Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

108. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 9, 1955—10 p.m.

4448. For Secretary from Collins. Department telegrams 4411² and 4412.³ This message in two parts. Part I follows.

Part I. Successive steps recommended as follows:

1. Transfer National Police and Sûreté from Binh Xuyen. Two possible methods of doing this depending on whether objective is to save face for Diem or Binh Xuyen, point about latter being to secure their peaceful cooperation with new government.

a. To make it easier for Diem to resign and prevent Binh Xuyen from claiming victory in present crisis, we would insist, as prior condition, on transfer of police to government, by ordinance issued by Diem, but openly supported by Bao Dai and possibly French and U.S. Public support by Bao Dai probably essential to avoid further bloodshed. In this case Binh Xuyen might be forced to bow but might try to sabotage new government in variety of ways. (I should note that French will oppose this step. Although he once favored it, Ely has now said he could not agree to it. French fear bloodshed if Binh Xuyen lose control of police under Diem and believe new Prime Minister should have political advantage of regaining control of police for government.)

b. In order induce cooperation of Binh Xuyen with new government, it might be advisable to offer Bay Vien a chance to save face by his “voluntarily” proposing that control of police be transferred to new government. I have just had conversation with Foreign Minister Do. Without indicating our possible thinking, I asked Do if he thought Bay Vien might relinquish police controls to any new government. Do said he felt that with proper approach, this might well be possible. He insists it would not be possible for Diem to achieve this. Do fully agrees that any new government would have to take over police controls, but feels strongly that everything possible should be done to secure cooperation of Binh Xuyen with new government. I believe that if Bay Vien were convinced ahead of time that U.S., France, Bao Dai and any new Premier would insist on government taking over police, he might well agree to make this offer himself. I believe this method preferable to 1a. above unless Washington feels Diem’s prestige and perhaps our own must be protected by following method 1a.

2. Persuade Diem to resign, or if he refuses, have Bao Dai relieve him.

a. Better solution would be resignation by Diem. If method 1a. above is followed, Diem could bow out somewhat gracefully “in order to heal the wounds” caused by recent events. We could possibly draft a statement for him.

b. Distasteful as it would be to use Bao Dai if Diem will not resign, I see no other legal method of replacing him.

c. For timing as to notification of Diem, see paragraph 3f. below.

3. Choose successor to Diem as President of Council.

a. I believe it is most important to place on French the onus and responsibility of designating Diem’s successor. French are all too ready to place onus Diem’s lack of success on U.S. It would be preferable therefore for the head of new government to be proposed by French and concurred in by the U.S. Ely indicated that he would favor Quat, Do or perhaps even ex-Defense Minister Minh. He stipulated as primary requisite that any new government must avoid taint of colonialism. Hence I believe that if Ely’s advice were followed French Government would not propose Buu Hoi, Tam or Huu. Our opposition these men has been made clear to French.

b. See my telegram 4263⁴ for discussion of possible successors. Of course, we would have to come to agreement with the French on a successor and I would now recommend either Do or Quat.

c. After France and U.S. have agreed on a man, Bao Dai’s consent must then be obtained. This would have to be done through Paris.

d. Bao Dai would then summon the nominee to Paris for consultation. If possible, this should be done secretly. If Quat were the choice, it might be done without a leak since he has made a couple of trips to Paris within the past year.

e. Assuming nominee would accept task of forming government, he would have to return at once to Saigon for consultations. These consultations should commence with discussions with Ely and me, who would inform him as to nature of programs which U.S. and France would support. Armed with this knowledge, he could then proceed with conversations with prospective ministers, representatives of various political parties, and leaders of the sects.

f. I feel that as soon as nominee has accepted, Diem should be invited by Bao Dai to resign or else be relieved. Under no circumstances should Diem be told of plan before French and U.S. have approached Bao Dai and gained his assent; to inform him could give him damaging material for his “White Paper”. Effort should be made by Bao Dai to have Diem remain in office until his successor is prepared to take over. If he should refuse to do this, which is wholly possible, Bao Dai would then have to designate, preferably from present Cabinet, someone to act as interim President of the Council. Unquestionably, as soon as Diem receives such notification, he will call on me to find out what information I have and perhaps to ask for advice. I would propose replying that I had been notified by my government of decision of Bao Dai, and would seek to persuade Diem to remain in office until his successor could take over. We should be willing to assist him in preparing a statement which he might issue as indicated in paragraph 2a. above.

4. Reach agreement between U.S., France, and new President on program for solution of sect political and military problems. It is believed that an agreement would have to be reached between Ely, the new President, and myself, on a program for solution of the political and military problems of the sects. This would require a prior agreement between French and U.S. Governments along the lines of our proposals contained in Embassy telegram 4373.⁵ These proposals are being actively studied now by General Ely’s staff. We expect to come to agreement here within 48 hours. Approval will still be required from Washington, particularly as to added costs which are involved in the induction of more sect personnel than originally contemplated, severance pay for sect personnel to be demobilized, and larger average strength of armed forces for FY 1955, caused by slow-down in discharge of Vietnamese army personnel as a result of present sect crisis.

