Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

168. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, May 3, 1955—8:41 p.m.

4867. For Collins and Kidder. Refs: Saigon 4985² and 5006³ repted Paris 1284 and 1290.

1. Tide presently may be running in favor Diem government provided “revolutionary committee” or any “Estates General” does not get out of hand. Challenge of rebel Binh Xuyen successfully met. National Army appears united in support legal government. Many political personalities and factions including Cao Dai have rallied to government. U.S. has maintained support for governmental authority. However, premature or precipitate action might reverse present trend to the disadvantage of government.

2. We would like the following conveyed to Diem:

A. If Diem relies on hastily organized ad hoc group such as revolutionary committee or “Estates General”, action to depose Bao Dai could set precedent and open way for later removal of Diem by same or similar group, including Viet Minh. Authority over army is crucial factor in present situation and Diem might wish to consider carefully how Bao Dai might still serve to consolidate Diem’s authority. To proceed with proposed action before Diem is assured of solid backing of Vietnamese people might open door to greater confusion, set government adrift in uncontrollable currents, and lead to ultimate Viet Minh triumph through subversion and infiltration.

B. Crucial task for Vietnamese nationalists is to consolidate support of army and to move ahead rapidly to translate paper plans and decrees into concrete actions backed up with adequate organization at the village level. As long as Viet Minh is hampered in the North by various real handicaps such as lack of rice and mass repudiation by hundreds of thousands of refugees, the South has possible opportunity to gain the upper hand politically if the Vietnamese nationalists can rally together effectively to strengthen Free Viet-Nam.

C. Accordingly, we counsel moderation on Diem. And we will counsel restraint and moderation likewise on Bao Dai and French. Future U.S. support for Viet-Nam will be predicated on our assessment degree of genuinely broad popular support and ability to deal responsibly and constructively with fundamental problems shown by nationalist, anti-Communist government. The U.S. is stressing this to all parties concerned.

3. For Embassy Paris: We hope French will exercise restraint in present situation. After informing French of substance above omitting any reference to Diem’s request for U.S. position as outlined reference telegram, make clear to them the immediate pressing requirement is for U.S. and France cooperate in supporting Diem’s government’s authority. If French or Bao Dai take measures against Diem or show evident disapproval of his government, it might push Diem to point where he may find it imperative to allow or take action against Bao Dai or French, in order to maintain his own personal authority. In this event, whether or not Diem or the Viet Minh come out on top, position French would be lost. Recall of Hinh⁴ immediately to France by Bao Dai would be useful demonstration willingness cooperate.

4. At Collins’ discretion if he believes useful we suggest he convey Diem that we would hope that Diem could immediately announce reorganized, broader government which would have administrative and political capabilities, unquestionable nationalist and anti-Communist orientation, determination to carry out seven-point reform program energetically, and capability to carry out program for the integration of the sects into the modern life of Viet-Nam and the convoking of provisional national assembly as soon as possible.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–355. Drafted by Young and cleared by Robertson, MacArthur, Dulles, and with Tyler and Murphy in substance. Sent also priority to Paris.
2. In this telegram, May 1, the Embassy relayed the following request from Diem: Could he expect “full and immediate U.S. support should he depose Bao Dai and form a new government with ‘full support of the people and army’…?” (Ibid., 751G.00/5–155)
3. In this telegram, May 2, Collins informed the Department of a discussion with Diem on May 2 concerning the situation in Vietnam after Diem’s initial successes against the Binh Xuyen. One of Diem’s themes was that popular opinion in Vietnam, as expressed by the “Revolutionary Committee”, wanted the removal of Bao Dai as head of state. “Diem suggested US Government recommend to Bao Dai to resign his powers in favor of Diem. I told Diem I would report his views to my government. … I said I believed the US Government could not and would not recommend to Bao Dai that he resign his powers.” Collins also reported the gist of a preliminary conversation with Ely on the situation. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–255)
4. General Hinh, Bao Dai’s emissary, had been expected to arrive in Saigon on May 1, but instead he landed in Phnom Penh.