172. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) and the French Commissoner-General in Vietnam (Ely), Saigon, May 4, 1955, 6 p.m.1
Saigon, May 4, 1955, 6 p.m.
- 1.
- Ambassador Collins called on General Ely at 1800, May 4. He told Ely of his morning call on Diem and of Diem’s reaction to the story implying French might be responsible for the death of General The. Ambassador Collins said that Diem had been disturbed by reports the Binh Xuyen still had launches from which they were firing on National Army troops. Diem had talked to Admiral Jozan repeating an earlier request that French reclaim these boats from Binh Xuyen. Ambassador Collins reminded Ely that he had some time previously requested Ely see what could be done about removing the launches from Binh Xuyen control. Ely replied that the launches were part of the police equipment turned over to the Vietnamese Police (i.e. Binh Xuyen) when police powers were transferred. He said he could not undertake to fight with Binh Xuyen to reclaim these vessels. The boats had long been in Binh Xuyen hands, having originally been French Police, not Navy, equipment. The boats were disarmed prior to transfer and thereafter re-equipped and rearmed by the Binh Xuyen.
- 2.
- Ambassador Collins related Diem’s remarks concerning the Revolutionary Committee and the congress Diem has convoked. He said he had urged Diem to use his influence on the congress to see [Page 361] that it acted moderately. Ely inquired what the US position would be if the congress turned Bao Dai out. Ambassador Collins replied that he did not know what the US position would be. However, he had instructions from the Department to urge moderation on Diem. Ely said he believed the Committee had been set up specifically to eliminate Diem a few days hence. Ambassador Collins said we have no such information. Ely said that several Cabinet Ministers, mentioning Huyen,2 have hit on this method for getting rid of Diem. Ambassador Collins repeated that we have no such information. He said Quat had indicated the Cao Dai were the prime movers along with the Viet Minh. Other reports indicated Diem’s brother, Nhu, was deeply involved. Diem is wary of the Committee, but we have no information indicating it is an immediate threat to him. Ely said he did not believe the Cao Dai were primarily responsible for organizing the Revolutionary Committee. He said there is a strong wave of feeling throughout the country against Diem, and that the Revolutionary Committee has chosen Bao Dai as its first target before passing on to Diem. Ambassador Collins said that he believed it was very difficult to get a balanced estimate of the popular opinion of Diem. He believed Diem had gained in prestige. The Army had remained loyal and had fought, and no civil war had ensued, despite Ely’s information and predictions. Therefore, he wondered how he should judge Ely’s information regarding Diem. Ely replied that civil war does not develop in forty-eight hours. Bay Vien is now in the maquis and will soon begin guerrilla operations. Two or three National Army battalions had fought so badly as to destroy large quarters of the city. Various army units were of dubious loyalty. Ambassador Collins commented that our contacts indicated the Army had remained loyal. Colonels (now Generals) Don and Minh have renounced their French citizenship and seem loyal to Diem. Bay Vien, instead of going underground, may wish to settle his quarrel with the goverment peacefully. Accordingly, Ely should reevaluate the intelligence on which he had based his previous estimates.
- 3.
- Ambassador Collins continued by saying that he was distressed by the build-up of anti-French feeling, which not only could serve no useful purpose, but was highly dangerous. He had cautioned US journalists against this. However, it would be helpful to the French position if Ely could close out the three Binh Xuyen posts remaining in the French zone. Ely replied that negotiations had been underway for several days, and that many Binh Xuyen elements had now left the French zone. However, he said he resented implications that he was the Chief of the Binh Xuyen and could give orders accordingly. All he had tried to do was to stop the fighting. He believed [Page 362] hostilities would not have broken out April 28 if Ambassador Collins had been in Saigon. Now that events have progressed so far, Ely believes all South Vietnam may be lost. However, he agreed that to avoid trouble, it would be advantageous to evacuate the three Binh Xuyen posts.
- 4.
- Ambassador Collins said he had received information that the Vietnamese Army had suspended operations against the Binh Xuyen for three or four days. He believed this to be a serious mistake. Moreover, the Vietnamese were moving one or more battalions back into Saigon for the duration of the Congress. Ely commented that there was no connection between the Congress and the return of the Vietnamese Army troops to Saigon. General Minh had told him that morning hostilities with Bay Vien had entered an entirely new phase, one of open country guerrilla activity, and that, he, Minh did not know whether the army could continue against the Binh Xuyen. Ely added that Minh had no confidence in certain army battalions and preferred to put the least trustworthy in the line and away from Saigon.