5. Obtain agreement of sects to proposed solution of their problems.

a. Next step would probably be for new President to meet with leaders of sects and obtain their agreement to solution arrived at under paragraph 4 above. He would have to make clear to sects that this was best program they could possibly obtain and that it was only way to continue American and French financial and moral support, without which the country could not possibly be saved from Viet Minh and Communism which sects profess to detest.

b. It is our thought that sects would not be invited to participate in Cabinet, except for possibly one or two men, who might be chosen because of their ability rather than as representatives of sects. In lieu of Cabinet participation, sects would be offered positions of honor in the High Council, which would be advisory to the President. See paragraph 7b. below.

c. Some quid pro quo will probably have to be offered sect leaders, particularly Bay Vien, if latter is to agree “willingly” to surrender police powers. I understand that in the past Bay Vien has indicated that he would like to be Minister of Interior or have one of his henchmen in this position. Such an appointment would be fatal and it must be made clear to new President that under no circumstances would we agree to this. It is possible that Binh Xuyen would settle for some economic assistance from the government in their commercial ventures. Bay Vien and perhaps General Soai might consent to leave the country on some official mission if they were permitted to take out bulk of fortunes they have acquired.

6. Form new Cabinet. During this period, the new President will have been consulting with possible new Cabinet members. As quickly as possible, he should form his new government and announce it.

7. Reorganize government structure.

a. Our tentative thinking on this point has been covered in some detail in recent telegrams.

b. We feel it would be advisable under current conditions for President, after consultation with his Cabinet and separately with Ely and me, to appoint a “High Council”, consisting of representatives of various intellectual groups, labor, sects and other religious groups, refugees, and distinguished personalities such as former President Long. My personal judgment is that this Council should not include people like General Hinh, Bui Hoi, Tam or Huu, though French might insist upon inclusion of some such people.

c. Diem has indicated that he would favor appointment of an economic advisory council, including some foreign experts. Certainly technically competent people will be needed in economic field, though they could be supplied to government through French and American economic aid programs. However, it might be well to have them carried officially in an advisory council.

d. Based on our experience here, I feel that there should be a Vice President who can be used by the President as a general executive and trouble shooter to handle specific problems as they arise. It might be advisable to have a second Vice President in charge of two Ministers of Defense and Interior, since for the coming year these ministries will have to work very closely together in pacification of country and ferreting out of Viet Minh agents and influence.

8. Announce complete program of new government. This announcement should include:

a. The plan of reorganization of government.

b. The broad program of social, economic and military reforms embodied in the Ely/Collins seven-point program. See Embassy telegram 2004.⁶

c. The detailed plan for the political and military integration of the sects in the national life. See Embassy telegram 4373.

9. Elect and convoke provisional National Assembly.

a. The necessary ordinances to establish the provisional National Assembly have already been published and May 15 has been announced as date for election of those members who are to be elected by village and other councils.

b. The Assembly should meet as promptly thereafter as possible. Its two most important tasks should be review of national budget and designation of a special committee to draft plans for a Constituent Assembly.

Part II. Paragraphs are numbered as in Department telegram 4412.

1. I believe French would do all possible remain aloof from any military action Diem might undertake against Binh Xuyen but would offer good offices to end or minimize any conflict. French would certainly do all possible in Saigon to protect own nationals and foreigners and property of both from harm, including public utilities.

2. Owing his special sense of mission, Diem will probably put up whatever resistance he can to being removed, but I doubt he will find substantial support in any quarter. In end he will probably retire in outrage from scene and voice his protests against Bao Dai, France and U.S. in some kind of “White Paper”.

a. Certain Vietnamese nationalists would seize on Diem’s removal to fan anti-French sentiment, but I do not believe Diem’s removal would result in popular violence against French except possibly sporadic individual incidents.

b. I believe Diem would ultimately accept removal as stated paragraph 2 above. I think he is true patriot and would not try sabotage constructive program of new government. I do not agree that he still has “considerable power” except support of France and U.S. I have tried to convey to Department how slender basis of Diem’s present support now is. If French and U.S. support is withdrawn, Diem will be hard pressed to muster any allies, and few if any of these are likely to resort to violence in his support.

3. National Army loyalty, which Diem does not fully command, is not completely transferable to any individual. I believe, however, army loyalty could be secured by new government more broadly based, not driven by political jealousies and crises like Diem regime, and fully backed by France and U.S. However, there may be individual battalion commanders in Center Viet Nam who might lead groups of men to defect. Such incidents would have very limited effect on bulk of army. It should be said here that under no circumstances should General Hinh be allowed return to Viet Nam now. He retains considerable influence in army and could become once again major disruptive influence.

