforced Vietnamese Govt headed by Diem and that, during period necessary for organization of procedure of consultation out of which might come a new govt including or not including Diem, sets forth practical aspects of this policy as follows:

(1) Support given by two governments to this new formula would be complete, loyal and sincere. In this respect French Govt proposes that two governments should transfer from Saigon those functionaries or agents who on one side or other would appear to be guilty of ill will in pursuance of new common policy. (2) Diem govt would be re-enforced. That is to say that it would be enlarged by means of operation which would go beyond that effected during these last few days limited to addition of few technicians and intellectuals not representing any political point of view. This enlargement could be studied on the spot by Ambassador Reinhardt and General Ely in collaboration with Mr. MacDonald and should take place during period of from three to four weeks. (3) Procedure of popular consultation should be put into effect under terms of which parties would decide if there is means of establishing new governmental formula and if in this new formula Diem should continue to be present, should take another Cabinet job or should disappear. (4) Given great difficulty of making this procedure acceptable to large sectors of French Parliament and public opinion American Govt should exercise all its influence on Diem to cease violent anti-French activities. (5) Expeditionary Corps would continue to be repatriated at present rate and period of pause foreseen for next summer would not be maintained except after new examination of situation. This operation would not be stopped until Expeditionary Corps was reduced to figure which will be fixed subsequently, and which will take into account views of our local representatives. Part of Expeditionary Corps could be regrouped in Cap Saint-Jacques region. (6) It should finally be agreed that as result of this new plan interested Govts have intention of aiding state of South Vietnam to prepare itself under best possible conditions for test of free elections which are placed for 1956. It should not be admitted by them that any complicated actions of Diem should in effect have object of avoiding this test.

Secretary said Faure’s suggestion helpful at this stage but repeated his statement that the situation does not lend itself to a contractual arrangement between the two governments. Essentially we are dealing with a third force or forces whom we are not able to control. Therefore in lieu of any contractual agreement the Secretary was prepared to state the general direction of US policy and he hoped the French Government would do the same so that both governments could proceed on the knowledge of what the other intends to do.

1. It is US policy to give Diem government complete and sincere support.

2. US desires Diem government be strengthened but US recognizes limitations on what it can do to bring this about. Perhaps the best way to strengthen Diem government is by including effective technicians rather than by creating a coalition of diverse and mutually conflicting elements.

3. US would be agreeable if the French Government wishes to indicate any of our personnel who have acted improperly or hostilely to French interests. It is the US policy to require US officials loyally to carry out US policies and not engage in activities conflicting with our common objectives.

4. The US believes there should be developed as rapidly as possible procedures for elections to bring about some representative process so that the Vietnamese Government can have a more secure basis and some more dependable method for change.

5. The US would exercise its influence with Diem to restrain anti-French propaganda, as the US has already done. The best way to bring about a cessation of such propaganda is to develop a genuine feeling in the Diem government that France is not trying to overthrow it.

6. The US believes that elections under the Geneva Accords should take place in 1956 if they can be conducted under conditions of freedom.

7. The French policy statement regarding the progressive reduction of FEC is acceptable on the assumption that the withdrawal of the French forces and French instructors would be harmonized with the buildup of the Vietnamese National Army.

Faure stated he was in agreement with these general lines and understood that they did not represent any kind of a control. He felt that there was a basis for agreement between France and the US. Therefore he suggested preparing instructions to our field representatives to ask them to do the best they can along these general lines. Faure said these talks had helped him understand the US viewpoint much better. He now feels the future depends primarily upon the climate of confidence between Americans and French in Vietnam. He stated there could be no doubt whatsoever on French intentions.

Macmillan summarized the common objectives as follows:

(1) The existing government of Ngo Dinh Diem should be fully supported by all parties for the present.

(2) All efforts should be directed towards its reinforcement as soon as possible.

(3) All efforts should be made toward the essential creation of a method of popular consultation prior to the next phase.

(4) All anti-West propaganda should be suppressed.

(5) An agreement should be achieved on a safety limit for the reduction of the Expeditionary Corps.

(6) Vietnam Government should be urged to make preparations for approaching the Viet Minh about the elections after July 29th, 1955.

Pinay suggested experts meet Thursday to draft a short paper on the points of agreement in order that instructions might be in harmony. Faure assured the Secretary that such a paper would not be a commitment or engagement but only a basis for the activities of our representatives. The Secretary said he preferred to have his advisers draft statement of US policy which could be shown to the French for any suggestions that they wished to make in it. They could submit the same to US. It seemed generally understood that experts would meet Thursday.³

The French suggested brief generalizing joint communiqué which omitted any mention of Diem. Secretary said absence of his name would create a great mystery, but French would not accept mentioning Diem, so communiqué postponed.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–1255. Secret. Repeated for information to Saigon.
2. May 11.
3. See Document 189.