Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

170. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Vietnamese Prime Minister (Diem) and the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins), Saigon, May 4, 1955, noon¹

Saigon, May 4, 1955, noon

1. Ambassador Collins called on Prime Minister Diem at noon, May 4, at his own request. He began conversation by expressing regret for the death of General The. Diem appeared to be deeply concerned by The’s death and referred to him as a “moderate element.” Diem went on to say with respect to The’s death that The had refused to use an armored car or to take shelter against enemy fire. Ambassador Collins said that, unfortunately, [name deleted] had told Colonel Gebhart² that shot killing The came from a French river boat. Diem immediately left the room to speak to [name deleted]. When he returned, Ambassador Collins said he was pleased by [name deleted] [Diem’s?] prompt reaction. As [name deleted] came into the room, he said he had a story from The’s men that The had been shot from the back. Ambassador Collins said that he viewed this rumor as serious. It was bad for The’s memory and could only tend to stir up dangerous anti-French feeling. Diem broke in to say that [name deleted] should consult him before making such statements, even if they were true. Diem went on to say that if such stories were true, he would make the necessary statements.

2. Diem described a conversation he had had with Admiral Jozan in which he complained that two Navy launches had delivered munitions on May 1 to Binh Xuyen. Moreover, Binh Xuyen launches had taken shelter May 3 beside certain French vessels. Jozan denied the report regarding the transfer of munitions. He also said that Ely had not discussed with him the question of recovering former French launches from the Binh Xuyen.

3. Ambassador Collins told Diem that he was very much concerned by the anti-French press campaign now underway. He said it was not only dangerous to the French but rendered the US position much more difficult. Diem said that, on May 3 in a radio address, he had counseled moderation. Ambassador Collins said that, nevertheless, the Vietnamese press was still printing inflammatory articles which Diem could stop through press censorship. Diem said he would speak to Information Minister Thai. However, any reduction in the anti-French press campaign would have to be brought about slowly since Vietnamese officers had had serious trouble with the French.³

4. Diem’s remarks concerning the Revolutionary Committee and the Congress he has convoked are contained in Embtel 5047.⁴

1. Source: Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, S. Secret. Drafted by Sturm on May 5.
2. Lieutenant Colonel John F. Gebhart, Assistant Army Attaché.
3. In a memorandum of a conversation held with Diem the previous day, Lansdale wrote: “I drew sparks from the President with my remarks about the anti-French propaganda. He pointed out that Ambassador Collins had raised the same point and wondered why we Americans were putting this burden on the Vietnamese, when the French actions had been so provocative. (In other words, why didn’t we go to work on the French to stop being so provocative?)” (Memorandum for the Record by Lansdale; Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, L)
4. Infra.