Office of the Historian

107. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) and Senator Mike Mansfield, Department of State, Washington, April 8, 19551

Washington, April 8, 1955

SUBJECT

  • Situation in Free Viet-Nam.

Senator Mansfield read General Collins’ 4382 and 4399.2 I summarized orally Paris’ 4376.3

The Senator’s reaction to these telegrams was as follows:

1.
The US should stick to its guns in continuing to support Diem. He is the truly nationalist leader in Free Viet-Nam who has any chance of saving Free Viet-Nam. That chance is small much less than the 50/50 figure that General Collins was giving when he was here in Washington. But the importance of Southeast Asia is so high and our stake is so great that we must take even that chance.
2.
Ngo Dinh Diem and Ho Chi Minh are the only two national leaders in Viet-Nam. To eliminate Diem will leave the field to Ho. Diem has a lot of support in Central Viet-Nam and even in the southern part. We cannot ignore over a half million refugees who probably know of and support Diem.
3.
Dropping Diem now would probably lead to chaos and disintegration. The Binh Xuyen would clearly be on top if we drop Diem. The French are not to be trusted in any event. The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao are self-interested. Bay Vien and his gang are totally unreliable. The issue with them has to be met head on sooner or later. Diem has demonstrated that he understands this problem and will meet it. The French have stopped him. Even the second truce is probably undesirable. The government should be free to take care of the Binh Xuyen challenge or go down—this government or any government would face the same problem.
4.
If we drop Diem now, it will have a very bad wide-spread effect on United States prestige in Asia. It will also hurt Viet-Nam and the cause of free nationalism at the Bandung Conference.4
5.
If we stick to Diem, even though it may mean difficulty with the French, the President or the Secretary should make a public statement just as soon as possible clarifying our position.

The Senator said he could be wrong in his analysis but he still saw no new evidence to change his view. He had read these telegrams and the ones a week ago from Collins. Nevertheless, he still felt we had no alternative. But he expressed himself strongly that if we continue our present policy in Free Viet-Nam we should support it vigorously and publicly to get the maximum benefit from it and to prevent any confusion as to where we stand. This will be important in Asia. We have nothing to be ashamed of in supporting Diem in the past or in the future. But it should be clear to all why and to what extent we are supporting Diem.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–855. Top Secret. Drafted by Young. Copies were sent to Dulles, Murphy, MacArthur, Merchant, Robertson, and Tyler.↩
  2. Document 105 and supra.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 103.↩
  4. The Conference of Asian and African States at Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955.↩