Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

171. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 4, 1955—6 p.m.

5047. 1. During course of call on Diem at noon May 4² I told PriMin we, French and UK were disturbed by Revolutionary Committee and possibility of Viet Minh involvement in it. Diem admitted that some of committee members had once been in Viet Minh but denied that any were now affiliated. He added that committee had desired take drastic independent action to depose Bao Dai, demand evacuation of FEC and call for elected assembly. Diem, however, had told committee he must convoke provincial representatives, explaining to me that his objective was to surround committee radicals with more moderate elements. I warned Diem committee constituted real threat to his govt. He conceded committee members were “ambitious and over excited”, but went on to say that “everyone” is against Bao Dai. Committee members, who wished Diem resign his powers to them, were not pleased with his decision to call in provincial representatives. He said committee had in effect disintegrated May 3 when more moderate members withdrew pending arrival of provincial delegates, and mass meeting held late afternoon May 3 had succeeded in attracting only 500 participants.

2. Diem went on to say that “Congress”, which would consist of Revolutionary Committee augmented by provincial delegates, should be encouraged to put forth moderate motions, but that no one could prevent it from demanding that Bao Dai resign as Chief of State. I asked Diem what the effect of such motion would be. He said Bao Dai would have to decide quickly to resign his powers, as he abdicated in 1946 to Viet Minh. Diem said he, Diem, was convoking congress since otherwise it would convene “spontaneously”. He said that in center Vietnam “everyone” is against Bao Dai, even members of Imperial Guard.

3. I told Diem this course of action would pose serious problems for US, particularly if Bao Dai refused to abide by decision of congress as forecast by Diem. I asked who in Diem’s view would take place of Bao Dai, what the form of govt would be, and what could serve as element of continuing legality. Diem answered only that unless congress met and acted, there would be grave “troubles”. I said that it appeared to be Diem himself was proposing to overthrow Bao Dai through medium of this congress which is not an elected body representative of Vietnamese people. I did not believe US could support such action on part of revolutionary junta. Diem replied that if he did not go along, congress would meet and take action against Bao Dai. I said that if congress met, it would be only because he permitted it to do so, and that he would bear full responsibility. I urged that he keep congress in leash until an elected assembly could be constituted. He replied that congress would set up provisional govt to hold office until elections should determine form of Govt.

4. I said I must report this decision on Diem’s part to Washington at once, but meanwhile urged him not to permit congress to convene under conditions he had outlined. In my view such action would be interpreted as a coup d’état for which he could not escape responsibility. The purpose of the congress as I saw it was to overthrow Bao Dai and set up Diem in Bao Dai’s stead. He asked what alternative there was. I said he should continue to govern as at present, hold elections when he could, and let National Assembly decide these matters. Diem said Bao Dai was interfering with him and trying to keep him from governing. He said Vy had tried to execute a coup at Bao Dai’s direction and Chief of State had sent Hinh to investigate conditions surrounding hostilities with Binh Xuyen. I replied that these mistakes on Bao Dai’s part did not warrant Diem’s making an even graver mistake. He is still running country. Why alienate his friends by usurping proper function of an elected assembly? I warned Diem that committee or congress which overthrew Bao Dai could also overthrow him if it deemed expedient. I said that any new govt set up under these conditions would be devoid of legality and that he himself would become captive of Revolutionary Committee. I urged him to reconsider and not make serious mistake of surrendering to committee. If congress were summoned, Diem should see to it that at most it call for elections to be followed by National Assembly.

5. Despite fact I repeatedly urged Diem take no action which would make US position in Vietnam very difficult, if not impossible, I cannot feel my words had much effect on him. It appears to me that he and his advisors are determined to get rid of Bao Dai, promptly and at all costs, unless we bring the heaviest pressure to bear on him, including threat of withdrawal of recognition and suspension of aid. In a separate telegram now in preparation I am making point that there may no longer be any possibility of achieving concerted Franco-US policy in Vietnam so long as Diem remains in office.³ Without rehearsing arguments made there, I feel certain that unless we make strenuous efforts avert action on which Diem is embarked, it will be out of the question to salvage any part of our cooperation with French here.

6. Above was prepared prior to receipt of Deptel 4867.⁴ You will note that I spoke to Diem more strongly than instructions contained in 4867 would seem to authorize. However, I limited my remarks as being by own views (in this connection, I had not seen Embtel 5031⁵ before dispatch. First sentence of para 2 should have read: “I sent Embassy officer to Thai to inform him that in my judgment US does not and will not support plans Revolutionary Committee depose Bao Dai”). Since I now have official views of Dept I have arranged to see Diem again at 1800 today 4 May and will inform him that I have now received instructions as indicated in Deptel 4867. This will not only add official weight to my arguments but meeting will afford opportunity for further sensing of effect, if any, my comments had on Diem’s intentions reference “congress”.⁶

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Collins

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1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–455. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information priority to Paris.
2. See the memorandum, supra.
3. Apparent reference to the drafting of Document 173.
4. Document 168.
5. In this telegram of May 3, sent in the first person in Collins’ name, the Embassy reported its response to a request by Colonel Thai, Minister of Information, as to the U.S. attitude toward the Revolutionary Committee’s announced plan to depose Bao Dai. The second paragraph reads as follows: I sent Embassy officer to see Thai to inform him US does not and will not support plans Revolutionary Committee depose Bao Dai. Question was left open as to what US attitude would be toward actions future duly elected National Assembly which alone could truly claim to be representative of Vietnamese people. It should be for elected National Assembly to decide form of government of Vietnam.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–355)

6. In telegram 5054 from Saigon, dated May 4, Collins reported that he had called on Diem at 8 p.m. and “explained to him that I now had precise instructions from Department and further informed him that Department regards possibility of overthrow of Bao Dai by Revolutionary Committee as highly dangerous procedure. I told him that while committee might today overthrow Bao Dai and give powers to Diem, in three weeks or three months time it might decide replace Diem with someone else and cited case of Kerensky.” At a later point in the conversation, when Collins asked whether a reorganized Diem government “would include capable men who did not always agree with Diem, such as Do, Quat, Minh or Thoai, the reply was contemptuous; Diem said Do and Minh represent nobody and that they are cowards, having resigned rather than face crucial issues.”

   The final two paragraphs, which immediately follow on the material just quoted, read:

   “8. In breaking off conversation I reiterated two points. First, I urged again necessity Diem use all influence in interest of moderation and, secondly, I told Diem that new government had best include men of ability, not necessarily those I cited but men who could get something done as United States would have to assure itself that new government was obtaining results if it were to continue its financial aid.

   “9. I left with impression that my afternoon discussion with Diem had had some moderating effect. This evening he had not repeated his positive assertion that nothing could prevent the Revolutionary Committee and States General from demanding resignation of Bao Dai.” (Ibid., 751G.00/5–455)

   The National Congress which met on May 5 passed a number of resolutions, among them one requesting that a national referendum be held to decide whether the State of Vietnam should become a constitutional monarchy or a republic.