4. Compilation of assets of strength Diem may have is difficult to make. With respect to political following in Center Viet Nam, this has been falling off partly as result of political activities of Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Can, and opposition has taken form for example of recent incidents at Ba Lang. There is no proper grass roots support of any leader in Viet Nam, leaving aside Ho Chi Minh. Diem’s virtues as anti-French leader have been tarnished by his dependence on his brothers which has led to quite general feeling that a Ngo family dictatorship is in effect being established. Few nationalists outside his family and immediate entourage would lift a finger in Diem’s defense. How great his following is in Catholic community is hard to say. Diem himself claims his support in center, for example, comes largely from non-Catholics. In any event Catholic community is not politically organized and represents less than 10 percent of population. Certainly many refugees from north were attracted by fact Catholic heads government of south, but political and physical strength of refugees is only a potential for exploitation at a later date. In National Army, scarcely any leaders are entirely pro-Diem, even Chief of Staff Ty; some are hostile, and the majority are probably no more than luke-warm. I believe there is no reason to anticipate serious adverse reaction in army at large if Diem is removed through orderly processes.

5. Viet Minh reaction to Diem’s removal would undoubtedly be to effect that free world had suffered damaging setback. Apart from stepped-up propaganda campaign and public gloating over defeat of an enemy, I do not believe Viet Minh reaction would be dangerous. In other words, I do not anticipate Viet Minh would attempt take military advantage of Diem’s removal. However, Viet Minh, playing many angles as usual, might attempt build up anti-French and anti-U.S. sentiment, charging overthrow of nationalist government to French and U.S. “Imperialists”.

6. It would be preferable to make change after Bandung in order avoid giving Viet Minh propaganda advantage for exploitation at conference. However, since Diem is still threatening to take independent action to remove Sang after Easter weekend, over strong French objections, it may be desirable effect change as soon as U.S. and French have reached agreement on case to be presented to Bao Dai. While I recognize difficulties this crisis creates for U.S. in view of our well-known association with Diem, I fear continued delay will lead to even graver problems of deteriorating French-U.S. cooperation in Viet Nam, intensification of civil disorders culminating, possibly, in civil war, and not improbable ultimate loss of all Viet Nam to Viet Minh. This eventuality would be damaging not only to U.S. prestige but, more importantly I am convinced, to U.S. security. Mechanics of possible change of government are discussed in Part I above.

7. Our agreement to replacement of Diem admittedly will be difficult to explain to American and world press. I would suggest something along following lines:

a. Diem had made a great contribution to his country at a time when his particular qualities were most valuable. He maintained calm after Geneva, contributed to exodus of refugees from north with its great psychological impact, successfully mustered world opinion in support of aid to these refugees and with support of France and U.S. developed sound and progressive social, economic and military reforms for his country.

b. Perhaps it was inevitable that implementation of these programs would develop divisive influences among the people of Viet Nam, who have only recently gained their independence. They have had little experience in meeting the complex problems which they face, such as reconciling different interests of sects and various regions of the country. This has resulted in clashes of personality, which had much to do with the current crisis, involving the “Unified Front” organization. Resultant bloodshed, even though not extensive, has created deep wounds which will be difficult for present government to heal.

c. Diem was unable or unwilling to take into his government members of various opposition parties. Only with broad support can the progressive programs developed by Diem be made effective. The new government is headed by a man who has had experience in government and whose personality is such that he should be able to get other strong men to work with him. He has adopted the same basic programs which Diem initiated and which have the full support of both U.S. and France. Decision as to who should head government of Viet Nam is, of course, one to be made by the Vietnamese people under their own system. While change in presidency involves temporary loss to Viet Nam of a great nationalist leader, it does not in any sense mean a change in the policies of his government which have drawn U.S. support. With this support and the cooperation of all elements of Viet Nam, the country can be saved from Communism.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–955. Top Secret; Niact. Also printed in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 894–906.
2. In this telegram, April 8, the Department requested Collins’ recommendations for establishing a new government in South Vietnam and solving the long- and short-term problems of the sects. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–755)
3. In addition to general recommendations, the Department requested in this telegram, also dated April 8, Collins’ views on the following: a) local French reaction to military action by Diem against the Binh Xuyen; b) Diem’s and local Vietnamese response to his removal by Bao Dai; c) potential transferability of the loyalty of the National Army to a successor; d) an assessment of Diem’s political assets among the Catholic community, the refugees, and grass-roots nationalists, as well as in Diem’s home area, Central Vietnam; e) the Viet Minh reaction to Diem’s removal; and f) the mechanics of removal and the public explanation for such an abrupt change in U.S. policy. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–455)
4. Document 84.
5. See footnote 2, Document 105.
6. Dated November 29, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2315.